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This thesis consists of three chapters dealing with important topics for the well-being of individuals:
retirement, health and happiness. All together are micro studies that deal with policy relevant research
questions. The first chapter is about whether a pension reform has effects on income smoothing and labor
supply, the second one is about the effects of health insurance coverage in the developing word, and the
third one is about happiness and economic theory.
The combination of an increasing life expectancy, a declining fertility and a lower economic growth
implies a big burden on the sustainability of public pension systems in different countries around the
world. As a response, a growing number of countries raised, or are planning to raise, their official re-
tirement age as part of a pension reform. We evaluate such a reform in the first chapter of the thesis.
In particular, the idea of this chapter is to investigate whether this type of reform affects labor supply
behavior of older single individuals in the presence of uncertainty about income, health and life ex-
pectancy. Our model closely follows the models of retirement behavior proposed by Rust 1989 and Rust
and Phelan 1997 and we conduct our empirical analysis using data for the Netherlands. The models does
a good job on predicting the main patterns observed in the data. It predicts that as individuals get older
their labor supply declines considerably and this varies by age and gender. Next, we use the model to
simulate the pension reform implemented in the Netherlands in 2012, which aims at gradually increasing
the retirement age from 65 to 67. Together with this reform, we also explore a hypothetical one that
immediately increases the retirement age to 67. We compare both reforms. The simulation results show
a small impact on the effective retirement age for the first reform and a bigger impact for the second
one, as expected. Respectively, individuals postpone their retirement by less than one month and seven
months on average; while differences across individuals mainly depend on their gender and health status.
The contribution of this chapter is that it increases the understanding of Social Security reforms.
Several empirical studies suggest that policies that change rules of Social Security and, in particular,
the retirement age, have effects on income smoothing and labor supply. But the size of these effects
might vary. Some literature for the U.S. finds that this type of reform indeed encourages individuals to
work longer but the response is small. Studies for other countries typically find more significant effects.
There is also evidence of no impact on labor supply when the studies consider borrowing constraints.
Thus, it is not surprising to observe different sizes of the effects depending on the type of reform and the
country under analysis. In our case, we find that a reform that gradually increases the age of retirement
has a rather small impact on behavior but a reform that immediately increases the legal age has a more
significant impact. This make sense if we consider that the implementation of the reform under analysis
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is gradual and it only targets one part of pension system in the Netherlands (first pillar). There are also
non-economic incentives such as social norms and framing of behavioral responses that policy makers
should take into account.
A second relevant topic in this thesis is the role of health insurance and its effects on individuals’
behavior. The fact that individuals value insurance because it helps them to smooth consumption has long
been recognized by the literature. Individuals would like to have the same consumption over time and
over possible outcomes. This means that given the choice between: i) two years of average consumption,
and ii) one year of extremely high consumption and one year of extremely low consumption, people
would be much happier with the former. In this line, health insurance has been proved to help individuals
to smooth consumption in the presence of adverse health shocks. The intuition is that insurance allows
to translate consumption from periods when it is high to periods when it is low due to the presence of a
severe illness. The latter is a concern because it has negative consequences not only on medical expenses
but also on labor supply and productivity.
The presence of a health shock and its consequences is particularly worrying in developing countries,
where many individuals do not have access to health insurance. The main reason for that is that insurance
reaches mainly formal workers. Informal ones do not have any type of insurance and they have to face the
presence of a health shock by themselves. This is relevant not only because informality comprises a large
fraction of the workforce but also because many of the informal workers are poor. As a response to this
challenge, Governments on these countries have been implementing health insurance programs targeted
to the poor. But to date, there are not many rigorous evaluations and, therefore, no much knowledge
about how to design them best (Acharya et al. 2013). This is exactly the motivation for our second
chapter.
In this chapter, we use data from Peru to evaluate the impact of access to a very popular Health Insur-
ance program called “Seguro Integral de Salud (SIS)” for individuals outside the formal labor market on
a variety of measures for health care utilization, expenditure and health indicators. We do this by means
of a regression discontinuity design. As expected, and in contrast to studies for a number of other coun-
tries, we find strong effects of insurance on health care utilization, such as visiting a doctor, receiving
medication, medical analysis and surgery. We also find some effects on preventive care (vaccination and
pregnancy care), but they are much less pronounced. We find positive effects on health care expenditures,
most likely at the high end of the distribution, and no clear effects on self-reported health measures.
Our interpretation of these results is that the SIS program was able to encourage poor individuals to
seek medical attention. They receive treatments when they need them, but they are less inclined to invest
in preventive care. This is not surprising, as the program does not provide any incentives to actually do
so. Taken together our findings on utilization and expenditures, the intuition is that once individuals get
in touch with the health care system, they use the services and they are even willing to pay themselves
for the ones they feel are important. This is a good new for a developing country where many people
might not seek any care, self-medicate or might give up treatments when the appropriate care is too
expensive. Compared to health care systems in other developing countries, the Peruvian one is a notable
exception. It reaches its goal to provide access to medical care to many poor people. There is no evidence
on the effects on health though; but it is imaginable that increased access will ultimately lead to better
health outcomes. We discuss in the chapter why it remains a challenge for the future to measure those,
together with how relevant is the program’s design and the role of incentives on health care providers
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and individuals.
In the third chapter we approach the well-being of individuals from a different perspective: happiness.
The literature on happiness economics or individuals’ subjective well-being is still in its infancy but it
brings valuable information about individual’s preferences. For the first time, we can say there is a proxy
of what we call utility in our microeconomic courses. If we are able to link this proxy to outcomes from
our theoretical models we think new roads will open. The challenge is, of course, how to formalize this
link. That is exactly what we do in this chapter by exploring whether subjective well-being and utility
measures are correlated. By doing so, we aim to close, at least partly, the gap between two disconnected
literatures: the literature on the individuals’ well-being on the one hand and, on the other hand, the
literature on the intra-household allocation of time and resources. The former literature is characterized
by a rather loose connection with theory, whereas the latter has a close connection with theory and uses
structural models. We use a model of the latter type (Chiappori et al. 2002). As a first step, based on
a model of intra-household allocation of time and resources, we estimate the parameters underlying the
mechanisms that govern intra-household allocation of resources and individual preferences in a dataset
from the Netherlands. In a second step, we recover utilities from the estimated parameters and relate
them to different measures of subjective well-being available in our data. While utility appears to be
poorly related to overall measures of subjective well-being, it appears to be more closely linked with
domain-specific subjective well-being measures.
Ideally, one would expect a positive correlation between utilities and general measures of well-being.
However, the correlation will never be perfect. This is what we find in our analysis. Our utility measures
use just two inputs: consumption and leisure. Both can be argued to be very important, but they are
not the only inputs. Of course, there are other factors influencing individual’s responses to well-being
questions or life events that are taking place in the lives of people. For this reason, it is more difficult
to find large correlations between well-being and utility measures. A clearer picture arises though if we
consider satisfaction with several domains of life, which can be seen as the building blocks of satisfaction
with life as a whole (Ferrer-i Carbonell and Van Praag 2002, Van Praag et al. 2003).
The main lesson from this last chapter is that, certainly, it is possible to link economic theory to
happiness data. Of course, we do not aim to cover all the aspects related to this topic. We only focus on
closing the gap and, by doing so, on having some piece of work that increases the understanding on this
issue. The possibilities to further investigate this are broad and challenging. The results might be happy.
Chapter 2
The impact of an increase in the legal
retirement age on the effective retirement
age
This chapter is a coauthored work with Frederic Vermeulen.1
2.1 Introduction
Population ageing is one of the most important challenges that are posed to the OECD countries. The
combination of an increasing life expectancy, a declining fertility and a lower economic growth implies
a big burden on the long term sustainability of public pension programmes in many countries. As a
response to this challenge, a growing number of countries raised, or are on the verge of raising, their
official retirement age as part of a pension reform. Such a change was quite early adopted by the United
States’ government. One of the provisions in the Social Security Amendments of 1983, for example,
gradually increased the age for collecting full social security benefits from 65 to 67 over a long period
that began in 2000. Similar policies are being adopted in many member states of the European Union,
with Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom as important examples (see European Commission
2012 for a detailed overview).
Still, it is well-known that in many OECD countries, there is a substantial gap between the official
retirement age and the effective retirement age. Although there are notable exceptions (like Japan, Korea
and Mexico), the average effective retirement age is lower than the official retirement age in most of the
OECD countries. In countries like Austria, Belgium and Luxemburg, the average gap is not less than five
years (OECD 2009).
The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of an increase in the official retirement age on the
effective retirement age in the Netherlands. Like in many other OECD countries, there is an agreement
1Bernal: University of Piura, Netspar and CentER, Tilburg University. Street Martir Jose Olaya 162, Miraflores, Lima. E-
mail: noelia.bernal@udep.pe. She gratefully acknowledges financial support from Netspar and the Sociale Verzekeringsbank.
Vermeulen: Department of Economics, University of Leuven. Naamsestraat 69, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium. E-mail: fred-
eric.vermeulen@kuleuven.be. He gratefully acknowledges financial support from The Netherlands Organization for Scientific
Research (NWO) through a VIDI grant and the Research Fund KU Leuven through the grant STRT/12/001.
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between the Dutch government and the social partners to gradually increase the official retirement age
from 65 to 67 by 2023. Obtaining insights into the efficacy of this reform is therefore of substantial
policy relevance.
A first feature of our analysis is that we make use of a dynamic programming (DP) model of retire-
ment. DP models are based on recursive methods for solving sequential decision problems; in our case
the decision when to retire. Such models have enabled economists to formulate and solve a variety of
problems involving decisions over time and under uncertainty. As a result, they have now become an
important and versatile tool in a host of areas, including labor economics, industrial organization, eco-
nomic demography and marketing (see, e.g., Rust 1994, 2006 and Adda and Cooper 2003, for numerous
references). Given the fact that the increase of the official retirement age will only be in full force by
2023, a DP model seems the most natural starting point for our analysis. One of the most important
advantages of structural modeling is its potential to predict the impact of future or hypothetical policy
changes.
A second feature of our study is that we will exclusively focus on older singles’ retirement behavior.
This choice has the big advantage that it allows one to circumvent well-known issues associated with the
modeling of retirement decisions of individuals in couples. Most of these issues can be brought back to
the question which model should be used to model such individuals’ retirement decisions. Some authors
(for example, Rust and Phelan 1997, French 2005, French and Jones 2011 and Eckstein and Lifshitz
2011) focus on the labor supply decisions of one of the spouses in a couple while they take the behavior
of the other spouse as exogenously determined. They consider a unitary model, which assumes that a
couple behaves as a single decision maker. One issue here is that there is quite some empirical evidence
that this assumption is too strong (see Browning and Chiappori 1998, Cherchye and Vermeulen 2008 and
Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen 2009, for some recent examples). Other authors explicitly account
of the fact that there are multiple decision makers in couples. Gustman and Steinmeier 2000, 2004 for
example, assume a noncooperative approach, where each spouse maximizes own utility while taking into
account the actions of the other spouse. van der Klaauw and Wolpin 2008, on the other hand, assume
that couples’ preferences are captured by some weighted combination of both spouses’ preferences. A
collective model à la Chiappori 1988 is considered by Michaud and Vermeulen 2011, though they focus
on a static retirement model. Given the above, it can be argued that our focus on the behavior of pure
singles, where, given individual rationality, the unitary model applies to by definition, offers us a very
clean setting to conduct our empirical analysis.
A third feature of our analysis is that the structural model that we build in this paper is applied to new
administrative data from Statistics Netherlands (CBS). The main advantage of our data is that it includes
very accurate and detailed information on individual incomes and pension entitlements. This level of
accuracy will be most useful when we formulate the intertemporal individual budget constraints, with
which rational preference maximizing individuals are confronted under uncertainty. As far as we know,
an analysis that is based on Dutch administrative data on incomes and pension entitlements has not been
conducted yet. A previous study for the Netherlands was conducted by Heyma 2004. He also uses a DP
model to provide insight into the dynamics between institutions, earnings, health and retirement behavior.
His basic hypothesis is that the retirement decision is a choice between different alternatives such as
employment, early retirement, disability and unemployment. So his paper is focused on analyzing the
substitute pathways for labor market exit by including more choices in his model. Availability of these
CHAPTER 2. THE IMPACT OF AN INCREASE IN THE RETIREMENT AGE 15
alternatives is restricted by institutional constraints. He finds that institutional structures are determinants
of retirement, particularly eligibility conditions and substitution between these exit routes. However, in
our paper, the issue of pathways into retirement is not a concern (see Section 2.2 for details) and we use
administrative information on pension entitlements whereas he uses survey data for only two moments
in time (1993 and 1995).
The main aim of our empirical analysis is to investigate in what way the pension system, and more
specifically the official retirement age, affects labor supply behavior of older single individuals in the
presence of uncertainty about income, health status and life expectancy. Our model closely follows the
models of retirement behavior proposed by Rust 1989, Rust and Phelan 1997, and Karlstrom et al. 2004.
Like these authors, we focus on the binary choice between working and not working and assume that
consumption equals net income in each period. Although this setting is restrictive, our data set does not
allow us to go any further in this respect. It should also be noted though that the Netherlands have a
well-developed occupational pension scheme (which we take into account in our analysis) that makes
other savings relatively less important. One substantial difference between our application and those in
Rust 1989, Rust and Phelan 1997, and Karlstrom et al. 2004 is that we solely focus on singles while they
apply a unitary model to individuals who can also be married.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a brief description of the pension
system in the Netherlands and describes the administrative data that we use. Section 2.3 presents our DP
model and gives details on the empirical specification. The estimation results are presented in Section
2.4. In Section 2.5, we provide simulation results with respect to the planned gradual increase in the
official retirement age and a hypothetical reform that immediately increases the official retirement age.
More specifically, we will analyze the impact of these policy changes on the effective retirement age.
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Background and data
2.2.1 The pension system in the Netherlands
The Dutch pension system combines three pillars. As Ewisk 2005 describes, the first pillar consists of
pensions that are pay-as-you-go financially based (with the Dutch abbreviation AOW). This state benefit
is an old-age pension provided to all residents in the Netherlands at the age of 65 and it is linked to the
minimum wage. No distinction is made between men, women, employees, self-employed or immigrants.
There is no means-test to check eligibility, which implies that other forms of income have no effect on
the level of the AOW benefit. It depends on household composition though. Single individuals receive a
different benefit than cohabiting or married individuals.2 All residents between the ages of 15 and 65 are
building up claims for the AOW. The entitlement accrual equals 2 percent for every insured year, which
leads to a 100 percent entitlement for individuals who live in the Netherlands for 50 years without gaps.
A gap occurs when a person resides outside the Netherlands. The AOW benefit was equal to a yearly
amount of 11,211 euros in 2005.
The second pillar comprises the old-age occupational pensions (OP), which are privately organized
by employers and employees. These occupational pensions are mandatory, funded and defined benefit
for the large majority of workers. There are two ways to define the level of expected benefits. In the
2For instance, in 2005, single individuals received 11,211 euros and cohabiting or married individuals 7,980 euros.
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final pay scheme, the pension is based on an annual replacement rate of 1.75 percent of the final salary,
whereas, in the average pay scheme, the pension is calculated based on a replacement rate of 2 percent
of the average career salary. These accrual rates imply that, by each year individuals decide to continue
working, they earn those percentages of their respective salary. It is expected that if the working period
is between 35 to 40 years, the total pension benefit will be around 70 percent of the salary, including
first pillar benefits (see Ewisk 2005 for more details). Therefore, the occupational pension scheme is
considered supplementary to the AOW pension.
The third pillar comprises voluntary pensions. They are intended to complement or improve the
occupational and AOW benefits and they must be organized by an insurance provider. This third pillar
consists of defined contribution pensions and part of these receive a favorable tax treatment.
In this paper, we focus on the first and second pillars. Therefore, we will define an individual’s
retirement income as the sum of the state and occupational pensions.
2.2.2 Data
The data set used in our study is drawn from a combination of three administrative data sets from Statis-
tics Netherlands (CBS). The first data set is called “Pension Entitlements” and it is available for the years
2005, 2006 and 2007. This data set contains new and valuable information on entitlements and attain-
able pensions from the second pillar. It is provided from pension funds, which ensures a high level of
accuracy. Moreover, it also contains information about the franchise, which is an important variable for
the computation of the pension income.
The second data set comes from an income panel study (called IPO). It contains detailed information
about individual and household incomes and it is provided by the Dutch national tax administration.
Again, this ensures a high level of accuracy. This data is basically a panel survey because it is based on
a randomly drawn set of “key persons” who are followed over time. Information about all the household
members in the key persons’ households is also recorded. To match this data set with the pension data,
we use the waves 2005, 2006 and 2007.
A third data set that we use is drawn from a population registration (called GBA). This dataset is used
to exclude individuals who migrated and to take into account the fact that some individuals we focus on
died over the period covered.
By merging these three data sets (using individual specific identifiers), we build a panel that contains
the main information we need for our DP model. In addition to demographic characteristics such as
age and gender, we have detailed information on incomes and pension entitlements. A drawback of our
data set is that it does not contain any information about the individuals’ educational level or on detailed
categories of their health status. In the case of health status though, we can construct a binary variable,
which indicates whether an individual is in good or bad health. The latter is then defined by receiving
income from disability benefits.
As mentioned in the introduction, we focus on the retirement decisions of male and female singles,
which allows us to consider a standard unitary model. Singles are defined as individuals who are not
married or cohabiting, and who are separated, widowed or divorced. We further focus on individuals
who are between 58 and 70 years old in the year 2005. These thresholds are chosen because we want
to focus on the retirement behavior of older workers. As we observe in the data, younger individuals
might not be thinking yet about their retirement (few individuals retire before age 58). Similarly, few
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Table 2.1: Socio-economic status in 2007
Employment / Retirement Status
Age in 2007 Employed Early retired Retired Total
60 107 15 - 122
61 99 25 - 124
62 48 20 - 68
63 33 11 - 44
64 13 5 - 18
65 19 - 9 28
66 1 - 15 16
67 3 - 9 12
68 2 - - 2
69 1 - - 1
70 2 - 2 4
71 - - 1 1
72 - - 1 1
Total 328 76 37 441
individuals above 70 are still working and most of them are retired. We further focus on employees
with an observed income (thus excluding the self-employed and individuals who receive assistance).
We follow these employees until 2007 and record those who transit to early retired and normal retired
status. We keep individuals with a defined benefit plan since there are only few individuals with a defined
contribution plan.
Our final sample has 1,323 observations of 441 individuals. Table 2.1 shows the socioeconomic
status of these individuals in the year 2007. Note that these individuals will either remain employed or
they will retire through early retirement or normal retirement. It is clear from the table that the share of
people out of the labor force is increasing with age. Obviously, the pathway through early retirement is
initially most important. This status is taken over by normal retirement for the oldest individuals in the
sample.
Table 2.2 gives some summary statistics on our sample. In 2005, on average, individuals are around
60 years old, 54.2 percent are men, 88.5 percent are native (where native means born in The Netherlands),
95.5 percent are in good health status and all of them are employees. Income and pension entitlements (in
the second pillar) are on average 42,521 euros and 28,842 euros respectively. In 2006 and 2007, variation
on the time-varying variables is observed (i.e. age, health, employment, income and entitlements).
It should be noticed that all individuals who reported themselves as employees are assumed to be full-
time workers. The information about employment status comes from the IPO and in this dataset there is
no information about the number of working hours and therefore we are not able to construct a variable
that disentangles between full-time and part-time work. Thus, in our sample, we pull together two types
of employees, those who have a full-time job and those who have a part-time job and we assume all work
full time. This is not a very strong assumption if we consider that we are focusing the analysis on singles.
According to the CBS, 62 percent of the singles between 55 and 64 years old worked at least 35 hours
in 2007. The numbers amount to 85 percent for men and 31percent for women.3 Clearly, the incidence
of part-time work is larger for women (69 percent) and, therefore, the more sensible implication of our
3CBS StatLine data for single individuals (including single parents).
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of initial state variables
2005 2006 2007
Age (years) 59.98 60.98 61.98
(2.179) (2.179) (2.179)
Male 0.542 0542 0.542
Native 0.885 0.885 0.885
Good health 0.955 0.950 0.944
Employed 1.00 0.844 0.736
Income (euros) 42,521 44,126 45,876
(13,522) (14,043) (14,703)
Pension entitlement (euros) 28,842 29,433 30,055
(6,440) (6,630) (6,833)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
assumption would be for them. We are implicitly assuming that older women who work part-time do not
react too different than those who work full-time which might be difficult to defend. This assumption
though is perhaps not too strong given a study by De Vos and Kapteyn 2004, who address the importance
of dealing with female part-time work, that showed no significant differences.
Another important feature of our study is that we do not consider disability insurance and unem-
ployment insurance schemes as pathways into early retirement. The concept of substitute pathways for
the Dutch labor market exit was an important phenomenon in the past but it is not a significant concern
to date (Euwals et al. 2012). In the 1990s, Kerkhofs et al. 1999 find that high replacement rates in the
disability and unemployment insurance schemes reduce the probability to apply for early retirement. Ad-
ditionally, they find that the early retirement scheme seems to be preferred over the other two schemes
(after controlling for replacement rates). Similarly, by using a panel survey (CERRA) for 1993 and 1995,
Heyma 2004. finds that early retirement, disability and unemployment schemes serve as substitute path-
ways for retirement. However, to date, several policy reforms implemented in the 1990s have reduced
the substitution between the different exit routes. By using administrative Dutch data for the health care
sector between 1999 and 2006, Euwals et al. 2012 find that the inflow into early retirement and disabil-
ity insurance has decreased over time and employment rates of the elderly have increased significantly.
Thus, the importance of the disability insurance as an alternative exit route is substantially reduced in the
last decade. The policies implemented also had effects on the substitution between unemployment and
disability insurance. According to recent estimates, there is almost no hidden unemployment in disability
enrollment (Koning and van Vuuren 2007, 2010). Overall it seems that the reforms to prevent early labor
market exit implemented in the Netherlands have been successful. Therefore, we decided not to include
disability and unemployment insurance schemes as choice alternatives or states in our model.
2.3 The model
2.3.1 A dynamic programming formulation
We formulate our retirement model as one where individuals are faced with a sequential decision prob-
lem in a discrete finite horizon setting. We use the standard assumption that individuals are expected
discounted utility maximizers. In each time period, the decision to retire is modeled as a binary choice
between working and retirement. Individuals are assumed to observe the available information in each
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period and, conditional on that, calculate expected discounted utilities for each of the two alternative
employment states. Finally, they are assumed to choose the alternative that maximizes their expected
discounted utility. The choice between working and retirement in the next period defines our control
(decision) variable, whereas the available information about income, pension entitlements, current em-
ployment status and some demographic variables define the set of state variables. Since individuals
do not know their future labor income nor their future health status, they have to make decisions under
uncertainty. This uncertainty then affects their decisions, which is modeled through conditional probabil-
ities. These probabilities represent the individual’s beliefs and are used to calculate expected discounted
utilities. Retirement is assumed to be an absorbing state.
Since this type of problem generally does not have a tractable analytical solution, we follow the
typical approach that is based on Bellman’s optimality principle. This implies that we use a backward
induction process to obtain an optimal decision given certain conditions on a controlled process. To
implement backward induction, we start in the last time period and for each possible combination of the
state and control variables we calculate expected discounted utilities and decision rules. We continue the
backward induction recursively for previous periods until we reach the first time period. This results in
a decision rule that contains an optimal retirement sequence given individual beliefs and constraints. At
every time period, individuals take the decision to retire if this alternative brings the highest expected
discounted utility for every possible continuation of the problem. This is made by comparing the value
functions for each alternative state, which summarizes the future consequences of choosing each alter-
native accounting for the uncertainty we described before.
The individual’s period preferences are represented by a random utility function Ut(st ,dt ,qu), where
st is a vector of state variables at year t, dt denotes the control variable (if the individual decides to
stop (continue) working in time period t, then the control variable takes the value 1 (0)), and qu the
parameters to be estimated. Following Rust 1989 and Rust and Phelan 1997, we assume a partition of
the state variables into two components: st = (xt ,et), where xt is a vector of observed state variables
and et is a vector of state variables that is observed by the individual but not by the econometrician.
The vector of observed variables xt considers the individual’s current employment status, labor income,
retirement income, health status, origin and age at time t. For empirical tractability, we assume the
following additive form for the period utility function:
Ut(st ,dt ,qu) = ut(xt ,dt ,qu)+ et(dt),
where the alternative specific error term et(dt) is assumed to be independent and identically distributed
according to a type 1 extreme value distribution. As mentioned above, the individual has to choose in
an environment with uncertainty about future incomes, future health and life expectancy. This uncer-
tainty is modeled through conditional probabilities that are represented by a transition probability matrix
pt(xt+1|xt ,dt ,qp), where qp denotes a vector of unknown parameters that characterize an individual’s
expectations (or beliefs) about those uncertain variables.
Following Rust and Phelan 1997, we formulate our problem in terms of a value function Vt(st),
which summarizes the future consequences of choosing each alternative (retirement or working) while
accounting for the uncertainty an individual is faced with. This function represents the expected dis-
counted utility of an individual who is in state st and follows an optimal decision j from time t onwards
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This value function, as well as its associated decision rule ( j), depends on the underlying primitives
of the structural model (Ut (.) , pt (.)), which, on their turn, depend on two sets of parameters. The
first set of parameters is the vector q = (qu,qp,b ), which contains the preference (qu) and beliefs (qp)
parameters and the discount factor (b ). The second set of parameters is the vector t that contains the
rules of the pension system (such as the normal retirement age, the accumulation of pension entitlements
and the level of benefits). The details of how these rules influence the computation of pensions are given
later.
By our assumption on the partition of the state variables, st = (xt ,et), and integrating out the unob-
served state variables, we can derive a conditional choice probability Pt(d|x,q ,t) that provides the basis
for estimating the unknown model parameters. More specifically, through the assumption of a type 1 ex-
treme value distribution of et(dt), a multinomial logit representation of the conditional choice probability
can be derived4:
Pt(d = d0|x,q ,t) =
exp(vt(xt ,d = d0,q ,t))
Âd2D(xt) exp(vt(xt ,d,q ,t))
,
where D(xt) is the choice set in state xt and vt is the expected value function defined recursively by:








where qt+1 is the individual’s survival probability from period t to t + 1, and D is the set of possible
transitions.
The expected value function vt(.) is related to the value function Vt(.) defined in equation (2.1) by
the following identity:
Vt(xt ,et) = max
d2D(xt)
[vt(xt ,dt ,q ,t)+ et(dt)] .
The next step consists of defining the likelihood function to estimate the model parameters. Given
panel data on observed state and control variables, xit ,dit (where i is an index to refer to an individual in
the data, i = 1, ..., I), we can estimate the model parameters by looking for the value of q such that the
following likelihood function is maximized:







Pt(dit |xit ,q ,t)pt(xit |xit 1,dit 1,qp,t).
To estimate the model, we follow the two-stage estimation procedure that was proposed by Rust
1989. In a first stage, the beliefs parameters qp are estimated by using a partial likelihood function
involving only products of the conditional probabilities pt (.). In a second stage, the estimates of qp are
used to solve the backward recursion numerically which allows one to estimate the remaining parameters
4More details can be found in Rust and Phelan, 1997.
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(b ,qu) using a partial likelihood function with only products of the choice probabilities Pt (.). Although
this procedure is not as efficient as full maximum likelihood, Rust 1989 and Rust and Phelan 1997 argue
that the efficiency loss is not too big and the computational burden is considerably reduced. Karlstrom
et al. 2004 use a similar estimation procedure in their study.
2.3.2 Individual preferences
The structural part of the individual’s preferences at time t are assumed to be represented by a Cobb-
Douglas utility function, which implies:
Ut(st ,dt ,qu) = [a lnct +(1 a) ln lt ]+ et(dt),
where ct and lt respectively denote consumption and leisure at time t. The parameter a is associated
with the consumption share in the individual’s full income at time t, while (1 a) represents the share of
leisure. In the empirical analysis, we assume that a depends on the individual’s gender and age (denoted
by gt and at respectively) which act as preference shifters.5 In particular, we assume that a = exp(a0+
a1gt +a2at)/(1+ exp(a0 +a1gt +a2at)), where a0, a1 and a2 are to be estimated. These individual
preference shifters are state variables in the DP model. Coherency of the utility function is guaranteed
since a 2]0,1[.
As stated before, there are no savings in our model. As such, an individual’s consumption in period t
equals her income in that period. This income contains both labor income and non-labor income, where
the latter contains pension benefits for individuals who are claiming benefits. In the case of leisure, we
define a set of two leisure options: one leisure value that corresponds to full time working and one leisure
value that corresponds with retirement. Taking into account a working week of 40 hours and 46 working
weeks per year and allowing for time to sleep and personal care, we obtain 1,040 hours of leisure for the
option of working and 2,880 hours for the retirement option.
2.3.3 Control and state variables
The next step is to carefully define control and states variables in the DP model. The constructed panel
allows us to formulate a model with a four-dimensional vector of observed state variables and a one-
dimensional vector of control variables.
2.3.3.1 Control variable
dt : This binary variable denotes the employment or retirement decision. It takes the value dt = 1 when the
individual retires. It means that she decides to enjoy income from only state and occupational pensions
and 2,880 hours of leisure. In contrast, the decision variable takes zero value, dt = 0, when the individual
continues working, which means that she chooses to receive labor income (and possibly an occupational
pension at a later age) and enjoy 1,040 hours of leisure. Similar to Rust and Phelan 1997, we assume that
individuals have a perfect control over their future employment status, so et+1 = dt with probability 1,
where et+1 denotes the employment status at period t +1. Although individuals are uncertain about their
5In principle, more preference shifters can be included in the analysis. However, given the particular data at hand, we faced
a multicollinearity problem when we also included variables like health status.
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future income, this assumption implies that an individual who decides to continue working is committed
to that decision until the next period in which she makes a new decision.
2.3.3.2 State variables
ct : Given the assumption of no savings, consumption is set equal to the individual total annual income,
that is discretized into five intervals. The total income includes labor and non labor income net of contri-
butions. Non labor income is defined as the sum of a disability benefit, a state pension, a survivor and an
occupational pension income (where some incomes, of course, are equal to zero for some states). Before
retirement, the data shows that the main income source comes from labor income. After retirement, the
main source of income comes from state and occupational pensions. We deduct from the total income
those contributions made to the state and occupational pension systems. This in order to include a most
accurate measure of income in the utility function specification of our model. The cut points for the
income intervals are constructed by taking the 20th, 40th, 60th and 80th percentile of the distribution
of income. For each year, the specific values of the cut points vary according to the income profile
estimation discussed in the next subsection.
gt : This binary variable denotes the gender of an individual. It takes the value of 1 for males and 0
for females.
at : This variable indicates the age of an individual in period t.
ht : This binary variable captures the health status in period t, which can be good or bad. We consider
individuals in bad health if they receive disability income (and are employees) according to the IPO
dataset.
The unique decision (control) variable for individuals is whether to retire or to continue working. We
assume that this decision is taken at the beginning of each year. This means that, at the beginning of each
year, the individual observes the available information and, conditional on that, she calculates expected
discounted utilities for the two alternatives and chooses that alternative which maximizes expected dis-
counted utility. Retirement is assumed to be an absorbing state which means that if she decides to retire
she will not start working again. The available information (state variables) at the beginning of each year
is the income in the previous period, the pension entitlements she has built in the state and occupational
pension system, the health status, the age and the current employment status. However, the individual
is uncertain about future income, future entitlements and consequently future pensions. Therefore, we
need to estimate the evolution of these variables and, as indicated before, we use these estimates (beliefs)
in the second stage of the estimation procedure.
2.4 Estimation results
In what follows, we will first discuss the evolution of the state variables and give the (first stage) estima-
tion results of the individuals’ beliefs. Next, we will discuss the (second stage) estimation results of the
preference parameters.
2.4.1 Evolution of state variables and estimation of beliefs
The transition matrix pt (.) represents the individual’s beliefs about her future health, income and life
expectancy. Similar to Rust 1989, Rust and Phelan 1997, and Karlstrom et al. 2004, we impose two
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main assumptions: the assumption of individual rational expectations and exclusion restrictions. The
first assumption implies that beliefs about future health, income and life expectancy coincide with the
population behavior of these variables. The second assumption implies that we can decompose the tran-
sition matrix as a product of conditional probabilities for each component and estimate them separately.
The following equation shows the decomposition of pt (.):
pt(xit+1|xit ,dit ,qp) = py(yit+1|yit ,dit ,hit ,ait)⇥ph(hit+1|hit ,ait)⇥pq(qit+1|qit ,git ,ait),
where py (.) is the conditional transition probability for income, ph (.) is the conditional transition proba-
bility for health status and pq (.) is the conditional survival probability. Each of these conditional proba-
bilities can be estimated independently of each other in the first stage of the estimation procedure. In the
second stage, we use these estimates to solve the DP model by recursion in a numerical way and estimate
the remaining parameters (b ,qu).
2.4.1.1 Labor income
We ran two regressions to estimate the labor income profiles, the fixed and the random effects model.
Our preferred specification assumes that (log) income from employment is explained by demographic
variables such as age, health, gender, origin and birth year. As expected, we find that under both models
age and health have a positive and significant effect on income (see Table 2.3). Older workers expect a
3.3 percent annual increase in their income whereas healthy workers expect an increase of respectively
19.5 and 27.9 percent relative to unhealthy workers all else equal. Note that the estimated coefficient of
health status varies depending on the model chosen.
Table 2.3: Estimation of labor income
















Note: A double asterisk refers to significance at the 95 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses
Recall that the fixed effects model allows us to control for omitted time-invariant variables such as
education level. Since we lack educational information in all of the data sets that we use, this model
might be more appropriate than the random effects model. We performed a Hausman test and we find
that the fixed effects model is to be preferred over the random effects model. Note that in our preferred
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model, the unobserved heterogeneity (r) is still important and significant. 92 percent of the unexplained
variation is captured by the individual effects.
Next, we predict the evolution of labor income by using the fixed effects estimates and the estimated
unobserved effects. Following Rust 1989 and Rust and Phelan 1997, we do this by using the continuous
(log) income variable and we obtain increasing income profiles explained by the significantly positive
effect of age. Nevertheless, since we do not observe many individuals working after 65 years old, we stop
the prediction at this age and assume that individuals who work beyond that age keep their last income.
This assumption is reasonable if we consider that few employers and employees at this stage take actions
to significantly improve productivity.
The discretization of the income distribution is an important concern in our model. To keep it simple
and numerically feasible, we only consider five grids but it could easily be extended to an arbitrary
number of grids, with the unavoidable increasing computation time though. For example, Rust and
Phelan 1997 consider 25 intervals for the total family income, whereas Karlstrom et al. 2004 consider
400 intervals for the labor earnings. However, they mention that their estimation results were rather
robust with smaller numbers of points. In our case, we compute the cut points for the intervals by taking
the 20th, 40th, 60th and 80th percentiles of the distribution and we repeat this process during the whole
period of analysis.
We then estimate the labor income transition probability matrix conditional on previous income,
health status and age category, py(yt+1|yt ,dt = 0,ht ,at). We decide to condition on the last two variables
because both have a positive and significant effect on the income profiles according to the fixed effects
model. We also take this decision because we do not have enough observations per age if we additionally
consider other variables such as origin or gender. Moreover, in order to have enough observations, we
group individuals in five classes, where each class contains five age intervals starting from 58 years old
until 70 years old (the last class includes individuals between 65 and 70 years old). We assume that
individuals in each class share the same transition probabilities.6
Table 2.4 displays the income transition probability matrix. Each cell displays the probability of
being in each quintile in period t + 1 conditional on having been in a specific quintile, and having a
specific health status and age category in period t. For instance, a 58 years old individual who has been
observed in good health status and in the first quintile of the distribution has a 97 percent probability
to stay in the same quintile in the next period, whereas a 60 years old individual has only a 94 percent
probability to remain in the same quintile.
2.4.1.2 Pension income
The next step is to estimate the pension entitlements and the pension income transition probability ma-
trix, py(yit+1|yit ,dit = 1,ait). We model the AOW (state pension) entitlements in a deterministic way by
assuming that in each year the individual resides in the Netherlands she accumulates 2 percent of the full
benefit. This is based on the current regulation which says that the accumulation of AOW entitlements
depends on the years an individual has lived in the Netherlands from his 15 birthday until he is 65 years
old. The accrual rate (ar) is assumed to be 2 percent for each year in which there is insurance and 0
6We do not have enough observations for individuals in the last class, so we have assumed that they share the same transition
probabilities as individuals in the previous category (60-64 years old).
CHAPTER 2. THE IMPACT OF AN INCREASE IN THE RETIREMENT AGE 25
Table 2.4: Transition probability matrices: Labor income
Good health; age 58-59 p̂y(yt+1|yt ,dt= 0,ht= 1,at)
yt 20th 40th 60th 80th 100th
20th 0.97 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
40th 0.02 0.94 0.04 0.00 0.00
60th 0.00 0.02 0.95 0.03 0.00
80th 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.03
100th 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.95
Good health; age 60-64 p̂y(yt+1|yt ,dt= 0,ht= 1,at)
yt 20th 40th 60th 80th 100th
20th 0.94 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00
40th 0.06 0.84 0.10 0.00 0.00
60th 0.02 0.02 0.85 0.12 0.00
80th 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.78 0.15
100th 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.91
Good health; age 58-59 p̂y(yt+1|yt ,dt= 0,ht= 0,at)
yt 20th 40th 60th 80th 100th
20th 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
40th 0.13 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.00
60th 0.00 0.17 0.83 0.00 0.00
80th 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.25
100th 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.95
Good health; age 60-64 p̂y(yt+1|yt ,dt= 0,ht= 0,at)
yt 20th 40th 60th 80th 100th
20th 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00
40th 0.00 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.00
60th 0.23 0.00 0.77 0.00 0.00
80th 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
100th 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.91
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percent for the years the individual lives abroad (bit):
AOWentitlementit = (50 bit)ar.
The expected state pension, AOW pensionit , is obtained by simply multiplying the entitlement with the
annual AOW benefit at year t, AOWbene f it jt . The annual AOW benefit for a single equals 11,211 euros
in 2005. This amount is multiplied by 100 percent if the individual has lived in the Netherlands for at
least 50 years, whereas it is multiplied by a lower percentage if the individual has lived abroad. Since we
do not have a variable that records years lived abroad, we are unable to accurately compute the expected
state pension. Therefore, we use the origin of individuals as a proxy variable in our estimation. If the
individual was born in the Netherlands, we assume that she retires receiving the full benefit of 11,211
euros. If the individual was born abroad, she is assumed to have gaps equivalent to 30 percent, so she
only gets an incomplete state pension of 7,848 euros.7
In the case of the OP entitlements estimation, it is important to realize that the accumulation fol-
lows the income process because individuals accumulate a percentage of their income for each year they
continue working. In our case, entitlements accumulated until 2007 are recorded in the “Pension entitle-
ments” data set. Therefore, we use these as starting points of the optimization problem. For the future
entitlements estimation, we use the estimated labor income profiles (ŷit) and apply the following formula:
OPentitlementit = (ŷ
i
t   f ranchiset)r[(1+ index)^(65 ait)].
The equation says that for a ait years old employee, we assume that she will accumulate entitlements
until she reaches the age of retirement and this process depends on the earnings net of franchise, accrual
rate (r) and indexation. In our model, labor earnings are those estimated before (using the fixed effects
model) and the franchise variable remains the same as the one observed in 2007. The accrual rate equals
2 percent and we do not assume any indexation. The expected annual OP pension is then computed by








The total pension income is obtained by simply adding the AOW and OP annual pensions. Similarly
as with labor income, we first estimate both pensions using the (log) continuous variables and then, we
discretize total pension by taking the same quintiles as for labor income. Next, we estimate the transition
probability matrix conditional on previous income and age category, py(yit+1|yit ,dit = 1,ait). We decide
to condition only on age in order to have enough observations and reasonable probabilities. Similar
as before, we group individuals in five age categories which are assumed to have the same transition
probabilities.8
Table 2.5 displays the estimated transition probability matrix for pension income. Similar as for the
transition for labor income, the conditional probabilities tend to decrease with age.
7Assumption based on projections of future pension incomes according to Statistic Netherlands.
8Individuals in the last category share the same transition probabilities as individuals in the previous category (60-64 years
old).
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Table 2.5: Transition probability matrices: Pension income
Age 58-59 p̂y(yt+1|yt ,dt= 1,at)
yt 20th 40th 60th 80th 100th
20th 0.94 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00
40th 0.06 0.86 0.06 0.01 0.01
60th 0.00 0.09 0.79 0.11 0.01
80th 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.82 0.07
100th 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.88
Age 60-64 p̂y(yt+1|yt ,dt= 1,at)
yt 20th 40th 60th 80th 100th
20th 0.84 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.05
40th 0.03 0.77 0.09 0.00 0.11
60th 0.00 0.06 0.70 0.11 0.13
80th 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.79 0.14
100th 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.95
2.4.1.3 Health status
Being healthy or not affects the ability to work and enjoy leisure and this effect might be related with
previous health status. To construct this variable we use the information recorded in the IPO dataset
and we consider individuals in bad health as those who receive a disability benefit.9 Individuals in good
health then are those who do not receive this benefit. The advantage of this measure is that it is objective
because individuals should be evaluated to determine their degree of disability. Only handicaps above
a certain level lead to the right to receive a benefit which implies that individuals must be in a very bad
health to claim this benefit. The disadvantage, however, might be that it underestimates the proportion of
individuals in bad health, since it is possible to be in bad health and less able to work without receiving
any disability income.
After constructing the health variable, we estimate the transition probabilities from the results of a
dynamic probit model which accounts of unobserved heterogeneity and previous health condition. In
this specification, we control for the initial condition problem by an approach suggested by Wooldridge
2002. We find that the lagged value of health has a stronger effect than other variables alone (which
points to strong state dependence). This implies that the chance to continue being in good health depends
strongly on having been in good health in the previous period. We also performed a static probit with
age, gender and origin as explanatory variables. We found only a significantly estimated (negative) effect
of age on the probability of being in good health and a considerable amount of unobserved heterogeneity.
Therefore, we decided to stick to the dynamic probit model. Obviously, in our specification, unobserved
heterogeneity (r) is still present but less prominent than in the static case (67.9 percent versus 86.6
percent of the unexplained variation is captured by individual effects). Table 2.6 shows both the static
and dynamic probit estimations.
Table 2.7 shows the estimated health transition probability matrix, ph(hit+1|hit ,ait). We only condition
on previous health status and age because they are the only significantly estimated explanatory variables
in our dynamic probit specification. In this case, we do not need to group individuals by age intervals
because we obtain reasonable probabilities by age. Our results show that the estimated probability of
remaining in good (bad) health as a function of previous good (bad) health status is pretty high, which
9Note that individuals can receive a disability benefit while still working.
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Table 2.6: Estimation of health status

















Note: Dependent variable: good health status. A double asterisk refers to significance at 95 percent level; an asterisk refers to significance at the 90 percent
level. Standard errors in parentheses.













reflects the strong state dependence discussed before. The negative effect of age on health status is only
slightly observed in the probability of remaining in good health, whereas it is more clearly observed in
the probability of remaining in bad health. For instance, a 58 years old individual has a 99.9 percent
chance to remain in good health status if she has been observed in good health in the previous period,
whereas she has 85.8 percent chance to continue having a bad health if she had a bad health status before.
In contrast, for a 64 years old individual, the chance to remain in bad health status is much higher (99.5
percent) and the chance to continue having a good health status is practically unchanged.10
10For individuals older than 66, we assume that they have the same transition probabilities as individuals at this age.
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2.4.2 Survival
The survival probabilities are specified exogenously by age and gender from the current mortality tables
available at Statistics Netherlands. As expected, probabilities decline with age for both genders and they
are higher for woman across all age cells (see Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1: Conditional survival probabilities by age and gender
We did not estimate the survival (mortality) transition probabilities for single individuals because we
do not have enough observations to do it consistently, especially for the very old. Most probably, we
would have had to use external data sources and extrapolation techniques in order to match mortality
rates from Statistics Netherlands projections (see Rust and Phelan 1997). For simplicity, we just use the
current mortality tables conditional on age and gender and we assume that single individuals have the
same survival probabilities as the entire population.
2.4.3 Estimation results with respect to the preference parameters
We next use the estimates of the conditional transition probabilities in the second stage of the estimation
procedure to solve the model numerically and estimate the preference parameters (b ,qu). We do this
by incorporating the conditional probabilities in the expected value function vt(xt ,dt ,q ,t) of the model.
This means that, in each time period, individuals calculate their expected discounted utilities for the two
alternatives (retire or work) using their probabilities of possible changes in health status, income and
survival and choose the alternative that maximizes their expected discounted utility.
Table 2.8 shows the estimates of the parameters of the utility function.11 Our baseline results indi-
cate that individuals value consumption and leisure differently depending on whether they are male or
female. Men tend to value consumption more than women. Therefore, men are willing to give up less
consumption in exchange for leisure as women would do. We also observe a positive impact of age on
11As often happens in this literature, we set the discount factor equal to 0.97. Though the discount factor is in principle
identifiable, there is not sufficient variation in the data to effectively estimate the discount factor.
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Table 2.8: Model estimation result
Parameters Estimate Standard errors
a0 (constant) -0.0714 0.9698
a1 (male) 0.2126 1.3715
a2 (age) 1.4120 2.7431
Loglikelihood -1280.0179 -
utilities. This somewhat counterintuitive effect may be explained by the fact that the age range of the
observations in our study is much smaller than the age range typically observed in labor supply studies
of prime age workers. Note that the standard errors are only indicative given the nonlinearity of the DP
model. As demonstrated by Gregory and Veall 1985, the outcome of a Wald test depends on the par-
ticular parameterization of the hypothesis under study. As a result, to analyze the joint significance of
the parameters associated with age and gender for the decision to retire, we performed a likelihood ratio
test where the unrestricted model is the one with a constant and age and gender parameters, whereas the
restricted model is a constant only model, where age and gender do not influence the retirement decision.
The test statistic is equal to 24 and is to be compared with the critical value of 5.99, which comes from
a chi-squared distribution with two degrees of freedom. We thus strongly reject the null hypothesis and
conclude that age and gender jointly influence the retirement behavior of individuals.
Figure 2.2 plots the observed and predicted cumulative probability functions of labor force participa-
tion for all individuals. We observe that our estimated parameters allow us to plot a predicted probability
that captures the main pattern in the data. However, the model turns out to underpredict (overpredict) the
probability to continue working for cohorts below (above) 65.
Figure 2.2: Cumulative distribution of labor force participation
In the analysis by gender, we observe that the model is able to predict the labor participation of
men better than the women’s. Given their preferences, men face a larger trade off between leisure and
consumption, which makes them better off when they continue working. Women, on the contrary, turn
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Table 2.9: Actual and predicted nonparticipation rates (percentages)




out to be better off by retiring and enjoying more leisure given their preferences. This behavior is quite
well predicted by the model in the case of men. However, in the case of women, the model underpredicts
the probability to work. The reason is that we do not have enough observations and variation by age to
properly capture their retirement behavior.
Shifting attention to nonparticipation, the model predicts increasing nonparticipation rates as indi-
viduals get older, which is in line with the observed data (see Table 2.9). However, the model predicts
lower nonparticipation rates compared to the actual data for cohorts below age 69 and higher retirement
rates for cohorts equal or above age 70. Recall that individuals above 70 years old are imposed to be
retired because there is not enough information for the model to correct predict behavior. This is because
the model is able to capture the main pattern of the data but not the exact number of individuals retiring
in each age cell. This might be related to the fact that we could not disentangle between full-time and
part-time workers. It might be the case that pension entitlements for those individuals who work part
time are not enough to compensate them to quit their job.
In the analysis by health status, we observe that healthy individuals tend to stay longer in the labor
force than individuals who have a bad health status. Given their preferences, individuals in good health
face a larger trade off between leisure and consumption, which makes them better off if they continue
working. Individuals in bad health, on the contrary, turn out to be better off by stop working and enjoying
more leisure given their health condition. This behavior is quite well predicted by the model using only
estimates for age and gender (see Figures 2.3 and 2.4, and Table 2.10 for nonparticipation rates). We
do not estimate a parameter for health status since age is probably correlated with health. Considering
our definition of bad health, our results also indicate that those who are receiving disability benefits are
less likely to participate in the labor force across all ages and they start to retire much earlier than those
who do not receive this benefit. Heyma 2004 finds similar results in the sense that restricting eligibility
for disability benefits hardly increases Dutch elderly labor force participation because individuals in bad
health still retire early through the unemployment route.
In short, we observe that as individuals get older their labor supply declines considerably and this
varies by age and gender. It is important to recall that our results are only valid for singles and it is
difficult to extend them to individuals living in couples. As it is acknowledged in the literature of family
retirement behavior, there is an association between the retirement decision of husbands and wives. More
specifically, the retirement status of one member has an impact on the probability to retire of the other
(Blau 1998; Gustman and Steinmeier 2000). Spouses may also have different preferences and thus react
differently to a policy change relative to singles. For instance, Mastrogiacomo, Alessie, and Lindeboom
2004 estimate retirement models for singles and married couples using SEP data and they find that
there are large variations in the retirement patterns of different types of households in the Netherlands.
Coefficients associated with the financial incentives for both singles and couples are significant but they
differ in magnitude and sign. Singles have lower participation rates and higher exit rates out of work
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than married individuals. Among singles, the divorced and the widowed remain longer in the labor force
as compared to those never married. Among couples retirement seems to be related.
Figure 2.3: Cumulative distribution of labor force participation by health status: Actual
Figure 2.4: Cumulative distribution of labor force participation by health status: Predicted
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Table 2.10: Actual and predicted non employment rates by health status (percentages)
Age 2007 Good health Bad health
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
60-64 19.2 11.6 52.2 80.6
65-69 56.1 26.7 50.0 89.6
70+ 66.7 82.5 - -
It is also important to highlight that our findings are specific for the Netherlands. In this respect, it is
interesting to mention Heyma 2004 who also uses a DP model and Dutch data to evaluate the relevance
and interaction of additional pathways into retirement (i.e. disability insurance, unemployment insur-
ance). The author also simulates three examples of labor force participation policies for the Netherlands:
restriction of disability benefits, flexible pension schemes, and a combination of lower wages and easier
working conditions. Simulation results show that only the restriction on disability benefits has an effect
on labor force participation, though the magnitude is very small. The other policies lead to ambiguous
or no effects.
2.5 Simulation
On July 12, 2012, a broad coalition of Dutch political parties passed a law that aims at the gradual
increase of the legal retirement age from 65 to 67. In this section, we use the estimated model to simulate
the effects of this current policy reform. The content of the reform has been extensively discussed in the
Netherlands in the past few years.
The basic idea of the reform is that the retirement age increases more for younger individuals than
for older ones. For individuals who are close to their retirement (specifically, those who are aged 61 or
more) it is planned that they have to wait a few months after their 65th birthday before they can claim a
complete public pension, whereas for younger individuals (aged 60 or less) it is planned that they have
to wait more time; around one year after their 65th birthday. For instance, an individual who is 64 years
old (and therefore close to retirement) has to wait only one more month, whereas an individual who is 59
years old (and therefore relatively far from retirement) will have to wait one full year.12 Figure 2.5 shows
the proposed legal retirement ages associated with the pension reform (labeled as “Monthly reform” in
the graph).
According to this reform, the retirement age would be increased even more for individuals below 58
years old (up to 67 years old). However, we are not able to capture this effect because we do not have
individuals below 58 years old in our sample. Therefore, to have an idea about the possible impact of
the reform when it is fully implemented and individuals have to wait until 67 years old to receive the
public pension, we also simulate a hypothetical reform to increase the legal retirement age from 65 to 67
(labeled as “Reform age 67” in Figure 2.5). In this hypothetical reform all individuals below or equal to
age 64 are immediately affected by the policy change and individuals above this age are not affected.
We simulate both reforms by evaluating the effects on the labor force participation of the workers in
the sample. To model the reforms we assume that an individual’s retirement behavior is solely affected
12The retirement age is increased even more for individuals below 58 years old. However, these cohorts are not included in
the sample.
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Figure 2.5: Legal retirement age in pre- and post-reform scenarios
by the economic incentives implied by the regulation of the legal retirement age. This means that the
only change compared with our baseline model (discussed in the previous section) is that we increase
the age at which individuals start to receive the complete public pension. We thus leave the level of the
pension benefits unaffected. To be consistent, individuals also contribute to the public pension system
until they are able to receive the pension. We also assume they continue accumulating entitlements in the
second pillar. In our model, the impact of the reforms takes place through the non-labor income in the
budget constraint, which in turn affects the decision whether to work or retire. Our exercises differ from
the ones made by Heyma 2004 in which policies were oriented to reduce benefits (i.e. disability benefits)
or to increase labor participation through changes in wages and working conditions. In our case, we are
interested in measuring the impact of changing eligibility rules through the retirement age.
Following the current reform rules, we find that there is little change in individual retirement behav-
ior: individuals postpone their retirement by less than one month on average. Table 2.11 shows that in
absence of the reform (baseline scenario), the expected retirement age is 64.53, whereas in the simulation
of the reform that gradually increases the retirement age (“Monthly reform”), the expected retirement age
increases only to 64.57. This result slightly varies by gender. Women’s optimal behavior is to continue
working for a bit more than men, but none of them postpone retirement for more than one month.
On the other hand, in the case of the hypothetical reform in which individuals have to wait until 67 to
receive the public pension (“Reform age 67”), results show a bigger change in retirement behavior. As we
can observe in Table 2.11, on average, individuals postpone retirement by 7 months (the difference in the
expected ages of retirement under the hypothetical reform and baseline scenarios is 0.56 years) and this
result varies by gender. Men expect to postpone retirement for around 10 months whereas women only
5 months, which implies that the hypothetical reform has stronger effects on men’s retirement behavior
relative to women’s.
Table 2.12 gives the expected retirement age by health status computed on the basis of the baseline
and simulations results. According to the “Monthly reform” simulation scenario, individuals in good
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Table 2.11: Expected retirement age by gender
Singles Baseline Monthly reform Reform age 67
(Legal age: 65) (Monthly increase up to 67) (Legal age: 67)
Total 64.53 64.57 65.08
(1.35) (1.38) (0.62)
Men 64.13 64.15 64.98
(1.56) (1.54) (0.35)
Women 64.68 64.73 65.11
(1.23) (1.29) (0.66)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 2.12: Expected retirement age by health status
Singles Baseline Monthly reform Reform age 67
(Legal age: 65) (Monthly increase up to 67) (Legal age: 67)
Good health 64.73 64.77 65.09
(1.09) (1.14) 0.60
Bad health 62.37 62.38 64.07
(1.92) (1.92) 1.70
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
health decide to work half a month more than in the baseline scenario. For individuals in bad health, the
simulation results show that the alternative to retire continues to be very attractive, so they do not decide
to postpone retirement with virtually no change in their expected retirement age as a consequence. In the
case of the hypothetical reform, the effects are again stronger. Healthy individuals optimally postpone
retirement for around 4 months and as we already explained above the reason is that health status turns
out to be a key determinant of the labor supply response, so by postponing the age of retirement, the
alternative to retire becomes less attractive in comparison with the alternative to work. By facing a
bigger trade off, healthy individuals are better off if they continue working. In the case of bad health
status, the results are not significant because we only observe few individuals in this status.
This type of policy change has typically been studied from the point of view of its labor supply
consequences. Empirical evidence suggests that reforms in the rules of Social Security and, in particular,
in the retirement age have effects on labor force behavior. However, the estimates of the effect vary.
In line with the U.S. literature on the ex-ante evaluation of the Social Security reform of 1983, we
find that this type of reform indeed encourages individuals to work longer since the alternative to retire
is less attractive given the benefit reduction caused by postponing the age of retirement. However, in
most of the literature the response is small. Mitchell and Fields 984a, 984b, predict that a three-year
increase in the normal retirement age from 65 to 68 would increase the actual retirement age by about
1.6 months. Similarly, Gustman and Steinmeier 1985 estimate the effect of raising the normal retirement
age from 65 to 67 and they find that the two-year increase would rise the actual retirement age by about
2 months; which is somewhat larger than Mitchell and Fields 984a, 984b. In their exercise, Coile and
Gruber 2000 find there is a modest effect of raising the normal age of retirement from 65 to 67 on labor
force participation basically because they account only for the financial implications of this reform and
they argue they do not consider the “norms” effect which might move the spike at age 65 to the right
as the legal retirement age increases. Further, Panis et al. 2002 also simulate an increase in the normal
age of retirement (to age 66 and gradually to age 68) and find that the magnitude of the effect on the
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incentives to work at any given age is small.
Other authors have found more significant effects. In their exercise for Sweden, Karlstrom et al.
2004 find also a upward shift in the cumulative distribution function of labor supply meaning that more
individuals decide to continue working instead of retiring. In their model, however, they include both the
effect of delaying the age of retirement and the change in the pension benefit. van der Klaauw and Wolpin
2008 also find that annual hours of work and earnings increase for single individuals when benefits are
postponed until 70 years old. However, in their model, since they consider both consumption and savings
decisions, consumption and net assets also fall after the age of 62, meaning that the adjustment of labor
supply is not enough to compensate the fall in consumption and savings levels produced by postponing
pension benefits. Rust and Phelan 1997 perform a counterfactual prediction of the impact of eliminating
Social Security. They find that the optimal decision without benefits implies that individuals continue to
work after the age of 65 and they interpret these results as evidence that Social Security rules have a strong
incentive effect on individual behavior. Blau and Goodstein 2010 find evidence that Social Security rules
matter, in particular the increases in the Delay Retirement Credit (DRC; actuarial adjustment of Social
Security benefits that workers receive if they delay claiming after the normal retirement age) and normal
retirement age account for between 25 and 50 percent of the increase in the labor force participation
of older men. Other factors such as incentives for married women to continue working and changes in
educational composition of the older male population contribute to the increase as well. However, the
estimate of these reforms does not disentangle the effect of increasing the normal retirement age and the
DRC.
There is also evidence of no impact on labor supply when the model accounts for borrowing con-
straints. In his analysis, French 2005 finds that shifting the early retirement age from 62 to 63 has almost
no effect on labor force participation. The reason is because borrowing constraints do not bind for several
individuals, so there is little disincentive effect on working produced by a retirement age of 62, so the
change to 63 has practically no impact on retirement behavior.
Thus, it is not surprising to observe different sizes of the impact on labor supply depending on the
type of the reform and the model used. In our case, we find that the reform that gradually increases the
age of retirement has a rather small impact on the effective retirement age but a reform that immediately
increases the legal age has a more significant impact. We also find that healthy individuals are those who
are most affected by both reforms and they decide to continue working for longer time. The small impact
in case of the current reform is partly explained by the design of the reform which basically increases
legal age only in the first pillar of the pension system and aims to affect individuals on a gradual basis.
By design, the reform aims to affect younger generations more whereas it leaves the older ones (almost)
unaffected. With the data we have we are not able to capture the effect on the cohorts who are younger
than 58 years old and, therefore, our results are not capturing the total effect. Thus, we also perform a
hypothetical simulation to immediately increase the legal age of retirement to 67. In this scenario, we
find a more significant impact on labor force participation, however is still difficult to conclude that this
would be the total effect of the planned reform. To do that we would need to take into account that
individual’s behavior is not solely affected by economic incentives (as we do in our model where the
change in the legal retirement age implies a present value benefit cut because individuals start to receive
public pensions later and it enters in the model through the budget constraint) but also by non-economic
incentives such as social norms and framing of behavioral responses (i.e. normal retirement age as a
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focal point). This could be an avenue for future research. See Mastrobuoni 2009 and Behaghel and Blau
2012 for a more detailed discussion.13
2.6 Conclusion
This paper uses a dynamic programming model to provide an empirical analysis of how pension system
rules affect the labor force participation of older single individuals in the Netherlands. We model these
labor supply responses in the presence of uncertainty on income, health status and lifespan. We use a
panel based on administrative data which has the main advantage of having new and accurate information
on pension entitlements. As far as we know, an analysis based on administrative micro data on pension
entitlements has not been undertaken yet, because it has become only recently available in the last years.
Our model is able to capture the main patterns of the sample data. Overall we observe that as
individuals become older they are more willing to sacrifice income for leisure which translates into
more individuals deciding to leave the labor force. We also find that gender and health status are key
determinants for the labor force participation (or retirement behavior). Not very surprisingly perhaps,
men and individuals in good health tend to stay longer in the labor force than women and individuals in
bad health.
The paper also discusses the simulation of the impact on retirement behavior of a current reform
that gradually increases the legal retirement age. The idea of the reform is that the legal retirement age
increases more for younger individuals than for older ones. Our simulation results show that there is very
small impact on the effective retirement age. An individual’s optimal behavior is to postpone retirement
by less than one month on average. A second simulation that immediately increases the age of retirement
to 67 years old is performed to have an idea about the long run effect on the planned reform. In this case,
the impact is larger as expected and it is around 7 months. There are differences by gender and health
status. Men and individuals in good health are those who are most affected by the reform and they decide
to continue working for somewhat longer.
Although the model performs relatively well given the available information, several extensions of
the model seem worthwhile to explore. Data limitations prevented us though to analyze these issues
further. Firstly, one could consider more alternative labor supply choices. Some individuals might want
to work only part-time to enjoy more leisure especially when they are close to retirement (see, e.g.,
Kantarci and Soest 2008, on the issue of partial retirement). This might bring better approximations to
actual behavior of older individuals. Secondly, one could consider more health status categories. Our
current definition of health status might underestimate the proportion of unhealthy individuals, so a more
detailed health variable might be useful. Third, the savings decision as a second control variable could
be introduced. To allow for savings decisions is an important aspect in life cycle models, since they
allow individuals to smooth consumption and protect themselves against future shocks. The level of
13Mastrobuoni 2009 finds that increasing the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) each year by 2 months (U.S. reform), has an
effect of 50% for both men and women, which means that the average retirement age increases by 1 month every year. His
identification strategy assumes that after controlling for labor, financial and demographic characteristics, any observed trend-
discontinuity in the average retirement is due to the change in the NRA. This strategy captures not only the financial or wealth
effect (response to the benefit cut implied by the increase in the NRA) but also the effect of social norms such as the fact that
some workers look at the NRA as a focal point. Behaghel and Blau 2012 provides evidence of framing effects in retirement
behavior by using a reform that increases the NRA from 65 to 66 in two-month increments per year of birth. They find a
relatively large impact on benefit claiming but a small impact on labor force exit behavior and self-reported retirement. The
results, however, consider both the wealth effect and the behavioral effect.
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one’s savings might also be a determinant for the early retirement decision in the sense that wealthier
individuals might have enough savings to compensate reductions in their retirement income when leaving
the labor force before the legal retirement age. Fourth, the small effects we found might be (partially)
explained by the absence of social norms and framing effects. This could be incorporated in future
versions of the model. Finally, another extension of our model could be to consider the intra-household
decision making process in which we can distinguish between decisions made by one-person (single)
and two-person (couple) households, since the latter were not included in the current analysis.
Chapter 3
The effects of access to health insurance
for informally employed individuals in
Peru
This chapter is a coauthored work with Miguel A. Carpio and Tobias J. Klein.1
3.1 Introduction
In developing countries, a large number of individuals is not covered by health insurance (Banerjee
et al., 2004; Banerjee and Duflo, 2007). The reasons for this are manifold. On the one hand, individuals
are often used to relying on informal forms of risk-sharing instead of being covered by formal health
insurance and therefore do not demand insurance.2 On the other hand, it has in the past not been seen
as the role of the government to provide health insurance. Moreover, the World Health Organization and
the World Bank stress that even when there is public health insurance then it often does not reach large
parts of the population and especially not the poorest families because it is only provided to the minority
of employees in the formal sector (WHO, 2010; Hsiao and Shaw, 2007). For instance, until recently, less
than 20 percent of the individuals in Peru have been covered by health insurance programs.
This may be a cause of concern, because health insurance does not only protect individuals against
catastrophically high health expenditures (Wagstaff and Doorslaer, 2003). It may also encourage them to
see a doctor instead of simply buying medication, and thereby promotes appropriate treatment of illnesses
that is often argued to be lacking (Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 2001; International
Labour Office et al., 2006).
In reaction, many low and middle income countries have recently introduced Social Health Insurance
(SHI) targeted to the poor, with the goal to improve their health and to provide them with financial
1We are grateful to Matin Salm and seminar participants at the First Annual Congress of the Peruvian Economic Associ-
ation, Diego Portales University, Vanderbilt University, Erasmus University Rotterdam and in Tilburg for helpful comments.
Maria Eugenia Guerrero provided excellent research assistance. We also thank Juan Pichihua from the Peruvian Ministry of
Economics and functionaries of SIS and MINSA for providing useful information and for their comments and suggestions.
Bernal: University of Piura, Netspar, CentER, Tilburg University; e-mail: noelia.bernal@udep.pe. Carpio: Universidad de
Piura; e-mail: miguel.carpio@udep.pe. Klein: Netspar, CentER, Tilburg University; e-mail: T.J.Klein@uvt.nl. The first author
is grateful for financial support from Netspar and the Sociale Verzekeringsbank.
2See for instance Fafchamps (1999), Jowett (2003), Chankova et al. (2008), Giné et al. (2008) and Dercon et al. (2008).
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protection against the financial consequences of health shocks. Typically, coverage by SHI may or may
not be free and implies that individuals receive medical attention from a service provider. The costs are
usually paid out of a designated government budget that is completely or partially funded by taxes.
However, to date, it is not well understood through which channels health insurance coverage con-
tributes to the well-being of individuals and how this relates to the incentives provided to health care
providers and patients.3 In particular, it is not well understood to what extent it is possible to encour-
age individuals to invest into preventive care, and to seek medical attention rather than simply buying
medication, and what the effects of preventive care and medical attention are on health outcomes.
One reason why we lack a deeper understanding is because it is challenging to quantify the effects
of insurance coverage at the individual level. There are two main reasons for this. First, we lack detailed
data on health care utilization and health outcomes, and second, it is not easy to control for selection
into insurance. The second problem means that a regression of utilization or outcome measures on
insurance coverage will yield biased results and will not estimate the causal effects of health insurance.
In this paper, we make progress in both directions. We use rich survey data from the National Household
Survey of Peru (“Encuesta Nacional de Hogares”, ENAHO) for the year 2011 to evaluate the impact of
access to the Peruvian Social Health Insurance called “Seguro Integral de Salud” (SIS) for individuals
outside the formal labor market on a variety of measures for health care utilization and health indicators.
The Peruvian case is interesting because SIS resembles European public health insurance systems
in that it covers health care expenditures, but does not strongly incentivice individuals to invest into
preventive care. Coverage is for free for eligible individuals, and those who are not covered by SIS
typically lack insurance coverage.4 SIS was created in 2001 and subsequently reformed. Prima facie,
these reforms have been successful, as coverage by SIS is substantial and enrollment has increased
from 20 percent in 2006 to almost 50 percent of the total population in 2011, reaching a relatively high
enrollment rate among the SHI programs in low and middle income countries (Acharya et al., 2013).
Yet, even though aggregate data suggest that some health outcomes improved since the program has
been implemented—between 2000 and 2010 total maternal and child mortality rates decreased from 185
to 93 and 33 to 17, per 100,000 and 1,000 thousands of children born alive, respectively5—to date there
is no study evaluating the effects of insurance coverage on preventive care, health care utilization and
health outcomes at the micro level that controls at the same time for selection into insurance.6
In this paper, we use rich individual-level data to provide such an evaluation. We control for selective
uptake of insurance by exploiting the institutional setup in Peru that gives rise to a Regression Disconti-
3See for instance Abel-Smith (1992), International Labour Office et al. (2006), Pauly et al. (2006), and Acharya et al. (2013).
4The latter may, however, seek medical attention on a pay-as-you-go basis and buy medication without a prescription.
5National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI)-National series, http://series.inei.gob.pe:8080/sirtod-series/. Dow
and Schmeer (2003) perform an analysis of the effect of health insurance in Costa Rica on infant and child mortality. They use
aggregate level data at the county level and control for fixed effects. As in Peru, increases in insurance coverage over time went
along with decreases in infant and child mortality.
6There are other studies relating enrollment to health care utilization and outcomes. For instance, Parodi (2005) finds that
SIS enrollment increases the probability that poor pregnant women give birth in a formal institution. However, he does not
control for selection into insurance. Bitrán and Asociados (2009) find that SIS increases utilization for both preventive and
curative services (with biggest impacts on treatments for diarrhea and acute respiratory infections for children) and that SIS
reduces the likelihood that insured individuals incur in out of pocket health expenditures. The authors control for selection into
insurance but they do not use the mean test used by SIS at the period of analysis. Instead, they use consumption per capita to
evaluate eligibility. On the other hand, there are also studies that are more public policy oriented. For example, Arróspide et al.
(2009) explore the design and effectiveness of the SIS’s institutional budget and provide policy recommendations; whereas
Francke (2013) analyzes whether the implementation of the SIS program has played a role in extending health coverage in
Peru.
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nuity Design (RDD). The reform was passed in 2009 and, since the end of 2010, a household is eligible
for the program if a welfare index called Household Targeting Index (Índice de Focalización de Hogares,
IFH) that is calculated by Peruvian authorities from a number of variables is below a specific threshold.
Variation in this index around the threshold provides a natural experiment that we exploit to conduct our
analysis. Importantly, households do not know how the index is calculated, and hence the incentive to
manipulate it—a common threat to studies based on such a RDD—is not present here. We, however,
have access to this information and use it to re-calculate the composite index of economic welfare.
Our analysis is for individuals working in the informal sector. As in many other developing countries,
formally employed individuals constitute a smaller group and are covered by a different scheme. For
informally employed individuals the IFH index is the most important criterion to determine eligibility.
The analysis focuses on individuals from the Lima Province because the regulatory framework mandates
that the eligibility evaluation using the IFH index should be first applied in this area. In 2012, almost
one third of the population lived in the Lima Province and half of Peru’s GDP was generated there. This
part of the country is very densely populated and therefore there are enough health care centers so that
we can exclude that either a large distance or absence of the staff explain that individuals do not demand
health care.7
Exploiting the unusually rich data from the ENAHO of Peru on health care utilization and health
outcomes, as well as the discontinuity generated by the institutional rules, we find that insurance cov-
erage has positive effects on the utilization of health services. Being insured increases the probabilities
of visiting a doctor by 51.5 percentage points, of receiving medicines by 52.7 percentage points, and
of requiring medical analysis by 20.6 percentage points. Regarding curative use, we find that insured
individuals are 56.4 percentage points more likely to seek medical attention (i.e. in public hospitals
and health care centers) and 25.7 percentage points more likely to have access to a surgical procedure.
SIS does not provide strong incentives to invest into preventive care. Nevertheless, we find that insured
women of childbearing age are more likely to control their pregnancy than uninsured women and indi-
viduals are more likely to be vaccinated. This is in line with the stark decrease in maternal and child
mortality that was observed after the program was introduced. At the same time, as could be expected,
we find no effects of insurance coverage on other forms of preventive care. As for health expenditures,
we find that health insurance coverage goes along with increases in health expenditures and their vari-
ability. Moreover, using an estimator of quantile treatment effects, we find that the effect is particularly
pronounced in the top end of the distribution. Our interpretation of this finding is that individuals health
insurance coverage results in individuals seeking professional medical advice more often and then be-
come convinced that they also should spend more on their health themselves. Finally, as is common in
such studies, we do not find clear effects on health outcomes at the micro level. Our interpretation of
this, in part, is that on the one hand these are longer term effects that are not measurable yet. On the
other hand, it has to do with the subjectivity of the health report that may be influenced by the increased
7According to Banerjee et al. (2004) these are two prime reasons why households in Rajasthan in India spend a considerable
fraction of their budget on health care, essentially buying drugs. In other parts of Peru, utilization of health services has been
limited by supply constraints. The Office of the Ombudsman reports that most of the 4,500 health care centers around the
country are not sufficiently equipped to provide inpatient care (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2013). An official technical committee
concludes that the biggest challenge faced by the Peruvian health system between 2009 and 2011 is the shortage of supply of
health services in many parts of the country, because it lacks adequate capacity infrastructure, equipment and human resources
(Comité Técnico Implementador del AUS, 2010). Finally, also statistics from the World Bank shows that, while the average
of hospital beds per 1,000 people is 1.83 for Latin America, it is only 1.55 for Peru. This also occurs with other measures of
supply health services, including the number of health workers such as physicians, nurses and midwives (World Bank, 2013).
CHAPTER 3. THE EFFECT OF ACCESS TO HEALTH INSURANCE 42
inclination of insured individuals to see a doctor. We interpret our findings in more detail by looking at
them through the lens of a simple conceptual framework, or model, that we present in Section 3.2 below.
The literature on the impact of SHI for informally employed individuals in low and middle income
countries is scarce, but growing.8 Table 3.1 provides an overview over a selection of related studies,
ordered by country, that are most closely related to ours. Our overall interpretation of the evidence on
the effects of insurance is that as of now, more is known about the potential pitfalls than about the effects
of a successful SHI program and in particular on how they depend on details of the implementation. The
results presented in this paper suggest that SIS in Peru is an exception and belongs to the latter category,
as does the Colombian program.9 Interestingly, the supply-side incentives between those two countries
differ in important ways. For that reason, it will be particularly interesting to compare our findings to the
ones for Colombia.
Turning first to the other countries, Thornton et al. (2010) find that initial take-up of subsidized, but
for-pay insurance “Seguro Facultativo de Salud” among informally employed individuals in Nicaragua
was as low as 20 percent. Moreover, after the subsidy expired most who previously signed up cancelled
their insurance. The specific reason they give for this is that convenience and quality of care were not
adequately addressed, which means that at the margin, the price of insurance—the cost side from the
perspective of individuals—plays a role, but that the bulk of individuals does not buy insurance because
the associated benefits are too low. This could also be because resources were wasted either in the
administration or at the health care providers. Another reason why the program did not reach its goal
was that over the course of the evaluation of the program, there was a drastic change in government,
and with it the design of the program. The results for the few who did sign up and kept their insurance
suggest that insurance could have a positive effect in the sense that average health care expenditures,
which are generally seen as too low, increased. This could, however, also be the case because those who
bought insurance and kept it constitute a negative selection of risks for whom the effect of insurance is
particularly high.
All three papers for Mexico investigate the effects of the “Seguro Popular” program, whose aim it
is—as the SIS’s in Peru—to improve access to health insurance for the poor. Unlike in the Peruvian, but
like in the Nicaragua program, coverage in the Mexican program is not for free. Turning to the effects
of introducing the program in Mexico, it is remarkable that the findings in all three papers consistently
suggest that the demand for medical care has shifted to providers that are part of the system, and in
line with this, individuals health care expenditures have been reduced, including catastrophic health
expenditures. In that sense, the program was successful in being a transfer program, but less so in
encouraging individuals to seek care when ill. Interestingly, as it is the case in Peru with the SIS program,
policy makers have also targeted pregnant mothers, and consequently, as in Peru, there is a positive effect
on obstetric utilization. At the same time, the findings do not suggest that utilization has increased for
8The selection of papers we discuss here is necessarily incomplete, but we believe it is to some extent representative.
Acharya et al. (2013) systematically examine 64 papers on the effects of health insurance and present a review on the 19
papers that correct for selection into insurance. The review concludes that there is little evidence on the impact of insurance
on health status, some evidence on utilization, weak evidence on out-of-pocket health expenditures, and unclear effects for the
poorest. However, arguably, given the large variation in incentives provided by the respective institutions, it is not surprising
that there is heterogeneity in the effect across countries. Giedion et al. (2013) also provide a comprehensive review classifying
papers according to findings and research design. They also conclude that specific features of the design have a large impact
on the likelihood that specific goals, such as increasing access or improving health, are reached. See also Abel-Smith (1992),
International Labour Office et al. (2006), Pauly et al. (2006) and Dercon et al. (2008), and the references therein, for a review
of the more policy-oriented literature.
9We provide a more in-depth discussion of the institutional details in Section 3.3.
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other types of care.
The design of the program in Georgia is very similar to the one in Peru. However, and in contrast to
our findings, Bauhoff et al. (2011) find no effect of insurance coverage on utilization. They argue that
this is due to the fact that individuals were not aware of the fact that they were covered or that there were
administrative problems that caused them to indeed not be covered, that they did not make use of the
services because the program did not cover drugs, and because the perceived quality of the services was
low. Therefore, it is not surprising that their findings are different from ours for Peru.
Turning to Colombia, and comparing the results to the ones in this paper for Peru, it becomes clear
that the effects of insurance coverage depend on the design of the system. In Colombia, private insurers
mainly receive a capitation fee and therefore have incentives to increase preventive services on the one
hand and to limit total medical expenditures on the other. And indeed, Miller et al. (2013) mainly find
effects on preventive care. In Peru, SIS covers both preventive and curative services and doctors are
reimbursed on the basis of the treatments they provide. Hence, participating hospitals and health care
facilities do not have an incentive to discourage curative treatments or medical procedures in favor of
preventive services. This explains why in Peru most of the effects are on curative use.
We proceed as follows. After outlining our conceptual framework in Section 3.2, Section 3.3 dis-
cusses the institutional background and provides details on the SIS program. In Section 3.4 we provide
information on our data and in Section 3.5 we formally describe the econometric approach. Results
are presented in Section 3.6 and results of a sensitivity analysis are presented in Section 3.7. Section
3.8 concludes that on the one hand, the evidence suggests that the program was well-designed in the
sense that—unlike in most other countries—enrollment was high and the effects on utilization were pos-
itive and sizable, but that on the other hand, measuring the effect of the program on health remains a
challenge—as it also is in the western world.
3.2 Conceptual Framework
In this section, we lay out a simple framework, or model, that we use to interpret our results. It is inspired
by the model of moral hazard and consumer incentives in health care by Zweifel and Manning (2000),
but tailored towards our setup.10 Our framework is also related to the Grossman (1972) model of health
investment, the model of health behavior by Gilleskie (1998), and the dynamic panel data model by
Adams et al. (2003) who find a causal effect of health on wealth for elderly health-insured Americans,
but no effect of wealth on health. We keep the presentation informal.
At any point in time, individuals are endowed with a health stock and face the risk of being hit by
a negative health shock. The corresponding arrival rate and intensity, respectively, depend on whether
individuals have invested into their health by means of healthy behavior, their level of health, as well as
their life style, including which job they work in. Arrival rate and intensity also depend on the level of
care they exercise, for example to prevent accidents from happening.11
10Zweifel and Manning (2000) provide a more formal model. See also Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) on the optimal design
of health insurance. Both papers provide excellent reviews of the respective relevant, partially overlapping literature.
11A reduction of preventive effort or care that is due to them being covered by health insurance is commonly termed ex ante
moral hazard. Conversely, the increase in the demand for medical care once we control for the risk is termed ex post moral
hazard. If higher risk types, in the absence of moral hazard, buy insurance, then one speaks of adverse selection in the Akerlof
(1970) sense. See for instance Zweifel and Manning (2000). The empirical literature on moral hazard and adverse selection is
still scarce, but growing. Arguably, this is because it is very hard to measure either of the two. Chiappori (2000) provides a
CHAPTER 3. THE EFFECT OF ACCESS TO HEALTH INSURANCE 45
Individuals may enroll into social health insurance. If they are sufficiently poor, i.e. if a welfare
index is below a certain threshold, then this is for free. Otherwise, they can buy coverage for a monthly
premium. Although there is no economic reason why there should be a substantial difference between a
zero price and a small positive price, this may have important behavioral implications, as pointed out by
Shampanier et al. (2007).12
Social insurance covers a list of treatments at specified locations. The prime reason for buying
insurance is that it provides access to care and changes its price.13 Individuals can always buy private
insurance that may or may not be more generous. Regular dependent employees are covered by another
social insurance scheme, independent of whether or not they are poor.
One reason not to enroll is the perception that even though health insurance buys individuals access
to doctors this is is not valuable because advice obtained from them is often of low quality, and therefore
insurance is not worth its (opportunity) cost, including the time it takes to enroll.14 But individuals may
also choose not to enroll for other, non-economic reasons.15
Individuals may not know themselves which treatment is optimal. They can seek medical attention
at a doctor’s office or in a hospital. Certain treatments are covered by the social health insurance, which
means that then they pay nothing for the visit. But there are also services that are not covered. In that
case, going to the doctor may go along with an increase in out-of-pocket expenditures.16 This is a form
of what has been termed supplier-induced demand (McGuire, 2000)—something that may or may not
be beneficial to the individual. In Peru, doctors are reimbursed for the treatments they provide. In that
sense, there is no explicit incentive for them to encourage the individuals to invest into preventive care—
possibly even to the contrary. In contrast, in Colombia, doctors mainly receive a capitation and therefore
have a higher incentive to invest in preventive care.
Importantly, and in contrast to what is common in developed countries, individuals can buy all drugs
at the pharmacy. That is, there are no prescription drugs. Not seeing a doctor may be reasonable if
individuals know about their condition and which drugs will help them. However, individuals may be
broad review of the early literature. Chiappori and Salanié (2000), Abbring et al. (2003), and Abbring et al. (2003) investigate
moral hazard in the market for car insurance. Finkelstein and Poterba (2004), Bajari et al. (2006), Fang et al. (2006), Aron-Dine
et al. (2012) and Einav et al. (2011) study adverse selection and moral hazard in the context of health insurance in developed
countries.
12This could also be part of the reason why take-up was low in Colombia, for instance, as pointed out above. If this is
indeed the case, then there is a clear policy implication: if it is desired to have high enrollment rates, then small fees are likely
dominated by zero fees, because small fees will not help finance the insurance scheme, but will have a substantial negative
effect on enrollment.
13Another reason to enroll is risk-aversion. Alderman and Paxson (1992) provide an early synthesis of the related literature.
Gertler and Gruber (2002) analyze the extent to which poor households in Indonesia are able to smooth consumption when they
are hit by a health shock. They infer that health problems have large welfare costs, and conclude that public disability programs
and subsidized healthcare could improve consumption insurance. Chetty and Looney (2006) present a model that illustrates
that consumption fluctuations can underestimate the welfare costs of health shocks if households are highly risk averse. Pauly
et al. (2008) use data from the World Health Survey for 14 developing countries and show that risk averse individuals may
benefit from having access to health insurance, out of a pure consumption motive. Mohanan (2013) shows that households
faced with shock-related expenditures are able to smooth consumption on food, housing, and festivals, with small reductions
in educational spending, and that debt was the principal mitigating mechanism households used, leading to significantly larger
levels of indebtedness.
14Das et al. (2008) provide evidence pointing towards such low quality advice, at least in other low-income countries.
15Non-enrollment into free (net of the opportunity cost of time) state-provided schemes is a well-documented phenomenon
in the U.S. See, for instance, Blank and Card (1991), Blank and Ruggles (1996), and Currie and Gruber (1996). Also in other
contexts, it is argued that individuals make dominated choices (see for example Choi et al., 2011, and the references therein).
16Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008) focus on the effects of health insurance on financial risk in China and find that health
insurance coverage increases the risk of incurring high and catastrophic spending, respectively. They argue that this is because
insurance encourages individuals to seek care and this ultimately leads to higher expenditures that they then cover themselves.
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wrong or lack a diagnosis to buy the right drugs, and the pharmacist may not be able to help them with
their choice. Therefore, not seeing a doctor has potentially adverse effects on health.17 Conversely, if
they do see a doctor and he prescribes a drug, then the individual will obtain it for free if he has insurance
coverage and the drug is in the list of drugs that are covered.
Finally, when asked about their health, individuals may answer that they are of worse health when
covered by the insurance. Strauss and Thomas (1998) argue that the reason for this is that insurance
coverage encourages them to see a doctor more often, and that he then makes them more aware of their
health problems. Sen (2002) distinguishes in this context between “internal” and “external” views of
health and stresses that “the patient’s internal assessment may be seriously limited by his or her social
experience”, such as seeing a doctor or not.18
To summarize, in the simple model outlined above, not all individuals may enroll into health insur-
ance. Once covered, they are likely to see a doctor more often, which is a pure price effect because the
price for doing so is either unchanged for the doctors where they cannot receive treatment for free, or
the treatment is now free, which increases demand for this service. By the same token, we also expect
utilization of other services to increase, including inpatient care. We expect out-of-pocket expenditures
to decrease for covered treatments and medication, but it may be that it increases or decrease for non-
covered treatments and medication, because of supplier-induced demand. Finally, for the reasons given
above, preventive care may increase or decrease, and also health reports may be affected in either way.
3.3 Institutional Background
3.3.1 The Bigger Picture
Before 2001, health services were provided by the Ministry of Health (MINSA), the social security
system (“EsSalud”), as well as private clinics and practices. Generally speaking, these providers catered
to different groups of the population and did not cooperate with one another (Cetrangolo et al., 2013;
Francke, 2013).19
MINSA runs a network of hospitals and health care centers that serve the general public. These are
the services poor individuals demand and pay for if they are not insured. Next to that, EsSalud provides
health insurance to formally employed individuals and maintains its own facilities for the provision of
care. Enrollment into health insurance, either EsSalud or private insurance, is mandatory for dependent
employees and voluntary for self-employed. Finally, the private sector offers services at relatively high
prices. Consequently, these services are only affordable to more wealthy individuals who are also able
to buy private health insurance.
The welfare program "Seguro Integral de Salud" (SIS), whose effect we evaluate in this paper, was
introduced in 2001. Its goal is to improve access to health care services for individuals who lack health
insurance, giving priority to vulnerable population groups that live in extreme poverty (Arróspide et al.,
2009). In 2009, an important reform took place. There were two goals. The first was to improve the
eligibility evaluation process. The second was to provide health insurance to a larger part of the popu-
17Laing et al. (2001) discuss the scarce evidence on this and provide suggestions on how to improve the use of medicines in
developing countries.
18See also the discussion of various biases in self-assessed health measures that are discussed in Murray and Chen (1992).
19In principle, MINSA is responsible for the regulation of the whole health system. However, in practice, it does so in a
relatively passive way (World Bank, 2006).
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Figure 3.1: Health Insurance Coverage in Peru over Time
Notes: Own calculations based on ENAHO survey for the years 2006-2012. See Section 3.4 for details on the data set and
in particular our estimation sample for the year 2011. Here, we use the entire sample.
lation. To achieve these goals, among others, the budget dedicated to SIS was increased and eligibility
rules were changed.20
The creation of SIS and subsequent reforms led to a substantial increase of health insurance coverage
over time. Bitrán and Asociados (2009) and Francke (2013) provide an interesting analysis of the SIS’s
coverage evolution and its relevance within the Peruvian health system in general. In our case, we used
data from the ENAHO to characterize the evolution over time. Figure 3.1 shows that SIS coverage
increased from 20.0 percent of the population in 2006 to 44.7 percent in 2011, which means that by then
SIS was the main health insurance provider. In contrast, the coverage of EsSalud and private providers
remained stable over the years. However, 32.4 percent of the population did still not have any type of
insurance coverage in 2011.21
20Before April 2009, in principle, SIS used a Household Welfare Index (“Índice de Bienestar de Hogares”, IBEH) to deter-
mine eligibility. However, the IBEH criterion was not strictly applied in practice.
21There are at least three reasons why the uptake in SIS is not 100 percent. First, perception of low quality might play a
role in the sense that despite the insurance is for free advices obtained from doctors might be perceived as of low quality, and
therefore insurance is not worth its cost, including the time it takes to enroll. Second, there could be a non-economic reasons
not to enroll such as the distance between individuals and the health care facilities or cultural differences (Parodi, 2005). This
is an important issue especially in rural areas. A third reason is that there has been administrative constraints such as the fact
that individuals need an ID to apply for the insurance, however, there are many individuals who lack of it. This issue is (again)
particularly important in rural areas.
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3.3.2 Seguro Integral de Salud
If eligible, individuals have the possibility to enroll into SIS at a number of places, including MINSA
facilities. They are covered as soon as eligibility is confirmed, which is usually a matter of days. Then,
they receive the health services that are offered at MINSA facilities and that are part of the benefit
package.
The aim of the government was to target particular, poor groups in the population. Ideally, eligibility
should be based on accurate information on income at the level of the individual or family. However,
such information is typically not available in developing countries because a large part of the population
works outside the formal sector and therefore does not pay income taxes and social security contribu-
tions. Eligibility for SIS is therefore based on the so-called Household Targeting System (“Sistema de
Focalización de Hogares”, SISFOH). For this, a unified household registry is maintained and is used
to calculate targeting indicators at the level of the family (see SISFOH, 2010). Data are collected by
government officials using a standardized form. It includes questions on, amongst other things, housing
characteristics, asset possessions, human capital endowments and other factors.
The most important targeting indicator for SIS is the IFH index.22 It is a linear combination of
the variables in the household registry that takes on lower values for households that are more poor.
Appendix C explains in detail how the IFH is constructed, including the complete list of variables and
their weights.
A household is eligible for SIS if the IFH index, water expenditures and electricity expenditures are
all below respective regional-specific thresholds.23 If no information for water and electricity expendi-
tures is available, then a household is eligible if its IFH index is below the threshold. In case one of the
household members works in the formal sector, then eligibility is related to income. Moreover, if the
monthly wage is greater than 1,500 Soles, or 570 U.S. dollars, then the household is not eligible for a
social program, unless either water or electricity service expenditures are below their thresholds.24
Importantly, potential beneficiaries are not aware of the exact details of the eligibility rules. Whereas
they intuit the importance of their answers to the questions of the government official, they do not know
how exactly the IFH index is calculated and what their cutoff value for eligibility is. SISFOH does not
inform households about the value of their index and only provides the result of the eligibility evaluation.
SIS offers a comprehensive package of health care benefits. It is estimated that SIS covers 65 percent
of the total disease burden in the country (Francke, 2013). Table 3.11 and 3.12 in the Appendix provide a
22Something important to mention is that SISFOH was established in 2004 and, by 2008, three main results were expected:
i) a national, complete and updated Household Registry with the corresponding eligibility status using the IFH index; ii) three
social programs (including SIS) would fully adopt this criterion to select their beneficiaries and; iii) the rest of social programs
would begin using it. However, administrative and political barriers postponed reaching these results as planned. Only in the
year of 2010, the Household Registry and eligibility status (including index’s weights) were finished and became available for
authorities. At the end of that year, SIS was the first social program to adopt the new criterion (see Llanos and Rosas, 2010 and
Regulation RJ-N063-2011 for more details).
23For Lima, these thresholds are 55 for the IFH, 20 Soles for water expenditures and 25 Soles for electricity expenditures.
This corresponds to 7.6 and 9.5 U.S. dollars, respectively. Table 3.17 in the Appendix provides the complete set of thresholds
by geographic areas.
24One may wonder whether the SIS program creates incentives to transit between formal and informal status. We do not find
evidence of that. We have explored our sample data and run some OLS regressions to analyze this potential issue in two ways.
First, following Card and Shore-Sheppard (2004), we explore whether there has been crowding out from private providers
or EsSalud to SIS (which would be consistent to the idea of incentives to leave formality due to SIS). Second, we analyze
whether enrollment to SIS has a significant effect on informality. No significant estimates are found. Furthermore, formality
is a complex decision made by firms taking into account cost-benefit analysis of several variables (i.e. taxes, formal health
insurance for workers, financial credit). Thus, individuals who work in these firms might have little influence on this decision.
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detailed list of services covered by SIS together with the maximum levels of coverage. Coverage includes
obstetric and gynecology interventions, pediatric interventions, neoplasm or tumor interventions, trans-
mittable and non-transmittable disease’s interventions, chronic and degenerative disease’s interventions
and emergency care. It also includes outpatient medical-surgical intervention and hospitalization, as well
as coverage of high-cost diseases. There are no waiting times or latent periods. But there are maximum
levels of coverage in terms of the number of medical attentions. For instance, for preventive care, SIS
covers up to 10 treatments to control pregnancy, ultrasounds, lab tests and supplements of iron and folic
acid. Regarding curative use of outpatient services, doctor visits and minor surgeries are covered without
any limit (including its medications). In the case of inpatient services (with or without surgeries), extra
diagnosis and maximum levels are applied.
There are two additional plans for self-employed individuals and to employees of small firms, re-
spectively. The latter are not seen as dependent employees and therefore do not have to be enrolled
in EsSalud. Both plans are not free of charge, but involve enrollment at a rate below the actual cost.
Moreover, they involve a slightly different benefit package. However, these two additional plans are not
important in practice. Administrative statistics from SIS show that the main plan targeted to the poor
reaches 12.7 million individuals, or 99.8% of the entire SIS population.25 In this paper, we focus on the
effects of the first plan and refer to it simply as the SIS plan.
MINSA is reimbursed for the services it provides. This is done out of the SIS budget and at fixed
rates that are based on estimates of the costs plus a markup. The rates are approved by MINSA in the
form of regulation that is updated on a regular basis. This means that, as opposed to Colombia, the
system offers no incentives to health care providers that are related to preventive care. At the same time,
it does also not provide incentives that limit curative use.
In our study period, some of the treatments and services that are covered by SIS suffered from a
number of substantial supply limitations. First, there was a lack of equipment in MINSA hospitals.
According to Defensoría del Pueblo (2013), which performed a supervision of a sample of hospitals at
a national level in 2012, 20 percent of them lack at least one piece of equipment required for inpatient
surgery and 15 percent report to have problems with at least one other input needed for performing
surgery. Second, there has been a shortage of dentists and ophthalmologists. The rate of odontologists
per ten thousand inhabitants is one of the lowest among all medical professionals (Giovanella et al.,
2012) and it is even lower when they work as providers for SIS (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2013). Likewise,
only a small number of ophthalmologists provides services to SIS participants, which in turn limits the
use of ophthalmological care. Only recently, and after our study period, the National Ophthalmological
Institute, the largest provider in Peru, joined the list of SIS providers. Third, even though drugs are
officially covered by SIS, according to the information in the ENAHO 2011, 37 percent of the covered
individuals report to have paid for drugs received at the hospital level and 9.7 percent report to have
paid for it at the health care centers level (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2013). This may be related to a cut
that SIS experienced in its budget, which resulted in a failure to transfer resources to MINSA, which in
turn motivated some hospitals to charge for hospitalization, regardless of insurance status. Patients are
referred from health care centers to hospitals when the formers do not have specific medical specialties to
perform proper diagnosis or treatments. Once at the hospitals, patients are less aware about the services
they are freely entitled to as participants of SIS or they are not able to find all the medications they need.
25See SIS Statistic Report, available at http://www.sis.gob.pe/Portal/estadisticas/index.html, accessed September 2013.
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Taken together, the supply limitations imply that some patients were not able to receive some treatments
and may have been asked to pay for other treatments that were actually formally included in the SIS
package, especially when they received treatment in a hospital.
3.4 Data
The paper uses cross-sectional data from the ENAHO for the year 2011, which is representative at the
level of each of the 24 departments that comprise the country. This survey fits our purpose because it
provides information on health care utilization, health expenditures, health outcomes, insurance status,
and the information needed to re-compute the IFH index. Information is collected using face-to-face
interviews with one or more respondents per household, who are also asked to provide information on
the other household members.
SIS is targeted to individuals who work in the informal sector. Therefore, for our analysis, we
select individuals that belong to a household in which no member is formally employed.26 This group
comprises approximately 60 percent of the entire sample. Second, we focus on individuals from the
Lima Province because, as described in Section 3.3, the regulatory framework mandates that the IFH
targeting rule should be applied in this area in 2011 and afterwards to the rest of the country. Our sample
contains information on 4,161 individuals after the two exclusions criteria are applied.
We construct our treatment variable using information on enrollment in SIS and in EsSalud. The
reason is that some individuals who were actually enrolled in SIS may have wrongly stated to have been
enrolled in EsSalud, because both are public insurance programs. While in principle SIS enrollment
is at the household level, there are households in our data in which some members state that they are
enrolled and other members state that they are not. For the results presented here we use this information
as stated by the individuals, because we believe that this corresponds most closely to what individuals
actually base their decisions on.27 Participation in EsSalud is also recorded in the survey. Similar as in
the case of SIS, we consider individuals (not households) enrolled into EsSalud as it is reported in the
survey.
Table 3.2 and 3.3 provide summary statistics for the main variables that we use in the analysis.
We distinguish between three sets of variables. The first one is the participation variable defined as
having public health insurance. The second set contains variables related to utilization of health services
including health expenditures, and the third set comprises variables of health report. The columns in
the two tables contain the summary statistics for the whole sample and for the sample broken down by
participation status and eligibility.
In 2011, 38.0 percent of the sample population was either enrolled in SIS or EsSalud. On average,
26We define formality as having monetary income from any wage activity. This does not include any monetary income or
income from self-employment. This definition is closest to the one used by the authorities. They distinguish between those
individuals whose wage is observed, who are mainly employees with a formal contract, and others. We have also explored
other definitions, including being a wage worker in the main occupation, any indication of having a formal contract in the main
occupation, and working in an enterprise that keeps accounting books and is affiliated to a pension system. Results remain
qualitatively the same.
27We also explored another variable for participation status in SIS. The variable was constructed at the household level and
was a dummy equal to one for individuals that belong to a household where at least one member reported to be enrolled to SIS.
The coverage of SIS increased from 13 percent to 28 percent with this second variable. The main results, which we discuss
in Section 3.6 below, did not change qualitatively. However, the magnitude was smaller. This is related to the econometric
approach, which basically calculates the local average treatment effect as the change in the outcome divided by the change in
the fraction of individuals who were insured. See also Section 3.5.
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individuals in the sample are 33.0 years old, half of them are woman, individuals have around 8 years of
education, and average annual household income is 30,620 Soles, or 11,636 U.S. dollars. Participants are
slightly older, more likely to be female, and are less educated than nonparticipants. This is not surprising
since the SIS program is targeted to the poor. When we compare eligibles to ineligibles, we find similar
patterns.
Turning to utilization of health services, we find that, on average, 31.9 percent of the individuals
has visited a doctor in the last month, 45.6 percent have received medicines and 6.3 percent have had
medical analysis in the same period. 4.1 percent of the individuals have received an intervention or
have undergone surgery in the last 12 months. Focusing on women, we observe that those who received
pregnancy care in the last 12 months represent 7.4 percent of the sample of the women who are in fertile
age. Utilization is generally higher for individuals who are covered by health insurance and for eligible
individuals.
Shifting attention to health reports, when individuals in the full sample are asked if they experienced
any symptom in the last month, 39.6 percent provide an affirmative answer. At the same time, only 14.4
of the individuals report that they suffered from illnesses. However, as already pointed out in Section
3.2, we should be cautious when interpreting this finding. After all, such reports can depend on whether
or not individuals are being told by a doctor about their health. Therefore, even if they are objectively
less healthy, they may report to be of better health if they do not see a doctor.
Regarding health expenditures, Table 3.3 shows that 57.1 percent of the individuals had some health
expenditures in the last 12 months. The average annual expenditures are around 401.1 Soles, or 152
U.S. dollars.
3.5 Econometric Approach
In this paper, we estimate the impact of SIS coverage on a host of variables characterizing health care
utilization, expenditures and health. Based on the institutional setup described in Section 3.3.2 we do
this by means of a fuzzy RDD using the IFH index as the continuous forcing variable.28 An individual is
eligible for public insurance if she lives under poor conditions, which is measured at the household level.
In Lima Province, the condition for this is that the IFH index is below or equal to a value of 55. The
usual assumption we will make is that variation in this variable around its threshold provides a natural
experiment that randomly assigns eligibility to households and thereby individuals. This assumption is
obviously motivated by the cutoff value of 55 for the index and the institutional rules in general. We will
formalize this assumption below.
As explained in Section 3.4, our treatment is coverage by public health insurance, which is defined
as being enrolled in either SIS or EsSalud. It follows from the institutional rules that there is no reason
to expect EsSalud coverage to change discontinuously when the threshold is crossed. Based on this, we
will attribute such discontinuous changes to enrollment in SIS.
As described in Section 3.3.2, the IFH index is not the only variable that is related to eligibility. Other
variables that are important in that respect are labor income, as well as water and electricity consumption.
However, the IFH index is the most important criterion for eligibility. Moreover, and importantly, as
for Essalud enrollment, we do not expect a discontinuity in any of those variables when crossing the
28This approach goes back to at least Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960). See Hahn et al. (2001) for a more modern
exposition and Imbens and Lemieux (2008) for a discussion of practical issues.
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eligibility threshold for the IFH index. Therefore, discontinuities around the eligibility threshold are
plausibly related to the IFH index only.
Once we impose linearity, we can estimate the effects using the standard two-stage least squares
instrumental variables estimator. Formally, we specify the first-stage equation that describes the relation-
ship between enrollment into health insurance for individual i, di, as a linear probability model










i eligi + edi ,
where zci is the IFH index centered at its threshold and eligi is an indicator for eligibility. The second-
stage equation for outcome variables yi is, accordingly,










i eligi + e
y
i .
When we use the two-stage least squares instrumental variables estimator with eligi as the instrument
for di and controlling for the index zci and its interaction z
c
i eligi with eligibility, then we will estimate the
ratio b y2/b d2 . This can then be interpreted as a local average treatment effect, as proposed by Imbens and
Angrist (1994), provided that three assumptions hold. The local average treatment effect is the average
effect of insurance coverage on the outcome, for those individuals who enroll when becoming eligible
by crossing the threshold.
The first assumption we need to make is that if no insurance would be assigned to everybody around
the threshold, then the distribution of the outcome conditional on the index would be smooth in the index
zi around zero.29 This assumption cannot be tested directly and is therefore the main assumption we
will make. As we have argued before, the institutional rules suggest that it holds. We provide further,
supportive evidence below.
The second assumption is that insurance status is monotone in eligibility. This holds by construction,
as changing from a value of the index slightly higher than the threshold value to a value lower than the
threshold value will make an individual eligible for insurance coverage.30 The final, third assumption
is an exclusion restriction. It is that the value of the index, zi, is independent of the outcomes, and in
particular eyi .31 It would be violated if households would manipulate their answers to the government
official in order to influence the value of the IFH index. As discussed in Section 3.3 this is unlikely to be
the case. We nevertheless test for manipulation in Section 3.7.1.
Under the same assumptions, it is also possible to estimate quantile treatment effects, as described
in Frandsen et al. (2012). In Section 3.6.2.3 we estimate the quantiles of the distribution of expenditures
with and without insurance. The underlying idea is straightforward. While the local average treatment
effect is an average, the quantile treatment effect is the change in, say, the median of the distribution an
outcome that results from being covered by public health insurance for those who select to enroll when
becoming eligible.
29This is slightly stronger than needed. Usually, it is enough to assume that the conditional expectation of yi given zi is
smooth around the threshold. We make a slightly stronger assumption here in order to be able to estimate quantile treatment
effects as well, as described below.
30The assumption would be violated if an individual would buy insurance if she is not eligible, but not if she is eligible. See
Battistin and Rettore (2008a) and Klein (2010) for related discussions.
31Again, for the same reason as above, mean independence usually suffices, but we make a stronger assumption in order to
also estimate quantile treatment effects.
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Notes: This and the following figures are based on ENAHO data for the year 2011 for Lima Province. See
Section 3.4 and Appendix C for details on the data and on how the IFH index is computed.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Graphical Analysis
We first graphically examine how enrollment into public health insurance is related to the IFH index.
Figure 3.2 shows the fraction of individuals enrolled into either SIS or EsSalud plotted against the IFH
index centered at its threshold. The figure shows a discrete increase in the probability to be covered at
the threshold, when moving from the right to the left, providing evidence on the importance of the IFH
index as a criterion to determine whether an individual is eligible for the SIS program.32
Besides, the figure shows that the probability to be enrolled into a public insurance is slightly de-
creasing in the welfare index among eligible individual to the left of the threshold. This means that
poorer individuals might be slightly more likely to be enrolled, which is in line with the government’s
goal to target the poor. To the right of the threshold, we see that the probability to be covered by public
32As explained before, we use this definition because individuals may have confused those two public insurance programs
when answering the respective survey questions. It follows from the institutional rules that any discontinuity in the probability
to be enrolled in either of those, at the threshold, can be attributed to individuals becoming eligible for SIS. It is, however,
likely that even if insurance status was perfectly measured we would not observe that the probability to be insured in SIS is
zero for individuals with a welfare index above the threshold. There are two reasons for this. First, there is a certain level of
leakage in the targeting strategy of SIS, which means that some individuals who are formally ineligible may still be able to
obtain insurance. What is important for our identification strategy is that there is a discontinuity in the probability to be insured
at the threshold. This is not a concern in that respect if at least some individuals are properly classified according to our index.
Second, we construct the IFH index using survey data from the ENAHO rather than using the official data collected by SISFOH
that is used to determine eligibility in practice. This may give rise to measurement error in the running variable. It is not a
cause of concern as long as there is a positive probability for each individual that the index is measured correctly. Battistin and
Rettore (2008b) show that then, the observed discontinuity can be attributed to those individuals for whom the index is observed
without error. See also Hullegie and Klein (2010) for an alternative parametric approach to estimating treatment effects in a
regression discontinuity design with measurement error.
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insurance is increasing in the welfare index. This is due to the fact that dependent employees are more
likely to have a higher value of the index and are more likely to be covered by EsSalud. Besides, EsSalud
offers voluntary paid plans for self-employed, which is a more common choice among individuals with
a higher value of the welfare index.
Next, we investigate how four of the most important measures of health care utilization are related to
insurance status.33 Figure 3.3a plots the probability that an individual has visited a doctor in the last four
weeks against the welfare index. We see that becoming eligible for health insurance, that is moving from
the right to the left of the threshold, is related to an increase in utilization. Figure 3.3b, 3.3c and 3.3d
show that also the probability to undergo surgery, to receive medical attention and to receive pregnancy
care increase, respectively.
3.6.2 Main Analysis
Next, we analyze more formally how insurance status and outcome variables are related to eligibility. For
this, as described in Section 3.5 above, we use two-stage least squares instrumental variables regression.
Throughout, we control for age, gender, whether the head of the household is female, the number of
household members, and years of education.34 We first use the full sample and control for separate
33The survey contains a wealth of variables related to health care utilization and outcomes. We provide a more comprehensive
analysis using regressions below.
34See Section 3.7.4 for results without controlling for covariates.
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Table 3.4: Effect of Health Insurance on Health Care Utilization
Estimates Ste.
Participation (first stage)
0 Health Insurance 0.1403*** (0.0257)
F = 29.8023
Utilization
1 Any doctor visit 0.5149*** (0.1954)
2 Medicines 0.5271*** (0.2045)
3 Analysis 0.2056** (0.0921)
4 X-rays 0.1297* (0.0712)
5 Other tests 0.0508 (0.0413)
6 Dental care 0.0660 (0.1231)
7 Ophthalmological care 0.0356 (0.0841)
8 Glasses 1/. -0.0305 (0.0693)
9 Vaccines 0.2884** (0.1317)
10 Kids check 2/. 0.0678 (0.2610)
11 Birth control -0.1443 (0.0934)
12 Other treatments 0.1763 (0.1616)
13 Hospital 0.1484 (0.0931)
14 Surgery 0.2567*** (0.0881)
15 Pregnancy care 3/. 0.6504** (0.2931)
16 Child birth 3/. 0.1900 (0.1593)
1-16 Any of the above 0.4377** (0.1860)
Notes: Except for kids check, pregnancy care and child birth N = 4,161. See Table 3.13 for variable
definitions. 1/. Not covered by SIS. 2/. Question applied for kids under 10, N = 649. 3/. Question applied
for women in fertile age, N = 1,182. * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
.
linear relationships between insurance status and outcomes, respectively, to the left and to the right of
the eligibility threshold. The endogenous variable is enrollment into public insurance and the instrument
is eligibility according to the welfare index.
Table 3.4 shows the results.35 We estimate the local effect of eligibility to be a 14 percent increase in
insurance enrollment. This corresponds to the size of the discontinuity in Figure 3.2. The effect is highly
statistically different from zero.
3.6.2.1 Health Care Utilization
We examine the effect of SIS on the use of 16 health services, including those in Figure 3.3. We find
that it has a large and significant effect on six of them. In particular, being covered by health insurance
increases the probability of visiting a doctor in the four weeks prior to the interview by 51.5 percentage
points. The probability of obtaining medicines in the same four weeks increases by 52.7 percentage
points. Moreover, health insurance increases the probability of performing at least some medical analysis
by 20.6 percentage points. Taken together, these three results suggests that covered individuals are more
likely to see a doctor who then performs an analysis or prescribes a drug, in line with the idea that covered
individuals receive medical care that caters better to their needs. This is remarkable because Peru is a
country in which poor individuals are accustomed to not receiving any professional diagnosis and where
35In Table 3.18 in the Appendix we provide ordinary least squares estimates corresponding to the ones reported here and in
the following two tables.
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drugs can also be bought in a pharmacy without a prescription.
We also find health insurance coverage to have significantly positive effects on two measures of
preventive care. The probability of being vaccinated in the three months prior to the interview increases
by 28.9 percentage points, and women at fertile age are 65.0 percentage points more likely to control
their pregnancy in the previous twelve months.36
The effect on the likelihood to receive surgery is also positive. It increases by 25.7 percentage points.
In Section 3.6.2.3 below we show that at least some individuals pay themselves for these surgeries, which
suggests that health insurance coverage increases the likelihood that they find it worthwhile to do so.37
At the same time, Table 3.4 shows that health insurance coverage has no significant effects on uti-
lization of dental and ophthalmological care during the previous three months, and also not on hospital-
ization. This can be explained by supply limitations. The health care centers of MINSA provide only
basic services. Individuals are sent to hospitals in order to visit a specialist, which also includes dentists
and ophthalmologists. This, together with the shortage of dentists and ophthalmologists described in
Section 3.3.1 explains our finding. As for hospitalization, as described in the same section above, hospi-
tals lacked equipment and there were budget problems that led to hospitals charging for services that are
formally covered by the health insurance. This likely explains why we do not find any positive effect for
hospitalization.
Eyeglasses are not included in the list of health insurance benefits. We nevertheless estimated the
effects of insurance on the probability to obtain glasses, because in principle, being insured could have
an effect because a doctor, for instance, could advise the individual to get new glasses when performing
another treatment. We find that insurance coverage has no significant effect on this.38
It is interesting to complement these results with statistics on reasons stated by individuals for why
they did not visit a health care center for those individuals who had a health incident. Table 3.5 shows
that the most important reasons were that individuals do not have money, consider the health incident not
big enough, and lack time. Instead, they seem to resort to self-medication, which likely means that they
buy some drugs at the pharmacy. This suggests that coverage by SIS may directly affect the 14 percent
of the individuals who state that they do not have money to visit a health care center and possibly also
the 43 percent who state that the health incident is not big enough. It may have less of an impact on
the individuals who state that they lack time to seek medical attention, as SIS does not cover foregone
wages.
3.6.2.2 Curative versus Preventive Use
In Section 3.2 we have argued that health insurance coverage may have positive effects on curative and
preventive care and that it depends on the institutional details where effects will be stronger. We have
argued that we expect the effects on preventive care to be relatively modest because the system does not
provide any incentive to do so.
Ideally, in order to shed light on this, we would observe whether, for instance, a doctor was visited
36We do not observe whether a woman is pregnant. Therefore, in principle, this includes the effect of insurance on becoming
pregnant.
37Additionally, we conduct a reduced form analysis to see whether any health service jumps discontinuously at the threshold.
Significance for the main variables we described before remain but their magnitude decreases, as expected. Recall that our
IV-2SLS estimates are obtained by dividing these effects by the change in the probability of enrollment. Similar pattern is
found for the reduced samples (women, men, 75 and 50 percent closest to the threshold) and the specification without controls.
38One can also see this as a placebo test in addition to the tests we perform in Section 3.7 below.
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Table 3.5: Stated Reasons for not Visiting a Health Care Center
Stated reason Percentage
Do not have money 0.1401
Live far 0.0088
Attention takes too much time 0.0641
Do not trust doctors 0.0320
Health incident not big enough 0.4322
Prefer using homemade medicines 0.0327
Do not have insurance 0.0182
Use self-medication 0.1677
Lack of time 0.1954
Abuse of health staff 0.0113
Other reasons 0.0333
Notes: Out of the 4,161 individuals in our sample 2,418 report of a
health incident. The question was asked to the 1,592 individuals who
did not visit a health care center. Multiple answers were possible.
.
for preventive or curative reasons. However, out of the 12 health services in Table 3.4, five may either
have a curative purpose or a preventive one: doctor visits, medicines, analysis, X-rays and other tests. A
second group of three variables is more likely related to curative use: hospitalization, receiving surgery
and birth delivery.
An important question of the survey is whether the individual experienced any symptom of an illness
or a health problem during the last 4 weeks. We will also use this question as an outcome in Table
3.8.39 We also construct an indicator from this information and interact it with the first five variables in
Table 3.4.40 This means that the outcome is the joint event of experiencing a health problem and going
to the doctor. Proceeding in that way allows us to only consider doctor visits, for instance, for those
individuals with health problems, which we then interpret as curative use. Panel A in Table 3.6 shows
the results. Insured individuals are 56.4 percentage points more likely to receive medical attention than
uninsured ones. Coverage also increases the probability of visiting a doctor with curative purposes by
55.5, the probability of obtaining medicines by 51.4 percentage points and the probability to conduct
medical analysis by 17.9 percentage points. When we group these variables together, then we find that
insurance increases the probability of using at least one curative service by 74.0 percentage points.
A third group of four variables clearly has a preventive nature: reception of vaccines, growth controls
of healthy children, reception of birth control methods and pregnancy care (variables 9-11 and 15 in Table
3.4). On top of that, the survey includes specific questions on preventive uses in the last 3 months. It is
related to family planning for women at fertile age, reception of iron supplements for pregnant women
and children under three years old, and information on prevention of sicknesses.
In line with our expectations, effects on preventive care are weaker. We do, however, find positive
effects on pregnancy care and on receiving vaccines. We find that women of fertile age are 65.0 percent-
39For those who reported any problem, there is a question on where they went for help. The variable “0’ Medical attention”
in Table 3.6 is equal to 1 if the individual went to a health institution such as a MINSA hospital or a private doctor, and equal
to 0 otherwise, for instance when the individual went to a drug store and basically did not receive any professional advice. The
variable is also 0 if the individual did not report any health problem.
40To be precise, in the questionnaire, individuals are asked whether they saw a doctor, for instance. On top of that, they
are asked whether they experienced health problems and then, if they answer with "yes", again whether they saw a doctor. In
our data, the answer to the first, general question is always yes if the one for the more specific question is yes. This concerns
outcomes 1 to 5 in Table 3.6.2.
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Table 3.6: Effect of Health Insurance on Curative and Preventive Use
Estimates Ste.
A. Curative
0’ Medical attention 0.5635*** (0.1741)
1’ Doctor visits 0.5554*** (0.1729)
2’ Medicines 0.5135*** (0.1676)
3’ Analysis 0.1788** (0.0863)
4’ X-rays 0.0926 (0.0667)
5’ Other tests 0.0382 (0.0319)
13 Hospital 0.1484 (0.0931)
14 Surgery 0.2567*** (0.0881)
16 Child birth 0.1900 (0.1593)
1’-5’,13,14,16 Any of the above 0.7402*** (0.1981)
B. Preventive
9 Vaccines 0.2884** (0.1317)
10 Kids check 0.0678 (0.2610)
11 Birth control -0.1443 (0.0934)
15 Pregnancy care 0.6504** (0.2931)
6’ Planning 1/. -0.0412 (0.2447)
7’ Iron 2/. 0.6127 (0.4954)
8’ Preventive campaign 3/. 0.0344 (0.0696)
6’-8’, 9-11,15 Any of the above 0.2743* (0.1626)
Notes: Total: N = 4,161, kids check: N = 649, pregnancy care: N = 1,182, planning: N = 1,181, iron: N = 343. Standard
errors in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. 1/. Family planning for women at fertile age. 2/. Reception of iron
supplements for pregnant women and children less than three years old. 3/. Information on prevention of sickness.
.
age points more likely to control their pregnancy relative to their uninsured peers.41 Moreover, we find a
28.9 percentage point increase in the probability to be vaccinated.42
The picture that emerges is—in line with expectations formed by the conceptual framework in Sec-
tion 3.2 and the institutional details in Section 3.3—that insurance coverage has a strong positive effect
on the use of curative services and a less strong positive effect on the use of preventive care. It is par-
ticularly interesting to compare these results to the ones by Miller et al. (2013) for Colombia, where the
system provides larger incentives for preventive care, as already discussed in Section 3.1. And indeed,
Miller et al. obtain a positive effect on preventive use and no effect on curative use, we obtain effects
mainly in curative use. Nevertheless, we do find some effects on preventive care, in particular on the
probability to be vaccinated and to receive pregnancy care.
3.6.2.3 Expenditures
Given our previous finding of positive effects in usage mainly for curative purposes, it is interesting
to ask what the effect of health insurance coverage is on out-of-pocket health expenditures. We have
41Parodi (2005) finds positive effects of SIS on pregnant women and especially those who live in urban areas. However, his
evaluation does not control for selection into insurance.
42The last variable indicates whether there was any preventive use. Clearly, in theory, the effect on this probability has to be
at least as big as the effect on vaccines, say, because an effect on vaccines implies an effect on any use. We did not impose this
here and indeed find that the effect on any use is slightly smaller than the effect on receiving vaccines. However, the difference
could also be due to estimation error.
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Table 3.7: Effect of Health Insurance on Health Expenditures
Estimates Ste.
1 Any health expenditures 0.2916 (0.1955)
2 Health expenditures 1018.8250** (440.8071)
3 Absolute deviation expenditures 809.5140** (385.2883)
4 Absolute value residual expenditures 608.7793* (369.3996)
5 Sqre residual expenditures 8.555e+06* (4.77E+06)
6 Expenses 50 0.2862 (0.1958)
7 Expenses 75 0.2716 (0.1655)
8 Share expenditures 0.1107 (0.0799)
9 Absolute deviation share 0.0702 (0.0730)
10 Absolute value residual share 0.0698 (0.0730)
11 Sqre residual expenditures 0.1422 (0.2277)
12 Share 50 0.5308** (0.2107)
13 Share 75 0.3474** (0.1760)
14 Catastrophic 5% 0.4059** (0.1777)
15 Catastrophic 10% 0.2907** (0.1407)
16 Catastrophic 15% 0.1750 (0.1148)
17 Catastrophic 20% 0.1448 (0.0998)
18 Catastrophic 25% 0.0485 (0.0856)
Notes: . Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
argued in Section 3.2 that it is unclear whether the effect is negative or positive. Obviously, it could be
negative because coverage means that individuals do not have to pay for certain treatments anymore. But
it could also be positive if medical attention convinces individuals to actually spend more on their health
themselves.
The literature has used a number of measures of health expenditures. These either attempt to measure
expected health expenditures, their variability—health risk—, or the likelihood to incur catastrophic
health expenditures.
Table 3.7 presents the effect of SIS on a number of variables constructed from annual health expen-
ditures at the individual level.43 The first dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the individual
incurs in annual health expenditures. We find no significant effect.
The second variable is the level of annual health care expenditures. The results suggests that insur-
ance actually increases the mean annual spending by about 1,000 Soles, which corresponds to around
380 U.S. dollars,—in line with the idea that individuals are motivated to spend more on their health when
using medical services more often. However, this amount is not large in relative terms. For instance, if
we compare it relative to the average income among the poor, we find that it is only around 5 percent.
We also examine a possible effect on the variability of medical spending. Our variability measure in
the third specification, similar to the one used by Miller et al. (2013), is the mean absolute deviation of
health expenditures, calculated separately by insurance status. Specification 4 and 5 are based on resid-
43See also the variable descriptions in Table 3.14. We also experimented with more sophisticated variability measures and
found similar results.
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uals obtained from a regression of health expenditures on the value of the index, insurance status and
the interaction of these two variables. The former uses the absolute value of the residual and the latter
the square. Effects are only significant at the 10 percent level. We find no effects on the probability that
health expenditures exceed the 50th or 75th percentile of the distribution of health expenditures in the
entire population.
In order to control for a possible income difference between the control and treatment groups, we
also analyze the effect of insurance on the share of annual health expenditures at the individual level on
annual household income per capita. The results are presented in row 8 to 13 and correspond to those in
row 2 to 7. Now we find a positive effect on the probability to incur high expenditures.
We also analyzed whether SIS changes the probability of an individual incurring catastrophic health
expenditures. Health spending are defined as catastrophic if share expenditures exceeds a certain thresh-
old. The cutoffs for this are manifold. On the one hand, we calculate the 50th and 75th percentile of the
distribution of the share and find that SIS increases the probability that this share exceeds the 50th and
75th percentile by 53.1 and 34.7 percentage points respectively. On the other hand, following Wagstaff
and Lindelow (2008), we use the thresholds 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 percent. We find that health insurance
coverage increases the probability that individual health expenditures exceed 5 and 10 percent of the per
capita household income by 40.6 and 29.1 respectively. We do not find significant effects for higher
cutoffs. These results are similar to those obtained by Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008) for China, who
found that insurance increases the risk of incurring high and catastrophic spending.
Overall, it is remarkable that we never find a negative effect on either expected health expenditures
or measures of variability or risk of high expenditures. Miller et al. (2013), in contrast, find for Colombia
that insurance lowers both mean inpatient medical spending and its variability.
In addition, we quantify the effects of health insurance coverage on the entire health expenditure
distribution. We follow Frandsen et al. (2012) for this. Figure 3.4 shows the estimates of the quantiles
of the distribution of health expenditures with and without health insurance coverage, as well as the
confidence intervals. Overall, we find that insurance has positive effect only on the higher end of the
distribution. This could be due to the fact that insured individuals usually receive free medical care
from SIS and uninsured individuals are not aware of their health status or who might give up on care
because of its price. In that sense, it is surprising that we do not see health expenditures to be higher
for uninsured individuals. This finding, however, is in line with our finding of stark differences in health
care utilization—uncovered individuals may simply not receive much attention or treatment of any kind.
Coming back to the finding that insurance coverage has a positive effect on the higher end of the
distribution, one explanation could be that individuals pay for part of the medical services because SIS
includes maximum levels of coverage or, as we have previously discussed in Section 3.3.2, because some
MINSA hospitals have charged for some services that are formally covered by the insurance.
In order to explore further why the effect of SIS on health spending is positive only for individuals
with high health expenditures, we select individuals whose welfare index is close to the threshold, the
20 percent closest to the left and the 20 percent closest to the right. We then divide individuals into
four groups, those who are eligible and those who are not and at the same time into those with low
health expenditures, defined as those below 50 percent, and those with high health expenditures, defined
as those above 80 percent. The idea is that by comparing eligible to ineligible individuals with high
expenditures, for instance, we can get an indication for which expenditures actually increased for the
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Notes: The figure shows the percentiles of the distribution of expenditures with and without health insurance,
along with 95 percent confidence intervals. See Frandsen et al. (2012) for details on the implementation.
high-spenders.
In Table 3.22 in the Appendix we report statistics for those four subgroups.44 First, consistently with
our general results, in almost all cases the utilization of medical services is larger for eligible individuals,
as compared to ineligible individuals. Second, we see that the differences between eligible and non-
eligible individuals are larger for individuals with high expenditures as compared to those with low
expenditures in the case of doctor visits, analysis, X-rays and surgery. This finding is consistent with
the idea that individuals reach maximum levels of coverage and pay themselves for getting complex
treatments, as already discussed in Section 3.2. Additionally, as explained in Section 3.3 above, some
MINSA hospitals may have charged for services that are usually covered by SIS.
Such rises in health care expenditures are usually seen in a critical way. However, one may also argue
that it is an open question whether this is justified here. On the one hand, the increase in expenditures can
be seen as an additional burden to the individuals, possibly also increasing the volatility of expenditures.
On the other hand, it could also indicate increased accessibility to health care, in response to them getting
the idea of using medical services in response to being insured. Finally, as some treatments are at least
partly covered by SIS, one may argue that the overall price of a treatment is lower when they insured by
SIS. In that case, the law of demand would also predict an increase in usage.
3.6.2.4 Effects on Health
We have argued in Section 3.2 that it is unclear how the effect of health insurance on health measures
that are reported by the individuals themselves can be interpreted. The reason for this is that individuals
44Birth control is excluded from the analysis because it contains only a few observations.
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Table 3.8: Effect of Health Insurance on Health
Estimates Ste.
1 Symptom 0.2655 (0.1942)
2 Illness 0.3158** (0.1465)
3 Chronic illness 0.0754 (0.1736)
4 Relapse 0.0601 (0.1113)
5 Accident 0.0714 (0.0591)
6 Num. days with symptom 0.4004 (0.4898)
7 Num. days with illness 0.6078* (0.3607)
8 Num. days with relapse 0.8262 (0.9162)
9 Num. days with accident 0.5295 (0.4494)
Notes: N = 4,161. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05
*** p<0.01.
who are covered and who see a doctor more often are more aware of their health problems. Therefore,
even if the effect on objective health measures is positive, it could be that the effect on subjective health
measures is negative of not significantly different from zero.
Table 3.8 nevertheless reports our estimates of the effects of insurance coverage on health reports. We
do find positive effects on reports of illnesses and a less strong effect on the number of days individuals
could not perform normal activities due to an illness. These results are well in line with the literature
(see for instance Acharya et al., 2013).
3.7 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, after having presented the main results, we assess whether the results are sensitive to the
particular specifications we have and whether the assumptions we have made can be supported by addi-
tional empirical evidence. We start by examining whether individuals have manipulated the IFH index
in order to become eligible for public insurance. Then, we assess whether there were discontinuities at
other values of the welfare index. Third, we conduct more local analysis by selecting subsamples of ob-
servations that are closer to the threshold. After that, we conduct a non-parametric analysis. And finally,
we assess whether other programs could challenge the validity of our results.
3.7.1 Manipulation Tests
A common threat to studies based on a RDD is the incentive to manipulate the running variable. In our
case, this means that an important number of households has access to how the IFH is calculated and, as
far as they are interested in being eligible, they may try to manipulate their answers to qualify for SIS.
We believe this is not the case for two reasons. First, households do not know the complex algorithm
behind IFH calculation. Second, the set of variables included in the IFH construction are verifiable by
questionnaire takers and difficult to manipulate. In this context, the manipulation of the running variable
would be at most partial, which typically does not lead to identification problems. However, this section
analyzes this potential thread.
We use the McCrary (2008) test for this. If manipulation is possible, the running variable will be
discontinuous at the cutoff. In our context, the density function would show many individuals barely
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Notes: The figures show estimates of the density of the IFH index around the threshold. The left figure is for the full sample. The
figure in the middle is for the sample in which we keep the 75 percent of the observations that are closest to the threshold in terms
of the IFH index, separately to the right and to the left. In the right figure we do the same for the 50 percent closest observations
to the left and to the right. Full sample: bin size of 0.59 and bandwidth of 23; sample 75: bin size of 0.44 and bandwidth of 12
and sample 50: bin size of 0.32 and bandwidth of 4.8.
qualifying for SIS, that is, to the left of the cutoff, and surprisingly few failing to qualify, that is, to the
right of the cutoff. The formal procedure is twofold: firstly a finely gridded histogram is obtained and
then this histogram is smoothed with a local linear regression for each side of the cutoff.
Figure 3.5 presents the results. The three panels show the results of the McCrary test for the full
sample, for a sample of the 75 and 50 percent individuals with an IFH index closest to the threshold,
separately on each side. Formally, the test for the full sample rejects smoothness of the density around
the threshold. However, the result is not robust to choosing smaller subsamples and in any case would
hint at manipulation towards becoming ineligible, as the density is higher above the threshold.45
3.7.2 Jumps at Non-Discontinuity Points
If having public insurance (which we instrument it by using eligibility into SIS program) is associated
with positive effects on health outcome indicators, we should not find effects by using other “thresholds”.
Since the threshold to determine eligibility is 55, we should find zero effects in settings where it is
known that there are non-discontinuity points. Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008) we do this by
conducting a parallel RDD analysis at the medians of the subsample distribution at either side of the
official threshold. For example, the subsample at the left of the threshold would be comprised by those
with zi(IFHindex)< 55 and we test for a jump at the median. By only using data on the left of the official
threshold, we avoid conducting the regressions at a point where it is known to have a discontinuity. We
proceed similarly for the subsample at the right of the threshold. Splitting each subsample at its median
increases the power to find discontinuities.
Results are presented in Tables 3.23 and 3.24 in the Appendix. In general, we observe no significant
effects on health outcome variables when we run the regressions at the medians of the subsamples. The
only exception is, however, the participation variable (health insurance) in the subsample at the right of
the official threshold; there is a significant jump when we use the IV-2SLS regressions on the 75 percent
observations closer to the median. However, this disappears when we use local linear regressions.46
45It could be that, for budgetary reasons, the government set the threshold in a way such that a bulk of individuals is just not
eligible for SIS. We are, however, not able to test this hypothesis. Importantly, it would not threaten our identification strategy
as long as the variation in the index around the threshold is still random.
46We also conduct a reduced form analysis (regressions of outcomes on the index, eligibility, its interaction and controls) to
see whether any outcome jumps discontinuously at the fictitious thresholds described before. No significant effects are observed
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3.7.3 More Local Analysis
It can be argued that the linearity assumption is strong and therefore the analysis should be conducted
on the population with IFH index values closer to the threshold. To see whether results are sensitive to
that, we reduce the sample to the 75 and 50 percent of the population with IFH index values closest to
the threshold, separately for each side.
Tables 3.25, 3.26 and 3.27 show the results for these reduced samples. Some of the coefficient es-
timates increase in magnitude while the precision of the estimates decreases. For instance, for the 75
percent sample, we find that the effects on the likelihood to visit a doctor, receiving medicines, conduct-
ing analysis and having access to surgery increase from 51.5, 52.7, 20.6 and 25.7 reported in Table 3.4 to
76.1, 88.3, 36.3 and 44.1 percentage points, respectively. At the same time, due to the decreased number
of observations, the precision of the estimates decreases, as expected. The estimates of the effects of
insurance on receiving vaccines and pregnancy care are therefore no longer significantly different from
zero.
3.7.4 Controlling for Covariates
It is standard practice to test whether the expectation of covariates such as age or gender is a continuous
function in the welfare index around the eligibility threshold. When it it is found not to be, then one may
be concerned that the assumptions underlying our analysis do not hold. This could be because there is
selection on observables, which makes it more or less likely that data are observed for a given individual.
While this could be addressed by controlling for covariates, one may then be concerned that there is also
selection on unobservables, which could not easily be addressed. Likewise, one may then be concerned
that there are other discontinuities at the same threshold and therefore the estimated effect cannot be
attributed to SIS only.
We first conduct a graphical analysis and then a formal one in which we replace the dependent health
variables by the observed covariates age, gender, whether the woman is the head of the household, the
number of household members, years of education and household expenditures. In Section 3.6.2, we use
the first five covariates as controls in order to be able to obtain more precise estimates.
Figure 3.6 and Table 3.9 summarize the results. The latter reports instrumental variables estimates of
the effect of insurance on the covariates. We do not find evidence for a discontinuity in the expectation
of the covariates except for one, which is the variable number of household members. Figure 3.6 shows
that the expected number of households changes by about 0.5, or 10 percent, which (roughly) gives the
estimated effect in Table 3.9 if we divide it by the change in the probability of about 0.14 reported in
the first column of Table 3.25. This means that the effect is significantly different from zero and of
substantial size.47
in general, except for vaccines. There is a negative effect on the subsample to the left and a positive one on the subsample at the
right of the original threshold. However, these effects disappear when we use local linear regressions. The rest of the variables,
especially those related to curative services, do not exhibit any significant jump at those thresholds.
47We also conduct a reduced form analysis of whether there is a jump on any of the covariates at the threshold. In general,
they do not exhibit any significant jump, except for the expectation of the variable number of household members. The effect
is negative as before.
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Table 3.9: Effect of Insurance Coverage on Covariates
(1) (2) (3)
IV-2SLS Full sample Sample 75% Sample 50%
Estimates Ste. Estimates Ste. Estimates Ste.
Woman -0.0438 (0.1956) -0.2057 (0.3028) 0.0769 (0.4240)
Age -7.3244 (8.4632) 6.9167 (12.6805) -0.5141 (17.9161)
Years of education 2.1508 (1.8593) 0.1840 (2.7045) -6.5433 (4.5075)
Number household members -3.5275*** (1.0520) -5.5418*** (1.9892) -3.8927 (2.3943)
Women as head of household -0.0149 (0.1692) 0.3951 (0.2793) 0.6886 (0.4523)
Household’s expenditure 1/. 0.2645 (0.1736) 0.0281 (0.2403) -0.5288 (0.4069)
Notes: N = 4,161. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.00.
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If selection on observables is present, then we should control for it in the main analysis. However,
we also conducted the main analysis without controlling for covariates, hence also not for the number of
household members. Tables 3.25, 3.26 and 3.27 show that the main conclusions we have drawn remain
the same. It is comforting to see that while we find a discontinuity in the number of household members,
our results do not seem to be sensitive to whether or not we control for it in our analysis.48
3.7.5 Non-Parametric Analysis
To address the concern that linearity is too strong of an assumption we conduct a non-parametric analysis.
For this, we use local linear and local quadratic regressions to predict the expected outcome and the
probability to be covered by insurance using only data to the left or to the right of the discontinuity,
respectively. We then calculate the difference between the prediction for the outcome from the right and
from the left and divide it by the difference in the probability to be covered by SIS. This leads an estimate
of the local average treatment effect that can be compared to the ones reported above.49
Table 3.10 shows the results. Generally speaking, estimates are less precise, but point estimates are
similar. This suggests that the linear specification we use is appropriate.
3.7.6 Juntos and Food Aid Program
Our identification strategy is based on the assumption that discontinuities at the eligibility threshold
can be attributed to SIS. There are some programs whose presence could in principle challenge this
assumption.
One of them is Juntos, a conditional cash transfer program. It combines a geographic targeting of the
poorest districts with individual targeting, based on the IFH index and the presence of children up to the
age of 14. However, Juntos is a rural program and our study focuses on the Lima Province, and our data
confirm that no individual in the sample belongs to Juntos.
Besides, there is a number of food aid programs oriented to the poor. To be precise, they are oriented
to different groups of the population, such as mothers, children and school students. Our data show that
29 percent of the individuals of our sample receive at least support from one of them.50 Importantly, since
these programs do not use SISFOH’s targeting rules and in particular not the IFH index, it is unlikely
that a discontinuity at the eligibility threshold can be attributed to them. Our finding in Section 3.7.4
that household expenditures do not exhibit a discontinuity at the insurance threshold provides additional
48One may nevertheless wonder why we find such an effect. We could also think of the number of household members as an
outcome that is negatively affected by having insurance because insurance has a positive effect on using birth control products,
which leads to reduced fertility. We, however, do not find such effects that could explain the reduction of birth control methods,
also not in the specifications that do not control for covariates. Taken together with the finding that results do not depend on
whether or not we control for covariates including the number of household members, leads us to conclude that the number of
household members does not play an important role here and that the effects we find are likely effects of insurance coverage on
reporting behavior. It is possible that after being covered by insurance, respondents to the survey use a more strict definition of
the household that includes only those members that are covered by health insurance.
49It is in principle possible to also control for covariates. This, however, would involve estimating partially linear models
where we impose that they enter linearly. We do not do so here because this goes along with a large increase in the computational
burden when we bootstrap the standard errors. Therefore, the results are closest to the ones in Tables 3.25, 3.26 and 3.27.
Arguably, since these have in turn be close to the main results where we control for covariates and since we have found that
only one covariate exhibits a moderate jump at the discontinuity, this seems a reasonable way to proceed given that this is meant
to be a robustness check.
50The percentage of individuals that receive food aid is 29 percent among those not covered by SIS and 51 percent among
those who are covered. There is no information on the reception of food aid for 874 individuals, or 20 percent of our sample.
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support for this interpretation.
3.8 Conclusions
Until recently, large parts of the population in developing countries did not have access to public health
insurance. While it is commonly believed that the effects of health insurance coverage are positive,
we still lack empirical evidence on its impact on health care utilization, health expenditures, and health
outcomes. Besides, it is not yet understood enough through which channels health insurance coverage
ultimately leads to better health outcomes and to what extent it is possible to encourage individuals to
invest into preventive care.
In this paper, we use rich survey data from Peru to study the effects of the large-scale social health
insurance program called “Seguro Integral de Salud” (SIS). The SIS program is targeted to poor indi-
viduals working in the informal labor market. Coverage has increased since 2006 and by now about 40
percent of the population are covered by SIS. We make use of the institutional details that give rise to a
regression discontinuity design. We estimate the effect of insurance coverage on a wealth of measures
for health care utilization, health expenditures and health.
We find strong effects of insurance coverage on measures of health care utilization, such as visiting a
doctor, receiving medication and medical analysis. We also find effects on preventive care, but they are
much less pronounced. We find positive effects on health care expenditures, most likely at the high end
of the distribution, and no clear effects on self-reported health measures.
Our interpretation of these results is that the Peruvian health insurance program was able to encourage
poor individuals to seek medical attention. They receive treatments when they need them, but are less
inclined to invest in preventive care, with the exception of vaccination and pregnancy care. This is not
surprising, as the system does not provide any incentives to actually do so.
The effect of insurance coverage on health care expenditures is small for most individuals. However,
in light of the remaining findings this is not indicating that the program has no effects. To the contrary,
individuals who are covered and can relatively easily be treated receive treatment at no or very low cost to
them, while individuals who are not covered are simply not treated and therefore have low expenditures.
Taken together with our finding that there is a positive effect on the health care expenditures at the higher
end of the distribution, our results suggest that once individuals get in touch with the health care system,
they are even willing to pay themselves for the services when they are important.
Overall, the evidence suggests that when compared to health care systems in other developing coun-
tries, the Peruvian one is a notable exception. It seems to reach its goal to provide access to medical care
to a sizable fraction of the poor. As of now, there is no evidence on the effects it will have on health, but
it is imaginable that increased access will ultimately lead to better health outcomes. We discuss in the
paper why it remains a challenge for the future to measure those, but the institutional features make this
a more promising endeavor than it is in many other countries.
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C IFH Index
C.1 Variables and Weights for IFH Construction
The IFH index is constructed such that it takes on values between 0 and 100. Higher values indicate
better living conditions. In the following, we explain how the index is calculated. SISFOH (2010)
provides more details.
First, the ENAHO for the year 2009 was used to determine the set of variables that enters into the
IFH computation. The Sommers test was used to identify correlation between candidate explanatory
variables and a measure of poverty. Then, significant variables were selected and a Principal Component
analysis for discrete variables was applied to reduce dimensions and to focus on those variables that
mainly explain the variability of the data. The weights that are used to construct the index correspond to
the contribution of the respective variables to the first principal component. This was done separately for
three geographic areas, the Lima Province, the other urban areas, and all rural areas.
Table 3.15 and 3.16 show the variables, the mutually exclusive alternatives and the corresponding
weights. There are three independent sets of weight that correspond to households living in different
geographic areas. For instance, consider a household from Lima that cooks with carbon, uses water from
outside the house and lives in a house with brick walls. Then, the first three addends of the IFX index
are -0.33, -0.35 and 0.10.51
Using those weights a raw index i f hi j is calculated as a linear combination of household character-
istics with cluster-specific weights. Then, it is standardized so that it lies between 0 and 100 in each
cluster. The standardized index is
i f h0i j = 100⇤
i f hi j   i f hminj
i f hmaxj   i f hminj
,
where i f h0i j is the adjusted IFH that lies in the interval [0,100] and i f hminj and i f h
max
j are the minimum
and the maximum values of the original IFH index in cluster j, respectively.
C.2 Thresholds for IFH by Cluster
To determine eligibility, there are thresholds for the IFH index by cluster. Individuals and households
with an index below or equal to the threshold are eligible for SIS. Table 3.17 shows the thresholds by
cluster. The 15 clusters were defined by identifying areas with similar monetary poverty in the year
2009. In general, each cluster includes several unconnected geographic areas.52 As an example, consider
cluster 2, which includes the rural areas of the jungle of the departments of Ayacucho, Junin, Loreto,
Puno, San Martin and Ucayali; and also the rural areas of the northern highlands of the departments of
Cajamarca and Lambayeque. The thresholds were determined such that poor individuals, in some sense
that is not spelled out, were eligible. They are conservative in the sense that they allow for type 2 errors
51Importantly, the number of members of the household with health insurance does not include those with either SIS or
EsSalud. This is important because otherwise, our third assumption in Section 3.5, the exclusion restriction, would likely be
violated.
52Only clusters 1, 14 and 15 include connected geographic areas.
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Table 3.15: Variables and weights for IFH construction
Variables Metropolitan
Lima
remaining urban areas rural areas
Fuel used to cook
Do not cook -0.49 -0.67 -0.76
Other -0.40 -0.50 -0.38
Firewood -0.37 -0.33 0.05
Carbon -0.33 -0.22 0.36
Kerosine -0.29 -0.19 0.37
Gas 0.02 0.12 0.52
Electricity 0.43 0.69 0.52










Wood or mat -0.48 -0.55
Stone with mud -0.44 -0.46
Rushes covered with mud -0.41 -0.43
Clay -0.39 -0.38
Sun-dried brick or adobe -0.37 -0.20






Septic tank -0.46 -0.30
Drainage system outside the house -0.39 -0.21
Drainage system inside the house 0.10 0.20
Number of members with health insurance
None -0.26 -0.25 -0.10
One -0.04 0.06 0.50
Two 0.06 0.17 0.59
Three 0.14 0.27 0.66
More than three 0.32 0.48 0.86
Goods that identify household wealth
None -0.47 -0.35 -0.11
One -0.17 0.05 0.64
Two 0.02 0.25 0.83
Three 0.15 0.40 0.90
Four 0.25 0.52 1.09




Notes: Taken from SISFOH (2010).
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Table 3.16: Variables and weights for IFH construction (continued)
Variables Metropolitan
Lima





Woven cane -0.38 -0.23
Tiles -0.23 0.03
Wood or mat -0.21 0.07
Concrete 0.17 0.32
Education of the Household head
None -0.51 -0.57 -0.59
Preschool -0.43 -0.25 -0.08
Primary -0.28 0.01 0.35
Secondary -0.06 0.19 0.59
Vocational education (VET) 0.10 0.33 0.68
Undergraduate 0.22 0.55 0.88







Vinyl sheets 0.28 0.51
Parquet 0.51 0.71
Overcrowding
More than six -0.68
Between four and six -0.51
Between two and four -0.31
Between one and two -0.07
Less than one 0.24









Floor made of earth
Yes -0.17
No 0.47
Notes: Taken from SISFOH (2010).
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Table 3.17: Eligibility Thresholds by Cluster






1 33 208,101 2,184 1,815 0.5159
2 36 1,907,122 2,116 1,697 0.5994
3 34 2,284,876 2,332 1,937 0.5404
4 38 2,646,680 2,282 1,916 0.5389
5 35 634,472 2,067 1,595 0.6410
6 34 212,723 5,941 4,045 0.2606
7 52 2,544,448 5,141 4,260 0.2565
8 42 2,134,993 5,667 4,428 0.2397
9 44 3,740,611 6,403 5,050 0.1352
10 50 2,229,638 5,997 4,673 0.1620
11 44 490,207 5,498 4,015 0.2725
12 43 101,993 8,632 4,638 0.1645
13 43 1,636,740 5,045 4,024 0.2116
14 33 93,527 8,961 6,178 0.0261
15 55 9,342,700 8,712 6,612 0.1546
Peru - 30,208,831 5,793 4,501 0.2764
Notes: Based on SISFOH (2010), own calculations using the ENAHO 2011. There is no threshold at the national
level. 1/. Soles.
in the sense that an individual might be declared as eligible even though, according to the criteria that
are used, is not part of the target population.53
Table 3.17 also provides some economic indicators obtained from the ENAHO for the year 2011.
The variation of the thresholds across clusters reflects the variation in income within Peru. The lower
thresholds correspond to the poorer clusters, that is, those with the lowest levels of per capita monetary
income (or spending) and the highest proportions of poor individuals.54 The Lima Province, the city
under analysis, is in cluster 15, with a cutoff of 55.
We use ENAHO data for the year 2011 as well as the actual weights to re-compute the IFH index for
individuals and households in our sample. We cannot directly assess how strongly our index is correlated
with the one that was used by the government to determine eligibility. However, as an informal test, we
re-produced figures illustrating the correlations between the IFH index and expenditures per capita in
SISFOH (2010). Figure 3.7 shows the figure we obtain for the Lima Province. Generally speaking, the
reproduced figures resemble the official ones.
53The thresholds are set such that the marginal benefit of expanding five percentage points of coverage of the eligible popu-
lation generated a marginal increase of one percentage point in that error.
54Cluster 14, which corresponds to the urban areas of the jungle of Madre de Dios, is an interesting exception. Informal
mining and illegal drugs production have increased income levels during the past years.
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Figure 3.7: Relationship between IFH and Expenditures Per Capita in Lima Province
Notes: Based on ENAHO data for the year 2011, See Appendix C for details on how the IFH index is computed.
The right figure shows box plots for expenditures by poverty status.
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D Additional Results
D.1 Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
Table 3.18: OLS Results for the Full Sample and by Gender
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample Women Men
Estimates Ste. Estimates Ste. Estimates Ste.
Utilization
1 Doctor visits 0.0733*** (0.0150) 0.0634*** (0.0212) 0.0785*** (0.0213)
2 Medicines 0.0664*** (0.0157) 0.0510** (0.0219) 0.0785*** (0.0227)
3 Analysis 0.0388*** (0.0083) 0.0321** (0.0125) 0.0440*** (0.0107)
4 X-rays 0.0232*** (0.0065) 0.0147 (0.0097) 0.0301*** (0.0083)
5 Other tests 0.0080** (0.0038) 0.0079 (0.0058) 0.0077 (0.0050)
6 Dental care 0.0151 (0.0105) -0.0062 (0.0144) 0.0372** (0.0153)
7 Ophthalmology -0.0008 (0.0072) -0.0035 (0.0102) 0.0020 (0.0102)
8 Glasses -0.0010 (0.0062) -0.0040 (0.0087) 0.0035 (0.0090)
9 Vaccines 0.0369*** (0.0101) 0.0430*** (0.0146) 0.0313** (0.0138)
10 Kids check 0.0058 (0.0292) -0.0054 (0.0392) 0.0179 (0.0432)
11 Birth control 0.0110 (0.0076) 0.0311*** (0.0117) -0.0108 (0.0094)
12 Others 0.0283** (0.0136) 0.0229 (0.0195) 0.0303 (0.0190)
13 Hospital 0.0439*** (0.0081) 0.0552*** (0.0128) 0.0293*** (0.0095)
14 Surgery 0.0214*** (0.0067) 0.0240** (0.0104) 0.0163** (0.0080)
15 Pregnancy care 0.0856*** (0.0180) 0.0856*** (0.0180)
16 Child birth 0.0531*** (0.0130) 0.0531*** (0.0130)
0’ Medical attention 0.0841*** (0.0131) 0.0795*** (0.0189) 0.0834*** (0.0179)
1’ Doctor visits 0.0834*** (0.0130) 0.0795*** (0.0188) 0.0821*** (0.0179)
2’ Medicines 0.0819*** (0.0128) 0.0798*** (0.0185) 0.0793*** (0.0176)
3’ Analysis 0.0338*** (0.0079) 0.0261** (0.0118) 0.0400*** (0.0101)
4’ X-rays 0.0157*** (0.0061) 0.0060 (0.0091) 0.0241*** (0.0078)
5’ Other tests 0.0067** (0.0032) 0.0076* (0.0046) 0.0057 (0.0043)
6’ Planning 0.0654*** (0.0209) 0.0654*** (0.0209)
7’ Iron 0.0196 (0.0383) 0.0520 (0.0431) -0.0839 (0.0829)
8’ Preventive campaign 0.0140** (0.0063) 0.0238** (0.0097) 0.0023 (0.0079)
Health report
1 Symptom -0.0093 (0.0157) -0.0155 (0.0221) -0.0049 (0.0223)
2 Illness 0.0171 (0.0113) 0.0275* (0.0162) 0.0037 (0.0160)
3 Chronic illness 0.0423*** (0.0144) 0.0237 (0.0197) 0.0582*** (0.0212)
4 Relapse 0.0333*** (0.0097) 0.0146 (0.0140) 0.0509*** (0.0133)
5 Accident 0.0031 (0.0048) 0.0035 (0.0064) 0.0021 (0.0074)
6 Num. days with
symptom
0.0322 (0.0361) 0.0109 (0.0491) 0.0535 (0.0580)
7 Num. days with
illness
0.0103 (0.0347) 0.0196 (0.0567) -0.0026 (0.0383)
8 Num. days with
relapse
0.1092 (0.0806) 0.0983 (0.1197) 0.0969 (0.1039)
9 Num. days with
accident
0.0846** (0.0420) 0.1024 (0.0716) 0.0608 (0.0379)
.
Notes: OLS regressions of outcome variables on health insurance and covariates (i.e woman, age, years of education, number household
members and woman as head of household). Standard errors are denoted by Ste. and reported in parentheses. "* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
Full: N=4,161 (total); N=649 (kids check); N=1.182 (pregnancy care); N=1,182 (child birth); N=1,181 (planning); N=343 (iron). Sample 75:
N=3,124 (total); N=499 (kids check); N=892 (pregnancy care) N=892 (child birth); N=891 (planning); N=264 (iron). Sample 50: N=2,078
(total); N=347 (kids check); N=618 (pregnancy care) N=618 (child birth); N=617 (planning); N=189 (iron).
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Table 3.19: Effect of Health Insurance on Participation and Utilization by Gender
Women Men
Estimates Ste. Estimates Ste.
First stage: Participation
0 Health Insurance 0.1415*** (0.0364) 0.1399*** (0.0363)
F = 15.1116 F = 14.8533
Second stage: Utilization
1 Doctor visits 0.4448* (0.2657) 0.6016** (0.2881)
2 Medicines 0.6602** (0.2961) 0.4045 (0.2835)
3 Analysis 0.1705 (0.1331) 0.2413* (0.1262)
4 X-rays 0.1583 (0.1098) 0.1006 (0.0899)
5 Other tests -0.0253 (0.0614) 0.1321** (0.0619)
6 Dental 0.0555 (0.1703) 0.0767 (0.1771)
7 Ophthalmology 0.0773 (0.1213) -0.0114 (0.1167)
8 Glasses 1/. -0.0593 (0.0945) 0.0004 (0.1024)
9 Vaccines 0.2027 (0.1847) 0.3862** (0.1908)
10 Kids check -0.6652 (0.6071) 0.4167 (0.3630)
11 Birth control 0.0274 (0.1344) -0.3181** (0.1394)
12 Others 0.3174 (0.2464) 0.0363 (0.2134)
13 Hospital 0.2172 (0.1563) 0.0845 (0.0972)
14 Surgery 0.4347*** (0.1649) 0.0735 (0.0845)
15 Pregnancy care 0.6504** (0.2931)
16 Child birth 0.1900 (0.1593)
(1-16) Any of the above 0.4198* (0.2428) 0.4653* (0.2823)
Notes: IV-2SLS regressions. 1/. Not covered by SIS. 2/. Women: N=2,127 (total); N=314 (kids check); N=1,182 (pregnancy care) N=1,182
(child birth). 3/. Men: N=2,034 (total); N=335 (kids check). 4/. Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
.
.
D.2 Differences by Gender
In Tables 3.19, 3.20 and 3.21 we conduct the IV-2SLS regressions but reducing the sample to two
subgroups, women and men. In general, we lose significance due to the number of observations but we
are able to know more about where effects come from.
Table 3.19 shows that the positive effects on the probabilities to receive medicines, surgery and
pregnancy care are driven by women, whereas the impacts on the probability of being vaccinated comes
from the men (probably children). The likelihood of visiting doctor is associated with both men and
women.
Table 3.20 indicates that, conditional on having had a health problem, both women and men, publicly
insured, are more likely to seek for medical attention in public hospitals and health care centers and
to receive professional attention and medication (estimates for variables medical attention, doctor and
medicines are significant at conventional levels). If we disentangle curative and preventive uses, we
observe no effects on preventive services whereas we do find effects on curative services for both women
and men.
Shifting attention to health report, in general we find no significant effects (see Table 3.21), but in the
case on women we find positive and significant effect on one variable: illness. As we already explained,
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Table 3.20: Effect of Health Insurance on Curative and Preventive Use by Gender
Women Men
Estimates Ste. Estimates Ste.
Second stage: Utilization
A. Curative (for individuals who had health problems)
0’ Medical attention 0.6257** (0.2529) 0.5070** (0.2377)
1’ Doctor visits 0.6118** (0.2501) 0.5045** (0.2374)
2’ Medicines 0.5785** (0.2433) 0.4543** (0.2290)
3’ Analysis 0.1427 (0.1266) 0.2167* (0.1161)
4’ X-rays 0.1429 (0.1054) 0.0397 (0.0823)
5’ Other tests -0.0131 (0.0427) 0.0935* (0.0512)
13 Hospital 0.2172 (0.1563) 0.0845 (0.0972)
14 Surgery 0.4347*** (0.1649) 0.0735 (0.0845)
16 Child birth 0.1900 (0.1593)
(1’-5’,13,14,16) Any of the above 0.9011*** (0.3039) 0.5868** (0.2553)
B. Preventive (for specific groups of individuals)
9 Vaccines 0.2027 (0.1847) 0.3862** (0.1908)
10 Kids check -0.6652 (0.6071) 0.4167 (0.3630)
11 Birth control 0.0274 (0.1344) -0.3181** (0.1394)
15 Pregnancy care 0.6504** (0.2931)
6’ Planning 1/. -0.0412 (0.2447)
7’ Iron 2/. 1.1696 (1.1375) -0.0862 (0.5180)
8’ Preventive campaign 3/. 0.0515 (0.1094) 0.0178 (0.0844)
(6’-8’,9-11,15) Any of the above 0.2911 (0.2404) 0.2783 (0.2160)
Notes: IV-2SLS regressions. 1/. Family planning for women at fertile age. 2/. Reception of iron supplements for pregnant women and children
under three years old. 3/. Information on prevention of sickness. 4/. Women: N=2,127 (total); N=314 (kids check); N=1,182 (pregnancy care);
N=1,181 (planning); N=255 (iron). 5/. Men: N=2,034 (total); N=335 (kids check); N=88 (iron). 6/. Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10
** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
.
.
Table 3.21: Effect of Health Insurance on Health by Gender
Women Men
Estimates Ste. Estimates Ste.
Second stage: Health report
1 Symptom 0.1164 (0.2670) 0.4327 (0.2871)
2 Illness 0.4833** (0.2215) 0.1400 (0.1960)
3 Chronic illness 0.1366 (0.2399) 0.0105 (0.2504)
4 Relapse 0.1307 (0.1662) -0.0097 (0.1485)
5 Accident -0.0020 (0.0700) 0.1439 (0.1000)
6 Num. days with symptom 0.0950 (0.4995) 0.6927 (0.8642)
7 Num. days with illness 0.8062 (0.5478) 0.3940 (0.4673)
8 Num. days with relapse -0.1836 (1.1663) 1.8964 (1.4563)
9 Num. days with accident 1.0086 (0.8235) 0.0057 (0.3664)
Notes: IV-2SLS regressions. 1/. Women: N=2,127. 2/. Men: N=2,034. 3/. Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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the public insurance implies a closer relationship between individuals and the health system, hence we
argue that women in our sample seems to be more aware they have an illness and report it (Strauss and
Thomas, 1998; Dow et al., 1997).
D.3 Health expenditures
Table 3.22: Health outcome variables by expenditure groups
Low Low High High Low Low High High
Z1<0 Z1>=0 Z1<0 Z1>=0 Z1<0 Z1>=0 Z1<0 Z1>=0
Doctor visit 0.1373 0.0998 0.7289 0.6000 Medical attention 0.0892 0.0560 0.5783 0.4970
0.3446 0.3000 0.4459 0.4914 0.2853 0.2301 0.4953 0.5015
Medicines 0.2193 0.1557 0.8614 0.7939 Doctor visit 1 0.0892 0.0560 0.5663 0.4909
0.4143 0.3630 0.3465 0.4057 0.2853 0.2301 0.4971 0.5014
Analysis 0.0361 0.0146 0.2229 0.1697 Medicines 1 0.0867 0.0560 0.5542 0.4909
0.1869 0.1201 0.4174 0.3765 0.2818 0.2301 0.4986 0.5014
X-Rays 0.0145 0.0073 0.1627 0.1152 Analysis1 0.0337 0.0122 0.1988 0.1636
0.1195 0.0852 0.3702 0.3202 0.1808 0.1098 0.4003 0.3711
Tests 0.0024 0.0024 0.0542 0.0364 X-Rays 1 0.0120 0.0073 0.1506 0.1152
0.0491 0.0493 0.2271 0.1878 0.1092 0.0852 0.3587 0.3202
Dental 0.0458 0.0341 0.2831 0.2727 Tests 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0361 0.0242
0.2093 0.1816 0.4519 0.4467 0.0000 0.0000 0.1872 0.1543
Eyes 0.0193 0.0122 0.1265 0.1697 Curative 0.1301 0.1022 0.6867 0.5636
0.1377 0.1098 0.3334 0.3765 0.3368 0.3033 0.4652 0.4974
Glasses 0.0096 0.0024 0.0723 0.1455 Planning 0.1188 0.0813 0.1509 0.1020
0.0978 0.0493 0.2597 0.3536 0.3252 0.2744 0.3614 0.3058
Vaccines 0.1422 0.0876 0.1024 0.1273 Iron 0.1111 0.0294 0.2143 0.3333
0.3496 0.2830 0.3041 0.3343 0.3187 0.1715 0.4258 0.5000
Kids check 0.1932 0.2424 0.4286 0.1923 Preventive campaign 0.0313 0.0268 0.0482 0.0485
0.3971 0.4318 0.5040 0.4019 0.1744 0.1616 0.2148 0.2154
Birth control 0.0289 0.0195 0.0663 0.0848 Preventive 0.2169 0.1557 0.2590 0.2606
0.1678 0.1383 0.2495 0.2795 0.4126 0.3630 0.4394 0.4403
Others 0.1084 0.0900 0.2952 0.4303 Symptom 0.2964 0.2968 0.5602 0.4667
0.3113 0.2866 0.4575 0.4966 0.4572 0.4574 0.4979 0.5004
Hospital 0.0434 0.0462 0.1325 0.1152 Illness 0.0964 0.0365 0.2349 0.2364
0.2039 0.2102 0.3401 0.3202 0.2955 0.1878 0.4252 0.4261
Surgery 0.0265 0.0243 0.1265 0.0727 Chronic 0.2964 0.2968 0.5843 0.6303
0.1608 0.1543 0.3334 0.2605 0.4572 0.4574 0.4943 0.4842
Pregnancy care 0.1287 0.0813 0.1509 0.1020 Relapse 0.0506 0.0511 0.2108 0.2121
0.3366 0.2744 0.3614 0.3058 0.2194 0.2205 0.4091 0.4101
Child birth 0.0693 0.0569 0.0755 0.0408 Accident 0.0145 0.0024 0.0663 0.0303
0.2552 0.2326 0.2667 0.1999 0.1195 0.0493 0.2495 0.1719
Use 0.4410 0.3528 1.0000 1.0000 Symptom Num. days 0.1084 0.0973 0.1867 0.1879
0.4971 0.4784 0.0000 0.0000 1.5085 1.0384 0.7909 0.8943
Illness Num. days 0.0651 0.0146 0.4036 0.2545
0.5367 0.1705 1.5530 1.1876
Relapse Num. days 0.2651 0.1338 0.7831 0.6424
2.6480 1.6789 3.8849 4.0439
Accident Num. days 0.0169 0.0000 0.4096 0.1030
0.2641 0.0000 2.8817 0.9476
Health expenditure (Soles) 4.3735 2.4161 1432.1270 1324.7330
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D.4 Additional Tables for Sensitivity Analysis
Table 3.23: IV-2SLS at the medians of the subsample distributions
(1) (2) (3)
Median Z<55 Full sample Sample 75% Sample 50%
Estimates Ste. Estimates Ste. Estimates Ste.
First stage: Participation
0 Health Insurance -0.0160 (0.0455) -0.0067 (0.0538) 0.0209 (0.0651)
F = 0.1237 F = 0.0155 F = 0.1031
Second stage: Utilization
1 Doctor visits 3.1152 (9.0213) 14.2173 (113.2961) -1.5376 (5.9184)
2 Medicines 2.5642 (7.5926) 8.2319 (65.6629) -1.1515 (4.9309)
3 Analysis 0.5863 (2.1066) 1.6053 (13.1504) 0.6894 (2.5525)
4 X-rays 0.7143 (2.2662) 0.3760 (4.1790) 0.6777 (2.3516)
5 Other tests 0.0669 (0.6350) -0.3273 (3.2590) -0.2170 (1.0048)
6 Dental care 0.4442 (2.0624) -0.1616 (5.0548) 2.1758 (6.9219)
7 Ophthalmology 1.6162 (4.6851) 4.4831 (35.9662) -0.5749 (1.9599)
8 Glasses 1.4392 (4.2278) 1.7585 (14.4648) -0.0345 (0.9222)
9 Vaccines 4.0881 (11.6414) 22.4286 (179.3428) -6.8304 (21.2996)
10 Kids check 1.3285 (6.1547) -0.9031 (4.3801) 0.2555 (1.6658)
11 Birth control -1.6099 (4.7842) -3.0300 (24.6963) 1.2799 (4.1810)
12 Others 4.7598 (13.7206) 10.1690 (81.5841) -2.3858 (7.8533)
13 Hospital 1.3865 (3.9999) 3.4710 (27.5809) -1.2934 (4.3790)
14 Surgery 1.4760 (4.2762) 4.5179 (36.0962) -1.3853 (4.5133)
15 Pregnancy care -12.3856 (356.4444) 1.0199 (3.6983) 1.3988 (12.6485)
16 Child birth 3.9812 (113.6240) -0.5121 (2.2735) -0.2288 (4.2888)
0’ Medical attention 1.3966 (4.2963) 6.2757 (49.5992) -2.8409 (9.6498)
1’ Doctor visits 1.8136 (5.3320) 6.4686 (51.1275) -2.7256 (9.3072)
2’ Medicines 2.0428 (5.9121) 5.6401 (44.5245) -2.8328 (9.6257)
3’ Analysis 0.5004 (1.8910) 0.8785 (7.8034) 0.8804 (3.0105)
4’ X-rays 0.7582 (2.3646) 0.3034 (3.7348) 0.8660 (2.8609)
5’ Other tests -0.1090 (0.4980) -0.5459 (4.5190) -0.0242 (0.4522)
6’ Planning 14.7303 (419.9662) -2.6319 (9.5069) 7.4002 (65.7071)
7’ Iron -1.1360 (1.4227) -0.7489 (1.4188) -0.2569 (0.7720)
8’ Preventive campaign 0.5337 (1.9841) 1.1240 (9.6639) 0.8012 (2.8689)
Health report
1 Symptom -0.8470 (3.8124) 0.9297 (10.6142) 1.5909 (5.5726)
2 Illness 0.2594 (2.1987) 3.1431 (25.3804) -0.4516 (2.8994)
3 Chronic illness 1.4699 (4.7893) 9.9956 (80.3271) -3.3579 (10.7153)
4 Relapse -1.0055 (3.2326) 1.4927 (12.6977) -1.9782 (6.3177)
5 Accident 1.1493 (3.4220) 2.3733 (19.2548) -0.7489 (2.5050)
6 Num. days with symptom 2.8030 (9.5805) 17.3124 (139.2717) -5.2107 (16.9078)
7 Num. days with illness -8.0916 (24.2102) -29.8136 (240.3652) 10.7701 (34.5336)
8 Num. days with relapse -3.4676 (12.0192) -22.5220 (182.5997) 0.9482 (9.7698)
9 Num. days with accident 5.3389 (15.9987) 18.3468 (146.8399) -10.6549 (34.3236)
Notes: IV-2SLS regressions. Standard errors are denoted by Ste. and reported in parentheses. "* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Full: N=1,786
(total); N=363 (kids check); N=532 (pregnancy care); N=532 (child birth); N=532 (planning); N=177 (iron). Sample 75: N=1,333 (total);
N=269 (kids check); N=392 (pregnancy care) N=392 (child birth); N=392 (planning); N=130 (iron). Sample 50: N=902 (total); N=174 (kids
check); N=266 (pregnancy care) N=266 (child birth); N=266 (planning); N=84 (iron).
.
CHAPTER 3. THE EFFECT OF ACCESS TO HEALTH INSURANCE 85
Table 3.24: IV-2SLS at the medians of the subsample distributions
(1) (2) (3)
Median Z 55 Full sample Sample 75% Sample 50%
Estimates Ste. Estimates Ste. Estimates Ste.
First stage: Participation
0 Health Insurance 0.0565 (0.0376) 0.0962** (0.0448) 0.0201 (0.0605)
F = 2.2580 F = 4.6110 F = 0.1104
Second stage: Utilization
1 Doctor visits 0.4775 (0.6780) 0.5318 (0.4824) 3.3836 (10.2383)
2 Medicines -0.2016 (0.6993) -0.0018 (0.4704) 0.1145 (2.9544)
3 Analysis -0.5745 (0.5287) -0.3626 (0.3069) 0.6739 (2.4458)
4 X-rays -0.4274 (0.4173) -0.0856 (0.2040) 0.2626 (1.4581)
5 Other tests 0.0862 (0.1825) 0.1591 (0.1449) 0.0559 (0.8215)
6 Dental care -0.4177 (0.5419) -0.3954 (0.3718) -0.8443 (3.2882)
7 Ophthalmology -0.5347 (0.4869) -0.4431 (0.3073) -2.5184 (7.6159)
8 Glasses -0.2632 (0.3561) -0.2924 (0.2547) -0.5562 (2.1578)
9 Vaccines 1.1538 (0.8391) 1.0150* (0.5260) 4.1314 (12.3479)
10 Kids check 0.4217 (1.5673) 0.0167 (0.6780) 0.1586 (1.6473)
11 Birth control 0.2812 (0.3760) 0.2137 (0.2499) 1.8521 (5.7011)
12 Others 0.5690 (0.7082) 0.6265 (0.5072) 2.0475 (6.7097)
13 Hospital -0.0852 (0.3378) -0.2331 (0.2598) -2.5987 (8.0320)
14 Surgery -0.1892 (0.2907) -0.1578 (0.1944) -1.6656 (5.1437)
15 Pregnancy care -0.3562 (1.9939) 0.1614 (2.1909) -0.6366 (2.1904)
16 Child birth 0.0468 (0.7438) -0.6018 (4.1688) 0.0444 (0.6071)
0’ Medical attention -0.5308 (0.6836) -0.1483 (0.3968) 0.0169 (2.3616)
1’ Doctor visits -0.4659 (0.6575) -0.1038 (0.3908) 0.2919 (2.4170)
2’ Medicines -0.5996 (0.7035) -0.2370 (0.4010) -0.3743 (2.6905)
3’ Analysis -0.4596 (0.4584) -0.2994 (0.2751) 0.7427 (2.5640)
4’ X-rays -0.2538 (0.3328) 0.0032 (0.1912) 0.4809 (1.8283)
5’ Other tests 0.0666 (0.1452) 0.0735 (0.1009) 0.1070 (0.6901)
6’ Planning -1.9868 (8.2431) 3.0745 (18.4645) -2.2867 (7.3510)
7’ Iron 0.6271 (1.5691) -1.0186 (3.1152) 0.4311 (0.6005)
8’ Preventive campaign 0.1187 (0.2777) 0.1202 (0.1928) -1.3088 (4.2166)
Health report
1 Symptom -0.3881 (0.7074) -0.4038 (0.5022) -0.5615 (3.3525)
2 Illness 0.3262 (0.5334) 0.1931 (0.3438) 1.2619 (4.3061)
3 Chronic illness 0.1146 (0.6412) 0.0351 (0.4484) 2.4965 (8.0458)
4 Relapse -0.3406 (0.5205) -0.3980 (0.3831) -0.9860 (3.8291)
5 Accident -0.1475 (0.2292) 0.0225 (0.1384) 0.6733 (2.1438)
6 Num. days with symptom 0.9274 (1.0469) 0.9754 (1.0353) -2.3397 (7.5884)
7 Num. days with illness -1.8098 (1.7281) -1.3920 (1.0875) -10.3284 (31.8735)
8 Num. days with relapse -2.5108 (4.1129) 0.0739 (2.7562) -6.1205 (24.5066)
9 Num. days with accident -2.6958 (2.3248) -1.7203 (1.3669) -2.9640 (12.0069)
.
Notes: IV-2SLS regressions. Standard errors are denoted by Ste. and reported in parentheses. "* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Full: N=2,375
(total); N=286 (kids check); N=650 (pregnancy care); N=650 (child birth); N=649 (planning); N=166 (iron). Sample 75: N=1,788 (total);
N=215 (kids check); N=478 (pregnancy care) N=478 (child birth); N=478 (planning); N=129 (iron). Sample 50: N=1,176 (total); N=140 (kids
check); N=306 (pregnancy care) N=306 (child birth); N=306 (planning); N=78 (iron).
.
CHAPTER 3. THE EFFECT OF ACCESS TO HEALTH INSURANCE 86
Table 3.25: Effect of Health Insurance on Utilization: No Controls and Reduced Samples
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample no controls Sample 75% Sample 50%
Estimates Ste. Estimates Ste. Estimates Ste.
First stage: Participation
0 Health Insurance 0.1385*** (0.0257) 0.1100*** (0.0314) 0.0910** (0.0409)
Second stage: Utilization F = 29.0425 F = 12.2723 F = 4.9504
1 Doctor visits 0.4975** (0.1965) 0.7604** (0.3398) 0.6378 (0.5000)
2 Medicines 0.5044** (0.2072) 0.8826** (0.3689) 0.9097 (0.5781)
3 Analysis 0.2063** (0.0941) 0.3631** (0.1640) 0.1077 (0.2096)
4 X-rays 0.1220* (0.0715) 0.2896** (0.1314) 0.2117 (0.1781)
5 Other tests 0.0476 (0.0420) -0.0134 (0.0636) 0.0147 (0.1097)
6 Dental 0.0818 (0.1249) 0.2933 (0.2079) 0.1092 (0.3005)
7 Ophthalmology 0.0269 (0.0850) 0.0255 (0.1314) -0.2501 (0.2416)
8 Glasses 1/. -0.0405 (0.0705) 0.0042 (0.1026) -0.2307 (0.1891)
9 Vaccines 0.2880** (0.1364) 0.3220 (0.2110) 0.4440 (0.3667)
10 Kids check 0.1645 (0.2955) 0.4880 (1.5819) -0.8043 (2.9582)
11 Birth control -0.1127 (0.0941) -0.1493 (0.1500) -0.0092 (0.2232)
12 Others 0.1859 (0.1653) -0.0896 (0.2475) -0.6426 (0.4753)
13 Hospital 0.1347 (0.0952) 0.3110* (0.1590) 0.3505 (0.2574)
14 Surgery 0.2637*** (0.0902) 0.4407*** (0.1684) 0.4062 (0.2521)
15 Pregnancy care 0.6434** (0.2942) 0.8070 (0.5415) 0.8604 (1.0486)
16 Child birth 0.1787 (0.1615) 0.0628 (0.2654) 0.1559 (0.5088)
(1-16) Any of the above 0.4282** (0.1887) 0.7161** (0.3274) 0.3727 (0.4498)
. .
Notes: 1/. Not covered by SIS. 2/. Full: N=4,161 (total); N=649 (kids check); N=1.182 (pregnancy care); N=1,182 (child birth). 3/. Sample
75: N=3,124 (total); N=499 (kids check); N=892 (pregnancy care) N=892 (child birth). 4/. Sample 50: N=2,078 (total); N=347 (kids check);
N=618 (pregnancy care) N=618 (child birth). 5/. Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Table 3.26: Effect of Health Insurance on Curative and Preventive Uses: No Controls and Reduced
Samples
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample no controls Sample 75% Sample 50%
Estimates Ste. Estimates Ste. Estimates Ste.
Second stage: Utilization
A. Curative (for individuals who had health problems)
0’ Medical attention 0.5424*** (0.1747) 0.7631** (0.3076) 0.6714 (0.4532)
1’ Doctor visits 0.5339*** (0.1736) 0.7463** (0.3038) 0.6081 (0.4373)
2’ Medicines 0.4929*** (0.1683) 0.6930** (0.2930) 0.5155 (0.4150)
3’ Analysis 0.1794** (0.0881) 0.2919** (0.1476) 0.0163 (0.1980)
4’ X-rays 0.0868 (0.0673) 0.2072* (0.1160) 0.1259 (0.1594)
5’ Other tests 0.0377 (0.0324) -0.0096 (0.0485) 0.0313 (0.0810)
13 Hospital 0.1347 (0.0952) 0.3110* (0.1590) 0.3505 (0.2574)
14 Surgery 0.2637*** (0.0902) 0.4407*** (0.1684) 0.4062 (0.2521)
16 Child birth 0.1787 (0.1615) 0.0628 (0.2654) 0.1559 (0.5088)
(1’-5’,6,7,8) Any of the above 0.7069*** (0.1974) 1.0279*** (0.3638) 0.8655* (0.5161)
B. Preventive (for specific groups of individuals)
9 Vaccines 0.2880** (0.1364) 0.3220 (0.2110) 0.4440 (0.3667)
10 Kids check 0.1645 (0.2955) 0.4880 (1.5819) -0.8043 (2.9582)
11 Birth control -0.1127 (0.0941) -0.1493 (0.1500) -0.0092 (0.2232)
15 Pregnancy care 0.6434** (0.2942) 0.8070 (0.5415) 0.8604 (1.0486)
6’ Planning 1/. -0.0270 (0.2455) 0.0426 (0.3875) 0.5890 (0.8563)
7’ Iron 2/. 0.5821 (0.4075) 0.8659 (1.0467) 0.0934 (1.0081)
8’ Preventive
campaign 3/.
0.0403 (0.0699) -0.1115 (0.1046) -0.3091 (0.2045)
(6’-8’,9-11,15) Any of the above 0.2963* (0.1693) 0.2075 (0.2518) 0.1286 (0.3956)
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Table 3.27: Effect of Health Insurance on Health: No Controls and Reduced Samples
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample no controls Sample 75% Sample 50%
Estimates Ste. Estimates Ste. Estimates Ste.
Second stage: Health report
1 Symptom 0.2655 (0.1977) 0.3459 (0.3118) 0.4221 (0.4981)
2 Illness 0.3140** (0.1475) 0.4533* (0.2464) 0.4254 (0.3835)
3 Chronic illness 0.0116 (0.1904) 0.1986 (0.2755) 0.1592 (0.4342)
4 Relapse 0.0295 (0.1157) 0.0756 (0.1804) 0.1869 (0.2917)
5 Accident 0.0773 (0.0603) 0.1947* (0.1054) 0.1381 (0.1536)
6 Num. days with symptom 0.3740 (0.4603) 0.8116 (0.8134) 1.4127 (1.4355)
7 Num. days with illness 0.6131* (0.3713) 0.7287 (0.5268) 0.6967 (0.7140)
8 Num. days with relapse 0.7297 (0.9491) 1.3831 (1.5312) 2.2356 (2.5425)
9 Num. days with accident 0.5432 (0.4562) 1.5373* (0.8913) 1.4919 (1.4427)
Chapter 4
Is utility informative about happiness?
This chapter is a coauthored work with Arthur van Soest and Frederic Vermeulen.1
4.1 Introduction
Two disconnected literatures can be distinguished that focus on concepts like happiness, life satisfaction,
(subjective) well-being, (individual) preferences, and (individual) utility. On the one hand, there is the
blossoming literature that mainly concentrates on the relationship between survey-based answers on
individuals’ subjective well-being and their (relative) income. This literature is characterized by its
rather loose connection with economic theory and by reduced form empirical analyses that focus on
the identification of the impact of (relative) income and various other characteristics on subjective well-
being. See the overview studies by Frey and Stutzer (2002), Kahneman and Krueger (2006), Van Praag
and Ferrer-i Carbonell (2008) and Clark et al. (2008) for detailed discussions and examples. On the
other hand, there is the literature on the intra-household allocation of time and resources that is based
on seminal work by Chiappori (1988). This literature is characterized by a close connection between
economic theory and data and its structural form empirical analyses (see Browning and Chiappori, 1998,
Cherchye et al., 2012, and Dunbar et al., 2013, for only a few examples). One of the aims of this literature
is the identification of the mechanism that governs the intra-household allocation of time and resources
and the identification of individual preferences on the basis of their observed choice behavior.
In this paper, our intention is to close the gap between these two literatures. To do this, we first
estimate a structural model along the lines of Chiappori et al. (2002) that explains the intra-household
allocation of time and resources in couples and allows identifying individual preferences. Secondly,
we relate individual utilities to measures of subjective well-being to analyze whether the former are
informative for the latter.
The paper uses novel and unique data from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences
(LISS), which is a representative panel for the Dutch adult population. The panel does not only contain
detailed information about the intra-household allocation of time use and resources (i.e. food consump-
1We thank seminar participants at the First Annual Congress of the Peruvian Economic Association and University of Piura
for useful comments. Bernal: Netspar, CentER, Tilburg University and University of Piura, e-mail: noelia.bernal@udep.pe. She
is grateful for financial support from Netspar and the Sociale Verzekeringsbank. van Soest: Department of Econometrics and
Operations Research, Tilburg University, e-mail: A.H.O.vanSoest@uvt.nl. Vermeulen: Department of Economics, University
of Leuven, e-mail: frederic.vermeulen@kuleuven.be.
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tion expenditure, private expenditure, leisure time, time spent with children and household work) but
also has extensive information on individual well-being (i.e. happiness) and life and domain-specific
satisfaction (i.e., satisfaction with leisure, work, and the financial situation).
We use two definitions of leisure time. The first definition is called “pure leisure” and it is the time
spent on leisure activities like watching TV, doing sports, traveling and hobbies. The second definition
is called “constructed leisure” and it is defined as the leisure usually focused on in labor supply models
applied to data without detailed information on time use. We compute it by subtracting hours worked
on the labor market from the total hours available minus an assumed amount of time spent on sleeping
and personal care. In the latter definition, time spent on home production activities is defined as leisure
time. We use both definitions to explore whether any specific measure of leisure works best and what is
missed when we focus on an alternative measure.
Results favor the use of the “pure leisure” definition versus the “constructed leisure” one, in line with
the notion that the distinction between leisure and household production matters for welfare analysis
(cf., e.g., Apps and Rees, 2009). Overall, the evidence suggests that individuals’ responses to general
questions of happiness and satisfaction are less correlated with individual utility measures than responses
to more specific questions on domain satisfaction (i.e. related to leisure, work, or the financial situation).
Our interpretation is that when we use a more appropriate definition of leisure (pure leisure), we are able
to identify individual preferences over leisure and consumption which are represented by utility measures
that are more informative about specific aspects of life, in particular in the domains of leisure, work, and
financial situation. By using constructed leisure we only capture this relationship partially, because this
measure does not disentangle genuine leisure from time allocated to children or housework, which might
have different effects on utility and thus leads to different conclusions about the relationship between
well-being and utility.
Ideally, one would expect a positive correlation between utilities and general measures of well-being.
However, the correlation will never be perfect. This is what we find in our analysis. Our individual’s
utility measures use just two inputs: consumption (of food and private personal goods) and leisure. Both
can be argued to be very important inputs for the well-being but they are not the only factors.
Our results are well in line with the literature on the relationship between well-being survey mea-
sures and choices. For instance, Benjamin et al. (2012) provide evidence that individual’s subjective
well-being predictions help to predict their choices and that the strength of this relationship varies de-
pending on, for example, the nature of the choice situations and the subject population. Our results are
in line with this evidence. Our estimation and computation of utilities rely basically on observed choices
of consumption and leisure on the basis of utility maximization. By finding significant relationships
between these utilities and specific satisfaction variables, we contribute to linking well-being measures
to choices. One important difference with the Benjamin et al. (2012) study is that we focus on observed
choices from real situations rather than predicted choices in hypothetical scenarios.
To interpret our results it is also important to note that there could be factors influencing individual’s
responses to well-being questions. For instance, Kahneman and Krueger (2006) have found that happi-
ness reports depend on contexts where questions take place, on the mood of the individuals, on specific
situations individuals experience, memory, and the reference provided. Dolan and Kahneman (2008)
show that, although individuals tend to adapt to changes in their circumstances, they often fail to predict
to which degree they will adapt. Together this evidence implies for our research that the general well-
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being variables we use might include the effect of other factors and life events that are taking place in the
lives of the respondents. Then, naturally, it is more difficult to find significant correlations between these
general reports and our utility measures. A clearer picture arises if we consider satisfaction with several
domains of life, which can be seen as the building blocks of satisfaction with life as a whole (Ferrer-i
Carbonell and Van Praag, 2002, Van Praag et al., 2003). Some of these domains more directly relate to
the arguments of our utility function, and it is there that we indeed find significant positive correlations
with our utility measures.
We proceed as follows. After discussing our conceptual framework in Section 4.2, Section 4.3 pro-
vides information on our data and explores the main statistics. In Section 4.4 we formally describe the
empirical approach and the results are presented in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 conducts an analysis to as-
sess whether the results are sensitive to the particular specifications we use. Section 4.7 concludes and
discusses some limitations of our study.
4.2 Theoretical model
Our aim in this study is to relate individual subjective well-being measures to individual utilities. Many
social surveys nowadays contain questions about individual life satisfaction, happiness or well-being.
The survey we will make use of is one of the numerous examples in this respect. Much more difficult is
obtaining information on individuals’s utilities as cardinal representations of their preferences. An often
used approach is to make use of observed choice behavior to identify preferences. For example, it is
a standard result in microeconomics that one can identify a decision maker’s preferences over leisure
and consumption goods by means of observed labor supply and consumption choices as functions of the
decision maker’s resources, wages and prices.
A first problem is raised with respect to the definition of the decision makers in multi-person house-
holds. In the standard unitary model, a household is seen as the decision maker. This household then is
assumed to have rational preferences over the household members’ leisure and household consumption,
which are represented by a well-behaved household utility function. The household’s choices then are
the result from the maximization of its utility function subject to a household budget constraint. One
difficulty with this approach is that there is a lot of empirical evidence that this unitary model does not
fit the data for multi-person households very well. The unitary model’s theoretical implications are of-
ten rejected when they are tested on data that are related to multi-person households (see, for example,
Browning and Chiappori, 1998, Cherchye and Vermeulen, 2008, Cherchye et al., 2009, and Cherchye
et al., 2011). Given that the unitary model works well to model singles’ labor supply and consumption
behavior (see Browning and Chiappori, 1998, and Cherchye et al., 2009), the evidence suggests that the
aggregation of rational individual preferences into household preferences is problematic.
This brings us immediately to a second problem given our research question. Measures of subjective
well-being are by default individual-specific. Utilities obtained through the above discussed standard mi-
croeconomic approach are household specific. Only when the household consists of a single individual,
preferences, and the utility function that represents the latter, are individual specific. Note that this is a
general problem: even in the case when the unitary model would work well for multi-person households,
there is the issue that one cannot say anything about the household members’ preferences on the basis
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of the household’s preferences without overly strong assumptions (like the often made assumption that
every household member is equally well-off).
A particularly interesting alternative approach to the unitary model has been proposed by Chiap-
pori (1988, 1992). This alternative, the so-called collective model, explicitly accounts of the fact that a
multi-person household consists of several individuals who have their own rational preferences. These
individuals are assumed to be involved in some intra-household bargaining process that gives rise to
Pareto-efficient intra-household allocations. As demonstrated by Chiappori (1988), individual prefer-
ences and the sharing rule (which governs the allocation of the household’s resources to its members)
can be identified if there is one “exclusive good” per household member, affecting utility of that member
only (see Chiappori and Ekeland, 2009, for identification results in more general settings).
The importance of the identification results associated with the collective model is that they in prin-
ciple allow to identify individual utilities (as a representation of individual preferences) on the basis
of household level data under some exclusivity assumption. It is exactly in these utilities that we are
interested given our research question.
Let us next demonstrate how we will proceed in practice. In what follows, we will focus on couples.
Female and male spouses are assumed to have egoistic (or Beckerian caring preferences; see Chiappori,
1992) over the own leisure and the own private consumption of a Hicksian good. Let us denote the
female and male spouses’ own leisure by respectively l f and lm, while the consumption of the Hicksian
good is denoted by respectively c f and cm. The spouses’ preferences are assumed to be represented by
the utility functions:
u f = u f (l f ,c f )
um = um(lm,cm).
Each spouse is faced with the following time constraint:
l f +h f = T f
lm +hm = T m.
where hi is hours worked on the labor market and T i is the total available time of spouse i (i = f ,m). As
mentioned in the introduction, we will focus on two types of leisure in the empirical analysis. The first
type (pure leisure) will be the time that remains after subtracting all hours worked (both market work as
well as household work) from the physical time T available (where T i = T   ki with ki spouse i’s time
spent on household work, which is supposed to be fixed).2 The amount of pure leisure is recorded in our
data and contains time spent on leisure activities like watching TV, doing sports, traveling and hobbies.
The second type of leisure (constructed leisure) is the leisure usually focused on in labor supply models
applied to data without detailed time use. It is obtained by subtracting hours worked on the labor market
from the total hours available minus an assumed amount of time spent on sleeping and personal care
(where T i = T ).
2See Cherchye et al. (2012) for a model with completely endogenous time use.
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As it is standard, we will assume that the opportunity cost for an hour of leisure is equal to the
spouses’ hourly wage rates, which are denoted by w f and wm respectively. Further, the couple may have
some nonlabor income that is denoted by y. This results in a household budget constraint that is equal to:
c f + cm +w f l f +wmlm = y+w f T f +wmT m.
As mentioned earlier, the collective model assumes that spouses’ choose Pareto-efficient intra-household
allocations. Given the assumptions made thus far, this implies that the household’s choices result from
the following maximization programme (see Chiappori, 1988):
max
c f ,cm,l f ,lm
u f (l f ,c f )+µ(w f ,wm,y,z)uwm(lm,cm) (4.1)
subject to
c f + cm +w f l f +wmlm = y+w f T f +wmT m
l f +h f = T f
lm +hm = T m.
The function µ(w f ,wm,y,z) is spouse m’s relative Pareto weight, which will in general depend on
the wages, the non-labor income and, possibly, a set of so-called distribution factors z that are variables
that by definition only affect the Pareto weight and not the preferences or the budget constraint (see, e.g.,
Chiappori et al., 2002).
Solving the above optimization programme results in the following demand functions:
l f = gl
f
(w f ,wm,y,z) (4.2)









Given the particular assumptions about the individual preferences and the exclusivity of the goods,
this leads to the following demand functions:
l f = g̃l
f
(w f ,y f +w f T f )
c f = g̃c
f
(w f ,y f +w f T f )







where y f + ym = y and where yi is spouse i’s share of the household’s nonlabor income y. This share is
actually a function that depends on the variables w f ,wm,y and z, and it is directly related to the Pareto
weight. The variable yi +wiT i is then spouse i’s share of the household’s full income.3 The solution
can also be obtained in two stages, where full expenditure shares are determined in the first stage and
individual choices in the second stage. The above demand functions basically come from the following





ci +wili = yi +wiT i
li +hi = T i.
The equivalence between the results that come from these individual maximization programmes and
the optimization programme (1) at the couple’s level is basically an application of the Second Funda-
mental Theorem of Welfare Economics.
Chiappori (1988) demonstrated that one can identify the individual preferences, as represented by u f
and um, up to a translation, and the sharing rule, given by y f and ym = y  y f , up to a constant, on the
basis of the observable functions l f = gl f (w f ,wm,y,z) and lm = glm(w f ,wm,y,z) alone.4
Given the data we have (where also c f and cm are observable functions; see Section 3), we obtain
complete identification without any unobserved constant (see Cherchye et al., 2012). The intuition of
this result is that we observe all the variables needed to bring the individual optimization programmes
(3) to the data (in particular li, ci, wi and yi +wiT i). This allows us to identify the spouses’ preferences
in a standard (unitary model’s) way. A particular issue here though will be that the variable yi +wiT i
(i = f ,m) is endogenous. However, as demonstrated by Cherchye et al. (2014), theory and empirical
analysis are nicely linked to each other here, since we can make use of the natural instruments y and z to
account for this endogeneity issue.
To sum up, the data at hand (discussed in detail in the next section) allow us to identify the individual
utility functions u f (l f ,c f ) and um(lm,cm), which will give us individual utilities for particular leisure-
consumption combinations. The latter will be associated with individual well-being measures. It should
be clear that these utility functions are only one cardinal representation of the spouses’ preferences. Any
other positive monotonic transformation of these utility functions gives rise to exactly the same demand
equations. As a result, we will experiment a bit in the empirical application with different utility functions
(that represent the same preferences) and check whether they are associated with individual well-being
3We use the full income representation here because it is naturally linked to the empirical model of Section 4.4.
4See Chiappori et al. (2002) for the case with distribution factors z.
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measures.
As a final note, let us point to an important caveat. In our empirical application, we will check
whether individual utilities are associated with individual subjective well-being measures. Although one
would expect a positive correlation between the two measures, this correlation will never be perfect, even
if choice behavior with respect to consumption and leisure is perfectly in line with the above theory. The
main reason of this is that utility is derived from only two inputs: leisure and consumption. Both inputs
can be argued to be very important. Still, an individual’s subjective well-being will also be affected
by variables that are not directly captured by the individuals’ utilities, or that can only be potentially
captured in a very indirect way, such as an individual’s health or social interactions. However, all that
we can do by means of the above approach is to identify conditional preferences and no unconditional
preferences over leisure, consumption, health, the amount of social interactions and so forth. Note that
this is basically a similar problem that is faced by the equivalence scale literature (see Pollak and Wales,
1979). Incorporating these domains is beyond the scope of our analysis and is left for further research.
4.3 Data
In this paper we use data from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS). The panel
consists of a sample of 5000 households that are randomly drawn from the population in the Netherlands.
Panel members complete online questionnaires. Households that could not otherwise participate are
provided with a computer and Internet connection. The main part of the LISS panel is the LISS Core
Study, which contains information about changes in people’s lives, reactions to life events, and the effects
of social changes and policy measures. For instance, variables related to demographics, health, work,
politics, economic situation, happiness and satisfaction are gathered. After 2009 questions on time use
and household consumption have been added to the panel, and they are asked to members who are at
least sixteen years old.
We select the years 2009, 2010, and 2012 of the panel because in these years we have all the informa-
tion we need to bring the individual optimization programmes to the data (see equation (4.3) of Section
4.2).5 We make the following selections. First, we define couples as female and male individuals who
are (married or unmarried) cohabitants and both between 25 and 60 years old (for simplicity, we will
refer to them as spouses in the rest of the paper). This selection is done to avoid including students and
retirees. Second, we consider couples in which both spouses perform paid work with positive hours of
work and observed income. Third, we consider couples with and without children. Fourth, we restrict
the sample to those who reported to be head or partner in the household (97 percent of the individuals in
the sample) and those households where both members report information. Finally, we exclude outliers
from the values of consumption, income and leisure.6 Our final sample consists of 456 couples (163
couples in 2009, 142 couples in 2010 and 151 couples in 2012).
All the variables are measured per month. The variable hours worked is defined as the monthly
average hours performed on the job reported in the LISS questionnaire Work and Schooling. There is
some missing information in this variable that we complete by using the hours of work specified in the
5Specifically we use information from the following modules: Background, Time Use and Consumption, Work and School-
ing, Personality, Social Integration and Leisure and Economic Situation (Income).
6We drop information for couples with values below centile 2.5 and above centile 97.5 on these variables (around 10 percent
of the sample).
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labor contract. We also define a labor income variable that considers the gross wage variable reported in
the LISS Income questionnaire and for some missing values that we find, we use a follow-up question
where individuals are asked to place their gross wage in specific intervals.7 The individual’s wage rate
per hour is then computed as the ratio of labor income and hours worked.8
Regarding consumption of the household members, the LISS data provides very detailed information
on expenditures which makes it a unique source (see the module Time Use and Consumption). The
module is based on survey questions on normal individual and household nondurable expenditures per
week. Even though this kind of measure is more noisy than diary based measures, it contains a useful
signal on consumption behavior of household members (see Browning et al., 2003). Specifically, the
questionnaire focuses on two types of consumption: goods and services that can be publicly consumed
by the household as a whole and goods and services that can be privately consumed by the members of
the household. We focus on the latter. We define (individual) private consumption as the sum of those
expenditures made on goods and services related to food and private expenditures in the past month.
The questionnaire has a question where respondents have to indicate how much of the household’s food
and drink expenditures they personally consume. We use this variable. Regarding the personal private
expenditures, we aggregate the categories available in the questionnaire such as food and drinks outside
home, clothing, personal care, schooling and so forth.9
Leisure is defined in two ways. Pure leisure is the time spent on leisure activities like watching TV,
doing sports, traveling and hobbies (thus, does not contain time spent on market work nor household
work). This information is gathered in the LISS data.10 The questionnaire explains and defines different
time use categories and a number of activities as examples. The categories are for instance: paid work,
commuting, home work, personal care, activities with children, leisure activities, schooling, administra-
tive tasks, and others. The sum of individual’s responses to the time spent on all the activities must add
up to 168 hours per week.11 We use the category named leisure activities to define our variable of pure
leisure per month.12 Our second measure of leisure is called constructed leisure and it is defined as the
77 intervals that go from less than 8,000 to 60,000 euros or more per year. We use this information for 14 percent of the
sample.
8Note that the division bias is not a concern here. Hours worked and labor income information comes from the Work and
Schooling and Income questionnaires whereas leisure information comes from the Time Use and Consumption questionnaire.
See Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2012) for a similar approach.
9The private good categories are the following: (1) food and drinks outside home (restaurant, pub, company restaurant, but
no expenditures consumed with (part of) the family; (2) cigarettes and other tobacco products; (3) clothing (clothing, shoes,
jewelry); (4) personal care and services (hair care, body care, manicure, hair dresser’s, but no medical expenditures); (5) medical
expenditures not covered by an insurance (medicines, doctor, dentist, hospital, maternity grant, glasses, hearing device); (6)
leisure activities (film, theater, hobbies, sports, photography, books, CD’s, DVD’s, expenditures related to traveling without
the family); (7) schooling (courses, tuition fees); (8) gifts (to family members, friends, charity); and (9) other expenditures not
mentioned above.
10See the module Time Use and Consumption.
11The precise time use categories used in the questionnaire are as follows: (1) paid work (excluding time spent on com-
muting); (2) commuting (for work or school); (3) home work (cleaning, doing the dishes, cooking, shopping, gardening, do
it yourself, but no tasks related to caring for children or other persons); (4) personal care (washing, dressing, eating, going to
the hairdresser, going to the doctor); (5) activities with children (washing, dressing, playing, reading, going to the doctor); (6)
helping parents (administrative tasks, washing, dressing, going to the doctor); (7) helping other family members (administrative
tasks, washing, dressing, going to the doctor); (8) helping other persons who are not family members (administrative tasks,
washing, dressing, going to the doctor); (9) leisure activities (watching TV, reading, sports, hobbies, visiting friends or family,
traveling, going out); (10) schooling (day or evening education, vocational training, language training); (11) administrative
tasks related to the own household; (12) sleeping and relaxing (sleeping, thinking, meditating); and (13) other activities not
mentioned above.
12Although we do not focus on this, the questionnaire has also information which investigates the joint time spent by spouses
on leisure activities.
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leisure usually focused on in labor supply models applied to data without detailed information on time
use. We compute it by subtracting hours worked on the labor market from the total hours available minus
an assumed amount of time spent on sleeping and personal care, 70 hours per week (see Browning and
Gortz, 2012 for an example of this type of measure).
Total expenditure is then defined as the sum (in euros) of private consumption and the value of leisure
time. Both definitions of leisure lead to a set of two total expenditure options as well. For simplicity, we
suppose that consumption is the numeraire good for which the price is 1 euro and the price of leisure is the
wage rate defined above. This allows us to model choices between these two commodities: consumption
and leisure, depending on simple relative prices. Following the notation of Section 4.2, total expenditure
for each spouse would be: xi = ci +wili with i = f ,m, and it is assumed to be equal to the (individual)
full income, defined as the sum of nonlabor income and the income if total available time would be use
to work (yi +wiT i). We treat this variable as endogenous in our regression analysis and we use two
instruments for it.
The first instrument is the full household income defined as the sum of each spouse full income
(w f + wm)T and the second instrument (our distribution factor z) is the male spouse’ share of asset
income.13 We compute the latter by using information about the male spouse’ individually assignable
income from the total asset income for the household. Specifically this income comes from interest
received from sources such as savings accounts, stocks, bonds, investment accounts and dividends (see
the Income questionnaire).14
The main descriptives are shown in Table 4.1. On average, for the year 2012, we observe that female
spouses are 44.7 years old. A large fraction of them have secondary or college education. Male spouses
are older on average (46.7 years) with similar schooling. Female spouses consume slightly more private
goods and services than male spouses, work fewer hours, have lower wage-rates, and spend less time on
pure leisure (this pattern is similar for all the years). Interestingly, when shifting attention to our measure
of constructed leisure, we observe the opposite. Female spouses have more (constructed) leisure time
than male spouses. The difference is explained mainly by the time spent on children and house work.15
The pure leisure time measure does not include these activities whereas the constructed leisure measure
does. Both definitions will be used in our empirical approach in Section 4.4.
Note also that we observe a set of two total expenditure values in line with the two leisure defini-
tions. Female spouses have lower (higher) total expenditures than male spouses when we use the pure
(constructed) leisure definition. This pattern is observed for all years. Regarding household composition
during the period of analysis, we observe that between 59.9 to 68.2 percent of the couples have children,
and that, on average, around 2 children live at home. The male spouse’s asset income and full household
income are around 244.9 and 15,762.2 euros per month in the last year of analysis, respectively.
Focusing attention on variables related to well-being, the LISS panel provides several variables from
different questionnaires (Personality, Social Integration and Leisure, Work and Schooling and Economic
13Nonlabor y is not included in our measure of full income. We explore this variable and observe that only around 70 percent
of the sample report this information. So, our measure of full income is equivalent to full earnings.
14To handle missing values, we first use follow-up questions where individuals are asked to place the amounts in an interval
instead of reporting specific values (choosing among 7 intervals that go from less than 1,000 to more than 60,000 euros per
year). For the remaining missing values, we use predicted values from an OLS regression of asset income on a set of exogenous
regressors (polynomials of age, labor income and education, as well as gender, household composition and a dummy variable
for benefit receipt).
15On average, female spouses spend 19.0 hours per week on children and 20.6 hours in house work; whereas male spouses
spend 11.6 hours per week on children and 11.2 hours in different tasks at home.
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Table 4.2: Definitions of well-being variables
A. General variables of happiness Scale
Happy 1/. On the whole, how happy would you say you are? 1-10
Satisfied with life at the moment 2/. How satisfied are you with the life you lead at the moment? 1-10
Life is ideal 3/. “..In most ways my life is close to my ideal” 1-7
Life is excellent 3/. “..The conditions of my life are excellent” 1-7
Satisfied with life 3/. “..I am satisfied with my life” 1-7
Got important things in life 3/. “..So far I have gotten the important things I want in life” 1-7
No changes in life 3/. “..If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing” 1-7
Best life 4/. “..On what step would you place yourself?” 1-10
B. Domain-specific variables of satisfaction 5/.
Leisure time How satisfied are you with the amount of leisure time that you have? 0-10
Way of enjoying leisure How satisfied are you with the way in which you spend your leisure time? 0-10
Work How satisfied are you with your current work? 0-10
Type of work How satisfied are you with the type of work that you do? 0-10
Hours of work How satisfied are you with your working hours? 0-10
Wage How satisfied are you with your wages or salary or profit earnings? 0-10
Financial situation How satisfied are you with your financial situation? 0-10
Colleagues How satisfied are you with the general atmosphere among your colleagues? 0-10
Schooling How satisfied are you with the schooling that you have followed? 0-10
Career How satisfied are you with your career so far? 0-10
Notes:
1/. 1 corresponds to totally unhappy and 10 to totally happy.
2/. 1 corresponds to not at all satisfied and 10 to completely satisfied.
3/. The questions are preceded by the following: “Below are five statements with which you may agree or disagree. Using the 1-7 scale,
indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line preceding that item. Please be open and honest in your
responding...” Number 1 corresponds to strongly disagree, 2 to disagree, 3 to slightly disagree, 4 to neither agree nor disagree, 5 to slightly
agree, 6 to agree, and 7 to strongly agree.
4/. The question is preceded by the following: “If you imagine a "ladder of life", where the first step represents the worst possible life and the
tenth step the best possible life, where 1 corresponds to the worst possible and 10 to the best possible life..”.
5/. Responses go from 0 to 10 where 1 corresponds to not at all satisfied and 10 completely (or fully) satisfied.
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Figure 4.1: General variables of happiness
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Figure 4.2: Domain-specific variables of satisfaction
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Figure 4.3: Domain-specific variables of satisfaction (continued)


































Situation - Income). We define two sets of variables: one set that we call “general variables of happiness”
and another set that we call “domain-specific variables of satisfaction”. The specific questions and the
range for the answers are given in Table 4.2.
Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 describe these well-being measures. For most of them, we observe a very
similar pattern for female and male spouses, with no significant differences between them. Both report to
be quite happy or satisfied with life in general (approximately 75 percent reports answers in categories 7,
8, 9 or 10), as is also reflected by the scores they give on agreeing or disagreeing with given statements.
More variation in responses is observed in the variable related to the possibility to change something in
life. It seems that individuals are generally quite happy or satisfied but if it were possible, they would
change some aspects of their life. See Table 4.9 in the Appendix for more descriptives.
For the domain-specific variables, we observe that most individuals report to be very satisfied in the
domains they are asked about. In the domain of leisure, the majority report to be satisfied with the time
they have and the way they spend it. Regarding work and education, they seem satisfied with their wages,
the type of work, working hours, education, and the career they have. A slight difference between female
and male spouses’ answers arises when they are asked about their financial situation though.16
4.4 Empirical Approach
In this paper, we want to relate individual utilities to measures of subjective well-being to analyze whether
the former are informative for the latter. Thus, we first estimate a structural model along the lines of the
model presented in Section 4.2 and obtain measures of individual utilities. We then relate these measures
to those of subjective well-being that we have in our data. We apply the model to the sample of 456
couples. Now, we explain the empirical approach we follow.
We first estimate the demand functions described in equation (4.2) of Section 4.2. As we already
explained, these functions are the results of the individual optimization programmes which are equivalent
to the results of the household maximization programme under particular assumptions. We are able
to do this because we observe in our data all the variables needed in the programmes, in particular,
consumption, leisure, hours worked on the labor market and wages (denoted as ci, li, hi, and wi with
i = f ,m; f for female and m for male). Private consumption ci is defined as the sum of expenditures
16The average score for female spouses is 7.20 and 7.09 for male spouses. See Table 4.9 in the Appendix for more details.
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made on food (personally consumed) and private expenditures on goods such as food and drinks outside
home, clothing, personal care and schooling. Leisure li is defined in two ways. Pure leisure is the time
spent on leisure activities like watching TV, doing sports, traveling and hobbies. Constructed leisure
is computed by subtracting hours worked on the labor market from the total hours available minus an
assumed amount of time spent on sleeping and personal care. The variable hours worked hi is defined
as the average hours performed on the job and wage wi is defined as the wage rate per hour worked
computed as the ratio between labor income and hours worked. Price of private consumption is assumed
to be 1 (numeraire good) and the price of leisure time is assumed to be the wage rate. We choose the
following functional specifications:
ci = g ic +b ic(xi   g ic  wig il ) (4.4)
wili = wig il +b il (xi   g ic  wig il )
where g ij ( j = c, l) would be interpreted as quantities of private consumption and leisure time to which
female and male spouses are in some sense committed (often called subsistence levels). b ij are the propor-
tions of the total expenditure xi, net of total committed expenditure, that are spread over the commodities.
These constants sum up to one. Total expenditure for each spouse xi is the sum of private consumption
and leisure expenditures (ci +wili) and it is assumed to be equal to full income (yi +wiT i). Note that
this is linked to the individual budget constraint, equation (4.3), of the theoretical model of Section 4.2,
where full income is defined as full earnings if total available time would be use to work. The intuition
is that the expenditure, for instance, on food and private goods (which we define as private consumption)
is equal to a certain “base amount” (g ij), plus a certain proportion (b ij) of the supernumerary income
(here total expenditure xi) after subtracting the expenditure needed to purchase the base amount of all
commodities.
This system of demand functions is known in the literature as the Linear Expenditure System - LES
(see Stone, 1954 and Pollak and Wales, 1969) and is appealing to our purpose for three reasons. First,
it has a straightforward and simple interpretation. Second, it is derived from a utility maximization pro-
gramme as the one stated in our theoretical model in Section 4.2. And third, it satisfies three conditions
frequently imposed on demand systems in theoretical work (Stone, 1954). The first one is the additivity
condition, which implies that the sum of the expenditures as given by the system is equal to total expen-
diture on private consumption and leisure time. The second condition is homogeneity, which means that
for both, consumption and leisure, the sum of the total expenditure elasticity and all the price elasticities
is zero. The third condition is symmetry of the substitution matrix (Slutsky condition). In our empirical
analysis, to make these conditions hold, it might be assumed that b ij’s are non-negative, sum up to one
and ci   g ic and li   g il for all individuals. These restrictions ensure that the system in (4) can be derived
from a utility maximization.17
17We are using the general form of the LES Model (see Stone, 1954 for a more detailed exposition). The idea is that
expenditures on individual commodities are expressed as linear functions of total expenditure and prices. But the model might
take a special form. For instance, the expenditure on any commodity could be a fixed proportion of total expenditure regardless
of its price; whereas in the general form each price is introduced into each demand equation. However, it has been demonstrated
in the literature that we could expect the general form gives better results than the special form in situations where quantities
demanded are not below certain levels. See Stone (1954) and Pollak and Wales (1969) for a more detailed explanation and a
discussion of practical issues.
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As we already discussed in Section 4.2, a particular issue here is that the variable yi +wiT i is en-
dogenous (and consequently the variable total expenditure xi). We make use of the natural instruments y
and z to account of this endogeneity issue. Full household labor income and the male spouse’ share of
asset income are used, respectively.18
These are natural instruments because they are related to the individual total income and we argue
they are exogenous. Full household labor income is correlated to the individual total income by con-
struction whereas we can imagine that variations in the share of asset income imply variations in the
individual total income. Exogeneity is verified by getting a p-value of 0.11 for the J-statistic. The main
assumption though is that these instruments do not directly affect preferences. They only have an effect
through consumption. We can argue that variations in the full household labor income and on the share
of asset income are driven by economic circumstances like labor market or financial market events which
might affect consumption levels but not tastes. This assumption is also used, for instance, by Browning
and Gortz (2012) and Browning et al. (1994).19
Observables such as the number of children (chi), age (ai), and two dummies for education (si for
intermediate and gi for college) are assumed to be taste shifter variables of the subsistence levels g ij.
Linear specifications are chosen. We rewrite g ij ( j = c, l) as follows:
g ic = g ic0 + g ic1chi + g ic2ai + g ic3si + g ic4gi (4.5)
g il = g il0 + g il1chi + g il2ai + g il3si + g il4gi
After replacing (4.5) in (4.4) and rearranging we have:
ci = a i0 +a i1xi +a i2wi +a i3chi +a i4chiwi +a i5ai +a i6aiwi +a i7si +a i8siwi +a i9gi +a i10giwi (4.6)
wili = ã i0 + ã i1xi + ã i2wi + ã i3chi + ã i4chiwi + ã i5ai + ã i6aiwi + ã i7si + ã i8siwi + ã i9gi + ã i10giwi
where b ic = a i1, g ic0 =
a i0
1 b ic
, g ic1 =
a i3
1 b ic
, g ic2 =
a i5
1 b ic
, g ic3 =
a i7
1 b ic
, g ic4 =
a i9
1 b ic
are all the parameters we are
interested on from the consumption demand equation and b il = 1 a i1, g il0 = 
a i2
b ic
, g il1 = 
a i4
b ic




g il3 =  
a i8
b ic
, g il4 =  
a i10
b ic
are all the parameters we need from the leisure demand equation.20 Estimations
are done with the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and we put special attention to evaluate if
the conditions from our model hold i.e. ci   g ic, li   g il , b ij   0 and Âb ij = 1.
18Full household labor income is defined as (w f +wm)T and male spouse’s share is the asset income assigned to the husband.
See Section 4.3 for details on the asset income computation.
19The latter have investigated whether wages have an impact on the demand for clothing by single people, controlling for
total expenditure and labor supply. They do not find any significant effect for this potential relationship.
20Note that we only need to estimate one of these equations since we obtain all the parameters we are interested on. For
instance, if we use the consumption demand equation, we analytically and computationally verify that we get the same estimates
using the leisure equation. Intuitively, for given prices and income, any change in consumption demand has to be compensated
by an opposite change in the leisure demand to satisfy the budget constraint (since we only have two goods in our setting).
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We then compute the utility functions that correspond to our empirical model. Two specifications
that represent the same preferences are explored21:
u iA(ci, li) = (ci   g ic)b
i
c(li   g il )b
i
l (4.7)
u iB(ci, li) = b icln(ci   g ic)+b il ln(li   g il )
Note first that under these specifications individuals are assumed to have utilities for different com-
binations of consumption and leisure. Second, note that individuals perceive utilities from the quantities
that exceed the subsistence levels. Thus, for instance, when ci   g ic does not hold, individual utility func-
tions will not be identified. This could be a particular issue for individuals with extremely low levels of
private consumption or leisure time and that is why we restrict our data to individuals with minimum
levels (see Table 4.1 in Section 4.3). Besides that, we also decide to experiment a bit by restricting our
empirical model and imposing the mentioned conditions. So, for example, during the estimation of the
first equation in (4.6) we add another moment condition stating that the difference between the observed
consumption and its subsistence level is positive (ci   g ic   0).22
The reason to do this is twofold. First, methodologically speaking, when ci   g ic does not hold, the
unrestricted model predicts negative consumption and therefore this makes nonsense and utilities cannot
be computed. To find the true demand functions corresponding to the given wages and expenditures for
which the LES functions predicts reasonable consumption, we decide to impose the mentioned condition
during the estimation process in the restricted model. By doing so, we restrict our attention to a region
in which goods are consumed in strictly positive quantities and utilities of many more individuals can
be computed. The second reason is empirical. It seems that imposing this condition plays an important
role for estimating the level of the proportion of the supernumerary expenditure and for some of the
covariates. See Section 4.5 which describes the results for both, the unrestricted model, in which we do
not impose any condition, and the restricted model in which we impose the condition described before.
Finally, following Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters (2004), we use OLS regressions to analyze whether
the values of the two specifications of the individual utility functions have a relationship with the mea-
sures of individual well-being. The relationship with individual domain-specific satisfaction variables is
also explored.23
To summarize, the described model and the data at hand allow us to identify the individual utility
functions u iA(li,ci) and u iB(li,ci), which give us the utilities we need for particular leisure-consumption
combinations for male and female spouses. We then are able to explore whether there is a relationship
between these utilities and individual well-being measures. Although one would expect a positive cor-
relation between the two measures, this correlation might not be perfect. As we already pointed out in
Section 4.2, one reason is that utility is derived from only two inputs: leisure and consumption. No
other domains such as individual’s health or social interactions are captured in our utility specifications.
Another reason could be that our empirical model has a functional form that is restrictive in the sense
21Recall that a utility function that represents a preference relation is not unique and that any increasing transformation of
the original utility function also represents that preference relation. Thus, for our analysis it should not matter whether we use
the original utility function or a positive monotone transformation. We can perfectly choose one of them. This means that both
specifications in equation (4.7) represent the same rational preference relation over own consumption and own leisure (under
the assumption of egoistic preferences).
22In particular, we impose the following conditions: ci   g ic = exp(g ic) and li   g il = exp(g
i
l ).
23The authors state that assuming ordinality or cardinality of happiness scores makes little difference, thus estimation results
through a latent-variable model are close to those of OLS.
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that we impose linearity in the consumption and leisure variables or that the controls we use (i.e. num-
ber of children, age, dummies for education) might also affect the b ij’s. This would mean that b ij will
not be fixed proportion (for all female or male spouses in our sample) but it will be an individual spe-
cific proportion in the demand equations. This is beyond the scope of our analysis and is left for future
research.
4.5 Results
In this section we analyze how variables of well-being are related to utilities. For this, as described in
Section 4.4 above, we first estimate the parameters of the demand system for female and male spouses
by using GMM. Throughout, we control for the number of children living in the household, age and two
dummies for education levels. We also estimate the parameters imposing the conditions described in the
previous section. We then compute utilities using the estimated parameters and conduct OLS regressions
of well-being measures on the computed utilities. We perform all the analysis using two definitions of
leisure: pure leisure and constructed leisure.
4.5.1 Pure leisure
Pure leisure is the defined as the time spent on leisure activities like watching TV, doing sports, traveling
and hobbies (thus, does not contain time spent on market work nor household work). We use this defi-
nition and estimate the parameters of the demand system for female and male spouses given in equation
(4.6) of Section 4.4. Results are shown in Table 4.3. The columns contain the results for female and
male spouses as well as for each commodity i.e., private consumption and leisure time. Two versions of
the empirical model are presented: unrestricted and restricted. The unrestricted version does not impose
any condition to the estimation technique, whereas in the restricted version we impose the conditions de-
scribed in the previous section. The rows show the results for each parameter controlling for the number
of children living in the household, age and two dummies for education levels.
Let us begin by discussing the unrestricted estimates of private consumption. As we can observe, the
committed levels of consumption of male spouses has a significant part explained by a constant, while
the rest of the observables do not seem to play a role. In the case of the subsistence levels of female’s
private consumption the intercept does not play a role but the number of children does. It seems that the
number of children decreases their basic amount of private consumption. The unrestricted estimates of
leisure time demand are consistent with the previous results. They are exactly the opposite to those of
private consumption and together b ic and b il are non-negative and sum up to one. With these estimates,
we obtain average values of the subsistence levels of 337.4 euros for female and 288.7 euros for male
spouses. Note that the conditions (ci   g ic and li   g il ) hold for 162 female spouses and 205 male spouses
(see the last rows of Tables 4.4 and 4.5).
If we shift attention to the restricted version, we observe that now the variables number of children
and college education play an important role on explaining the consumption of male spouses (see the
last two columns of Table 4.3). For them, having more children living at home reduces the basic amount
of consumption and having higher education increases it. In the case of female spouses the presence of
children also decreases the subsistence consumption level but the age increases it. Note that the constant
term plays a smaller role for both spouses whereas the values of b ic increase significantly (from 0.07 to
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0.34 for females and from 0.05 to 0.22 for males). Note also that with these estimates, the average values
of the subsistence levels are lower than before and that the conditions hold for the majority of individuals
(324 female spouses and 353 male spouses).
Next, we examine the relationship between individual utilities and measures of well-being. We
compute individual utilities using the estimated parameters shown in Table 4.3 and equations (4.7). Two
specifications of the utilities are used: u iA(li,ci) and u iB(li,ci). The first specification strictly corresponds
to our empirical model whereas the second specification is just a positive monotonic transformation that
represents the same preferences. The different measures of well-being are divided in two groups. The
first group contains 8 measures that we call general variables of happiness and the second group contains
10 measures of well-being that we call domain-specific variables of satisfaction (see Table 4.2 for the
exact definitions). We conduct OLS regressions of all these measures on the computed utilities and
explore whether there is an association between them. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 provide the results.24
Let discuss first the results for the general variables of happiness. Table 4.4 shows that, in general,
there is no clear evidence of significant relationship between utilities and general measures of happiness.
This is true for both versions of the model: unrestricted and restricted. The specific way the questions
are formulated in the survey, either in a direct or indirect way, makes little difference to the results. For
instance, individual’s responses to direct questions such as: “on the whole, how happy would you say
you are?”, or “how satisfied are you with the life you lead at the moment?” seem not to be related to the
different specifications of utilities. The only exception arises for female spouses. Utilities (under the two
specifications and versions of the model) seem to be positively correlated to their scores of satisfaction
with the life at the moment. On the other hand, when questions are formulated in a more indirect way
such that the individual gives a number that indicates how much she (he) agrees with given statements
(for instance, “in most ways my life is close to my ideal”), we find similar patterns: no significant
correlations between utilities and these measures.25
Ideally, one would have expected a positive correlation between utilities and measures of well-being.
On the one hand, since the measures of well-being comes from a representative survey and from individ-
ual’s responses to direct questions, these measures should contain indications of individual’s evaluation
of her (his) own happiness and satisfaction (see for example Frey and Stutzer (2002)). On the other hand,
our computed utilities, by using two very important inputs such as consumption (of food and private per-
sonal goods) and leisure, are a good instrument to assign a numeric measure associated to preferences.
However, the correlation between these two good measures is not necessarily perfect. The main reason of
this is that an individual’s subjective well-being might also be affected by variables that are not directly
captured by the individuals’ utilities, or that can only be potentially captured in a very indirect way. For
example, an individual’s health status or personal relationships may affect her or his choices with respect


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CHAPTER 4. IS UTILITY INFORMATIVE ABOUT HAPPINESS? 110
to leisure and consumption. Our model is unable to capture that.
The story becomes much more interesting when we explore the well-being of individuals in specific
situations. Table 4.5 reports the results. We observe a positive and significant correlation between our
utility measures and some domain-specific variables of satisfaction, in particular, the domains of leisure,
work and financial situation. In the domain of leisure, both specifications of utility for both male and
female spouses seem to be positively correlated to their scores of satisfaction with the amount of leisure
time and of the way to spend it. There are some small differences by specification of the model and
utility though. In the unrestricted version, the first specification of utility performs better than the second
specification (in logarithms), whereas in the restricted version there is little difference between them.26
In the latter, there seems to be a difference between female and male spouses regarding satisfaction with
the amount of leisure time. The significant correlation found for male spouses in the unrestricted version
disappears; although the sign remains positive.
Shifting attention to the domain of financial situation, there is some evidence that our utility measures
are significantly and positively correlated with responses to the question: “How satisfied are you with
your financial situation?” for both male and female spouses. Under the unrestricted model, utilities
of male spouses seem to be informative about their responses about satisfaction with their financial
situation. For female spouses, utilities do not seem to be informative. Only in the restricted version this
seems to be the case.
In the domain of work, there are some evidence of positive correlations for female spouses. In
particular, our measures of utilities using the first specification in the restricted model seem to have a
positive and significant relationship with responses related to the following questions: “how satisfied
are you with your current work?”, and “how satisfied are you with the type of work that you do?”. No
evidence is found for male spouses. There are also some positive correlation between our utility measures
and the level of education attained by female spouses, but it seems to be significant only when we use
the unrestricted model.
To summarize, the evidence we found suggests that individuals’ responses to questions of general
well-being (e.g., happiness) are less likely to be correlated with our individual utility measures; whereas
responses to more specific questions of satisfaction (for instance, those in the domains of leisure, work
and financial situation) are more likely to be associated to utilities.
4.5.2 Constructed leisure
The picture that emerged in the previous analysis might depend on the particular definition of leisure
we have used e.g., pure leisure. Thus, we construct another measure of leisure. This second measure
24We do not include controls in these regressions but in Section 4.6 we explore them controlling for the number of children
living in the household, age and two dummies for education levels. Other controls are explored as well. In principle, the
inclusion of controls should not matter for the estimation of the relationship (if there is any) between well-being and utilities.
However, if the estimates do change in an important way it might indicate that something else is going on. We verify that this
is not an problem in our case. Significances, magnitudes and signs of almost all variables remain.
25Note that we also find a negative correlation result between utilities and the variable called “No changes in life” for male
spouses in the restricted model. Recall that the latter contains numbers that represent the level of agreement to the following
statement: “if I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing”. Although this result might sound counterintuitive, we
interpret it through the lens of our theoretical model which suggests that this subjective well-being measure is probably affected
by variables that are not directly captured by our measures of utility, or that can only be potentially captured in a very indirect
way.
26See equation (4.7) in Section 4.4. First specification: u iA(ci, li) = (ci   g ic)b
i
c (li   g il )
b il . Second specification: u iB(ci, li) =
b icln(ci   g ic)+b il ln(li   g il ).
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(constructed leisure) is the leisure usually focused on in labor supply models applied to data without
detailed time use. We compute it by subtracting hours worked on the labor market from the total hours
available minus an assumed amount of time spent on sleeping and personal care. This might shed some
light on which measure of leisure works best and what is missed when we focus on an inappropriate
measure. Tables 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 show the results.
Let us start with the results of the demand system estimation (Table 4.6). Similar to the case of pure
leisure, in the unrestricted version of the model, the base level of consumption of male spouses has a
significant part explained by a constant. Controls such as the number of children, age and education do
not seem to have a significant impact on it. In the case of female’s private consumption, nothing seems
to play an important role. Regarding the conditions: b ij   0 and Âb
f
j = 1 (b mj = 1) with (i = f ,m) and
( j = c, l), we verify that they hold but we observe a change in the size. They are relatively larger than
the corresponding estimate results in Table 4.3, especially for female spouses. It seems that, when we
use the measure of constructed leisure, female spouses show a larger proportion of their consumption
explained by the supernumerary expenditure. Similar as before, we verify that the conditions ci   g ic and
li   g il holds only for a relatively small sample of our data. Thus, in the restricted model we impose these
conditions and verify that they hold for a larger number of individuals (see last rows of Tables 4.7 and
4.8). Now (and similar to the case of pure leisure), having more children living at home reduces the basic
amount of consumption of both female and male spouses. Consistently with the new way of measuring
leisure, the g il ’s associated with the demand of leisure are also larger than the ones in Table 4.3, which
suggests relatively larger committed expenditures on leisure.
Let us now focus our attention on the relationship between utilities obtained using these estimates
and the measures of well-being. Similar as before, Table 4.7 shows that there is hardly any significant
relationship between utility values and general variables of happiness. The only exception seems to be
-for male spouses in the unrestricted model- the variable that measures in what step of a “ladder of life”
individuals place themselves. It seems that there is a positive association between their responses and our
measures of utilities. No conclusive results are found for the rest of variables under both specifications of
the model and utilities (see Table 4.2 in Section 4.3 for more details on the definitions of the variables).
Table 4.8 shows the OLS regressions of domain-specific variables of satisfaction on our measures of
utilities. We find that utilities under both specifications are informative about satisfaction with leisure
time, for both female and male spouses, under the unrestricted version of the model. In the restricted
version, only utilities of female spouses are correlated to satisfaction with leisure.27
To sum up, our results using the second measure of leisure suggest that satisfaction with leisure time
is the only well-being variable that is associated with our utility measures.
Taken together, our interpretation (of both analysis using pure leisure and constructed leisure) is that
when we use more appropriate definitions of leisure (e.g., pure), we are able to have utility measures
that are more informative about the well-being of individuals in specific situations, in particular in the
domains of leisure, work and financial situation. On the contrary, by using a constructed measure of
leisure we are only able to capture this relationship in a partial way. In the domain of leisure, note for
instance that we only have significant correlation for leisure time and not for the way individuals enjoy
it. This is probably explained because the constructed measure does not disentangle time allocated to
27Note that there seems to be a negative correlation between utilities and satisfaction with respect to career for female
spouses in the restricted model. We argue that this subjective measure is affected by variables that are not captured by our
utility measures.
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children or to house work, which might have different effects on utility and then in the relationship with
happiness. Time spent on children might increase utility and be positively correlated to happiness and
satisfaction, whereas time allocated to house work might decrease utility and be negatively correlated to
happiness. Whether the first effect is bigger or smaller than the second one remains unknown. Thus, since
our pure leisure definition is not affected by these effects, we argue it works better than the constructed
one when we want to evaluate behavior and satisfaction of the households. Note also that by using
the constructed measure of leisure we fail to capture the effects in the domains of work and financial
situation. In the case of the more general variables of well-being, it seems that this is more difficult to
capture their relationship with utilities irrespective of the definitions of leisure we use.
4.6 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, after having presented the main results, we assess whether the results are sensitive to
the particular specifications we have used. We start by including two additional control variables in
the demand system estimation. We then explore the OLS regression of well-being variables on utilities
(computed using the new estimates) controlling for different sets of variables which lead to different
specifications for these regressions as well. For simplicity, we only conduct the analysis using the pure
leisure definition and show the results for the consumption equation.
Tables 4.10 and 4.11 in the Appendix show the results for the demand system estimation. Both ver-
sions of the model are considered: unrestricted and restricted. Specification (1) is the same specification
we have used in Table 4.3 in which we control for the number of children living in the household, age
and two dummies for education levels. We keep it here for the purpose of comparison. In the second
specification (2) we add a dummy that indicates whether both spouses work full time in the labor market,
whereas in the third specification (3) we consider another dummy that indicates whether the couple has
children below eight years old living at home. Results indicate that none of these additional variables
seem to play a role in the unrestricted model (see Table 4.10) whereas working full-time seems to be
important for the basic demand of consumption for both spouses in the restricted model (see Table 4.11).
The rest of our main results remain qualitatively the same.
Shifting attention to the well-being variables, Tables 4.12 and 4.13 in the Appendix show the results
for the OLS regressions of general variables of happiness on utilities (computed using the new estimates
found in Tables 4.10 and 4.11, respectively). We do not include controls yet. What we observe is that, as
in our main analysis, there is no clear evidence of significant relationship between utilities and general
measures of happiness. This is true for both versions of the model: unrestricted and restricted. A notable
exception seems to be the variable satisfaction with life at the moment for female spouses. Utilities
(under both versions of the model) seem to be positively correlated to their scores on this variable. When
we include controls in these regressions (see Tables 4.14 and 4.15) we find basically similar results.
We then explore the OLS regressions of domain-specific variables of satisfaction on our computed
utilities. Tables 4.16, 4.17, 4.18 and 4.19 in the Appendix report the results for the unrestricted and
restricted version of the model and without and with controls, respectively. We confirm our main results.
There seems to be positive and significant correlations between our utility measures and some domain-
specific variables of satisfaction, in particular, variables on the domains of leisure, work and financial
situation. Note that this correlations remain for the different specifications we explored ((1), (2) and (3))
and different versions of the model. Although the results are slightly better in the restricted model. There
CHAPTER 4. IS UTILITY INFORMATIVE ABOUT HAPPINESS? 116
are also some positive correlation between our utility measures and the level of education of female
spouses, but it seems to be significant only when we use the unrestricted model. When we include
controls we see that the main conclusions we have drawn remain the same (see Tables 4.18 and 4.19),
which would indicate that our results do not seem to be sensitive to whether or not we control for it in
our analysis.
It is important to relate our main findings to the literature. Usually, in the literature that use well-
being survey data, it is assumed that subjective well-being measures are an empirical proxy for utility,
and that individual’s responses reveal what they would choose if they were well informed about the
consequences of their choices. For instance, Benjamin et al. (2012) provide evidence that individual’s
subjective well-being predictions are predictor of their choices and that the strength of this relationship
varies depending on, for example, choice situations and subject populations. Our results are in line with
this evidence. Recall that our estimation and computation of utilities relies basically on observed choices
of consumption and leisure, and those choices come from a utility maximization, therefore by finding
significant relationships between these utilities and specific satisfaction variables, we contribute to link
well-being measures to choices. Importantly for us, the study of Benjamin et al. (2012) also finds that
the life satisfaction measure is a better predictor of choice than the happiness measure, which is similar
to our case because we find stronger relationships between utilities and specific variables of satisfaction
than the relationships between utilities and general happiness. One important difference with this study
is that we focus on observed choices from real situations rather than predicted choices in hypothetical
scenarios (see also Benjamin et al., 2013 for a recent analysis on the relationship between preference-
based marginal rates of substitution and well-being survey data).
Related to this literature, it is also important to note that there could be factors influencing individ-
ual’s responses to well-being questions. For instance, Kahneman and Krueger (2006) have found that
happiness reports depend on contexts where questions take place, on the mood of the individuals, spe-
cific situations individuals experience, memory, and the reference provided (see also Diener et al., 1985
for more details on how individuals create references to respond to life satisfaction questions). Dolan
and Kahneman (2008) show that, although individual’s tend to adapt to changes in their circumstances,
they often fail to predict in which degree they will adapt. This evidence will imply for our case that the
well-being variables we use might include the effect of other factors and life events that are taking place
in the lives of the respondents.28 If that is true, then it would be more difficult for our utility measures
to be significantly correlated to these general reports. The authors also point out to be careful when
exploiting individual’s satisfaction ratings because they are somehow likely to come from whatever the
respondent’s attention is drawn at the time of the assessment. Relating this to our results, perhaps, for
these type of reasons our measures of utility fail to be strongly informative about the general variables of
well-being which are directly influenced by these factors. On the contrary, as we find, when individuals
are forced to think their well-being answers within specific domains (i.e. leisure, work and financial
circumstances), our utility measures are more informative.
As a final note, it seems that incorporating alternative methods to measure the subjective well-being
has been in the scope of the literature. For instance, Knabe et al. (2010) suggest that instead of asking
about their life satisfaction one could ask about the strength of emotions that individuals face in spe-
28For example, Lucas et al. (2003) find that, on average, individuals experience an increase in happiness in the years close to
marriage but after some time they appear to return to their baseline. Related to our utility measures, this effect is not necessarily
reflected in their choices about consumption and leisure.
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cific situations in a day-to-day basis. This is called “The Day Reconstruction Method (DRM)”. The
authors argue that this tool, based on concrete activities, reduce the presence of abstract issues such as
the transcendental purpose of life or social comparisons.29 It is probably more natural to expect some
relationship between these type of new measures and our utilities which are also constructed based on
concrete choices on consumption and leisure.30 This all seem very appealing and is left for future re-
search.
4.7 Conclusions
In this paper we want to relate individual subjective well-being measures and individual utilities. The
measures of subjective well-being are by default individual specific and are available in the LISS data.
The utility measures instead need to be constructed. To do that, we estimate a structural model along the
lines of the collective model of Chiappori et al. (2002). This approach allows us to identify individual
preferences and represent them by individual utilities on the basis of household level data and some
specific assumptions. We use exactly these individual utilities to explore whether they are correlated
with well-being measures. Our estimations are done with GMM for the model, and OLS regressions for
the relationship between utilities and well-being.
We exploit two definitions of leisure time. Pure leisure is the time spent on leisure activities like
watching TV, doing sports, traveling and hobbies, whereas constructed leisure is the leisure usually
focused on in labor supply models applied to data without detailed information on time use.
Overall, we find that when we use more appropriate definitions of leisure (pure), we are able to
identify individual preferences over leisure and consumption which are represented by utility measures
that are more informative about specific situations, in particular in the domains of leisure, work and
financial situation. By using a constructed measure we are only able to capture this relationship in a
partial way. This finding sheds light on how important it is to accurately measure the leisure variable
in microeconomic and labor supply models. It seems that, when we do not use a genuine measure, we
cannot fully capture behavior of individuals because this measure does not disentangle pure leisure from
time allocated to children or housework; whereas, when we use an accurate measure, we are able to
identify individual preferences and have different conclusions about their relationship with well-being.
Our results are well in line with the literature of well-being and choices (see for instance Benjamin
et al., 2012 and Benjamin et al., 2013). Our estimation and computation of utilities relies basically on
observed choices of consumption and leisure, and since these choices come from a utility maximization,
therefore, we contribute to link well-being measures to choices. It seems that when individuals are forced
to think their well-being answers within specific domains (i.e. leisure, work and financial circumstances),
utility measures obtained through their choices are more informative about their satisfaction.
29They use this tool in Germany for both employed and unemployed individuals. Results show that unemployed persons
report lower levels of satisfaction with their lives in general. Employed people rank working and work-related activities among
the least enjoyable activities but experience more positive feelings than the unemployed when performing similar activities.
However, when comparing utilities, not much difference is found. They use different measures of experienced utility (proposed
byDolan and Kahneman, 2008 and which requires people to state how they feel when performing various activities on the
previous day). Unemployed seem to compensate the gap from the time spent on similar activities by using doing more enjoyable
activities (during the time which the employed have to work).
30Kahneman and Deaton (2010) also provide an interesting study which distinguishes two aspects of well-being. The first
one is emotional well-being that comes from everyday individual’s experience and the second one is life evaluation in general.
Interestingly for us, one of their findings is that high income buys life satisfaction but not happiness and that low income is
associated with low life satisfaction and low emotional well-being.
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In the case of the relationship between utilities and general variables of well-being, it seems that this
is more difficult to capture irrespective of the definitions of leisure we use. The main reason to have
only an imperfect correlation is that our individual’s utility measures use just two inputs: consumption
and leisure. Another reason could be that there are some factors influencing individual’s responses to
well-being questions. The literature in this respect have found that happiness reports depend on factors
such as contexts where questions take place, on the mood of the individuals, and so on (see for instance
Kahneman and Krueger, 2006 and Dolan and Kahneman, 2008). This implies for our case that the well-
being variables we use might include the effect of other factors and life events that are taking place in the
lives of the respondents. Then, naturally, it is more difficult for our utility measures to be significantly
correlated to these general reports.
To incorporate new domains in our utility functions (such as health or social interactions) and to ex-
plore new measures of the subjective well-being (for example using data from DRM approach suggested
by Knabe et al., 2010) seems appealing but it is beyond the scope of our analysis and is left for future
research.
CHAPTER 4. IS UTILITY INFORMATIVE ABOUT HAPPINESS? 119
Appendix
A Descriptive statistics of well-being
Table 4.9: Descriptive statistics of well-being variables
Female Male
Mean St. D. Min. Max. Mean St. D. Min. Max.
A. General variables of happiness
Happy 1/. 7.905702 0.9174082 3 10 7.881579 0.8740524 3 10
Satisfied with life at the moment 2/. 7.817982 1.011899 2 10 7.848684 0.9097267 5 10
Life is ideal 3/. 5.453947 1.008789 1 7 5.317982 0.9708867 1 7
Life is excellent 3/. 5.550439 1.010755 1 7 5.482456 0.8410611 2 7
Satisfied with life 3/. 5.809211 0.8232892 2 7 5.714912 0.7913524 2 7
Got important things in life 3/. 5.609649 1.095964 1 7 5.535088 1.028643 1 7
No changes in life 3/. 4.91886 1.407982 1 7 4.72807 1.428348 1 7
Best life 4/. 7.633772 0.7757873 5 10 7.546053 0.8758455 3 10
B. Domain-specific variables of satisfaction 5/.
Leisure time 6.651316 1.930415 0 10 6.622807 1.747289 0 10
Way of enjoying leisure 6.822368 1.635198 0 10 7.050439 1.485342 1 10
Work 7.460526 1.32871 0 10 7.399123 1.429178 0 10
Type of work 7.565789 1.389147 0 10 7.554825 1.491831 0 10
Hours of work 7.66886 1.50676 0 10 7.497807 1.557681 0 10
Wage 6.75 1.647842 0 10 6.91886 1.668057 0 10
Financial situation 7.201754 1.155435 1 10 7.087719 1.119744 0 10
Colleagues 7.576577 1.335736 2 10 7.525727 1.421688 0 10
Schooling 7.25 1.5173 0 10 7.219298 1.598124 0 10
Career 7.278509 1.430922 0 10 7.339912 1.331209 1 10
Notes:
1/. 1 corresponds to totally unhappy and 10 to totally happy.
2/. 1 corresponds to not at all satisfied and 10 to completely satisfied.
3/. The questions are preceded by the following: “Below are five statements with which you may agree or disagree. Using the 1-7 scale,
indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line preceding that item. Please be open and honest in your
responding...” Number 1 corresponds to strongly disagree, 2 to disagree, 3 to slightly disagree, 4 to neither agree nor disagree, 5 to slightly
agree, 6 to agree, and 7 to strongly agree.
4/. The question is preceded by the following: “If you imagine a "ladder of life", where the first step represents the worst possible life and the
tenth step the best possible life, where 1 corresponds to the worst possible and 10 to the best possible life..”.
5/. Responses go from 0 to 10 where 1 corresponds to not at all satisfied and 10 completely (or fully) satisfied.
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B Additional Demand System Estimations
Table 4.10: Private consumption equation (pure leisure) - Unrestricted specifications
Pure leisure 1/. Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
â i0 (constant) 286.6960* 220.1555 268.2416 625.4842*** 611.9720*** 712.2892***
(149.4164) (151.3284) (180.1246) (183.3323) (186.6574) (211.3274)
â i1 = b
i
j(total expenditure) 0.0734 0.0972 0.0886 0.0564 0.0456 0.0540
(0.0688) (0.0759) (0.0998) (0.0678) (0.0600) (0.0490)
â i2(wage) -6.9291 -8.5755 -13.8992 -21.5250 -20.3526 -27.0003*
(9.0233) (11.4349) (21.4208) (17.5137) (17.8938) (15.3113)
â i3(children) -42.6081** -29.7623 -29.0587 -18.7064 -9.1715 -2.4378
(21.5902) (23.6837) (24.8895) (25.3485) (24.8090) (28.2662)
â i4(children*wage) 1.9662 2.0536 1.6177 0.5183 0.1899 0.0278
(1.7033) (2.0307) (2.1312) (1.6985) (1.6713) (1.7099)
â i5(age) 2.6925 3.2383 2.4413 -5.6739 -6.0537* -7.8830**
(3.0924) (3.0710) (3.6229) (3.6360) (3.5843) (3.9264)
â i6(age*wage) -0.1286 -0.1753 -0.0507 0.2420 0.2635 0.3570*
(0.2210) (0.2135) (0.2000) (0.1891) (0.1889) (0.2009)
â i7(second. educ.) -63.7091 -108.5082 -110.8378 -127.3928 -113.9724 -123.9519
(71.8909) (78.0835) (98.4106) (91.2717) (86.4136) (81.0747)
â i8(second. educ.*wage) 5.1092 8.0454 8.2180 7.8060 6.8557 7.4631
(5.3555) (5.8544) (7.9028) (5.4537) (5.0743) (4.6234)
â i9(college educ.) -53.1834 -69.1515 -69.3271 -69.0992 -76.3135 -79.6792
(70.3764) (70.6230) (73.4668) (83.3515) (78.2000) (83.3581)
â i10(college educ.*wage) 2.6775 2.8644 2.9446 5.2732 5.3655 5.4763
(4.0397) (3.9356) (4.1003) (4.0654) (3.8570) (4.0807)
â i11(full-time) 101.7381* 105.3169* 48.3190 36.4836
(57.9891) (59.5350) (72.6047) (65.2911)
â i12(full-time*wage) -0.6385 -0.6576 0.7824 1.4737
(4.3445) (5.3511) (4.2942) (3.7080)
â i13(children8) -15.6806 -63.6067
(74.1726) (82.3891)
â i14(children8*wage) 3.4310 3.1906
(5.9728) (3.7538)
Hansen’s J chi2(2) p = 0.1155 p = 0.1416 p = 0.0920 p = 0.1155 p = 0.1416 p = 0.0920
g ij (subsistence level) 2/. 337.3822 331.0603 338.9559 288.6494 284.3220 285.3359
(71.2596) (96.2520) (97.1756) (76.3929) (77.7507) (83.8547)
Notes:
1/. Model using pure leisure definition, iterative gmm estimator, male’s share of asset income and full household income as instruments for
total expenditure, all other regressors as instruments for themselves, standard errors in parenthesis. 2/. Average value and standard deviations
in parenthesis.
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Table 4.11: Private consumption equation (pure leisure) - Restricted specifications
Pure leisure 1/. Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
â i0 (constant) 3.7965*** 3.6469*** 3.7472*** 4.5801*** 4.6699*** 4.7838***
(0.4584) (0.4586) (0.5088) (0.4768) (0.3781) (0.3437)
â i1 = b
i
j(total expenditure) 0.3409*** 0.3588*** 0.3484*** 0.2269*** 0.2009*** 0.1965***
(0.0786) (0.0795) (0.0870) (0.0785) (0.0617) (0.0536)
â i2(wage) -20.5507* -29.1713** -44.3055** -19.5546 -18.2849 -23.1646
(11.8134) (12.9774) (19.3242) (16.7458) (14.1274) (14.2485)
â i3(children) -0.0460*** -0.0362*** -0.0332** -0.0634*** -0.0559*** -0.0480**
(0.0143) (0.0138) (0.0145) (0.0185) (0.0188) (0.0197)
â i4(children*wage) 3.0717** 4.3839*** 3.0410** 2.2295 2.3906* 1.8981*
(1.4100) (1.5866) (1.3901) (1.4130) (1.2593) (1.0809)
â i5(age) 0.0034** 0.0036** 0.0028 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0021
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0024)
â i6(age*wage) -0.3235** -0.2976** 0.0271 -0.0645 -0.0466 0.0594
(0.1454) (0.1440) (0.1429) (0.1113) (0.1001) (0.1227)
â i7(second. educ.) 0.0032 -0.0009 -0.0005 0.0217 0.0235 0.0178
(0.0342) (0.0330) (0.0336) (0.0487) (0.0501) (0.0504)
â i8(second. educ.*wage) 4.6211 5.1119 5.6188 3.6851 3.0371 3.2017
(3.3644) (3.4336) (3.5655) (2.9580) (2.5300) (2.4450)
â i9(college educ.) -0.0001 -0.0159 -0.0128 0.1033** 0.1054** 0.1027**
(0.0344) (0.0337) (0.0343) (0.0482) (0.0490) (0.0491)
â i10(college educ.*wage) -3.5840 -5.7028** -6.0286** -0.0278 -0.3933 -0.5253
(2.7572) (2.7717) (2.6513) (2.3683) (2.0956) (2.0401)
â i11(full-time) 0.0854*** 0.0800** 0.0987** 0.0879**
(0.0301) (0.0315) (0.0402) (0.0412)
â i12(full-time*wage) 11.8857*** 13.3477*** 6.5881*** 6.9850***
(3.1624) (3.6829) (2.1612) (2.1279)
â i13(children8) -0.0342 -0.0664
(0.0422) (0.0561)
â i14(children8*wage) 11.4253** 4.4101*
(4.7368) (2.5601)
g ij (subsistence level) 2/. 5.8984 5.8977 5.8959 5.8311 5.8285 5.8276
(0.0937) (0.1123) (0.1140) (0.1058) (0.1200) (0.1225)
Notes:
1/. Model using pure leisure definition, iterative gmm estimator, male’s share of asset income and full household income as instruments for total
expenditure, all other regressors as instruments for themselves, standard errors in parenthesis. Restricted version assumes: g ic = ci   exp(g ic)
and g il = l
i   exp(g il ). 2/. Average value and standard deviations in parenthesis.
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